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I7TßODUCT IO2T. 
Since 1803 there has been discussion over the 
powers of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Those who favor judicial review of legislative acts 
regard the Justices of the Supreme Court as the 
guardians of the Constitution; those who oppose it 
speak of " judicial usurpation of executive and legis 
lative powers." 
When Sir Henry Maine stated, " The success of 
this experiment (judicial review) has blinded men 
to its novelty. There is no precedent for it, either 
(1) 
in the ancient or in the modern world, "he accredited 
the founders of American constitutionalism with too 
much originality. Certainly none other than the Amer- 
ican nation can be held responsible for its success 
or failure in the United States, yet it is of con- 
temporary interest to understand the contributions 
which other countries, and in particular, Great Brita' 
haveenade to this doctrine. 
Whenever judicial review has been attacked, the 
supporters of the theory have claimed that its founda- 
tion is deeply rooted in the past. 
(1) Maine, Popular Government ( 7. v. 1825 ) -o. 217. 
n, 
For example, in the records of the New York State 
Ear Association Reports for 1915 one reads: 
The American Revolution was a lawyers' 
revolution to enforce the principle 
laid down in Lord Coke's, Lord Hobart's 
and Lord Holt's decisions that acts 
of Parliament against common right or 
in violation of the natural liberties 
of Rnglishmen were void, 
It is submitted that when such astounding state- 
ments are made by a committee of lawyers of the New 
York Bar, the evidence to support such statements should 
be 
investigated and evaluated. When and where did Lord 
Coke, Lord Hobart, and Lord Holt lay down such a prin- 
ciple? 
Chief Justice Marshall stated that the written 
constitution was the fundamental law of the land. Is 
there British authority for this statement? What is 
the British background of the doctrine of judicial 
review? 
The writer realizes that the British people are 
beginning to tire of the tendency upon the part of Amer 
icans to justify their customs and institutions on the 
ground that the customs and institutions originated in 
Great Britain. Recently newspapers reported that the 
new American Ambassador was well liked because he did 
not look for his ancestors' tombstones the day after he 
arrived at Southampton. 
PRT S IDENT ROOSEVELT ANT THE 
UNITED STATES SUPRF E COURT. 
The research for this thesis was commenced a 
short time before President Roosevelt s arted his 
unsuccessful attempt to reconstitute the Supreme 
Court of the United States. During the heated de- 
bates in the Senate and House of Representatives, 
many references were made to British history and 
British constitutional law. Senator Borah, for ex- 
ample, stated on February 1, 1937, " The effort to 
establish and maintain an ind epee ;l ent judiciary 
long antedated the adoption of our Federal Consti- 
tution...Far back. in English history, still read 
with unfailing enthusiasm, Sir Edward Coke...flung 
in the face 
the laurels of a lifetime/of-the King..." The Magna 
Carta and other constitutional documents were fre- 
quently mentioned. Thus because there is a con- 
nection between this thesis matter and the con- 
temporary political struggle in America, the writ- 
er has included the chapter on President Roosevelt 
and the United States Supreme Court. With the per- 
mission of Professor D. Oswald Dykes, this chapter 
was nubl? shed in the Scots Law Times, Dec. 4, 1938, 
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. 
"No feature in the government of the United 
States," wrote Lord Bryce over a quarter of a century 
ago, "has awakened so much curiosity in the European 
mind, caused so much discussion, received so much 
admiration, and been more frequently misunderstood, 
than the duties assigned to the Supreme Court and the 
functions which it discharges in guarding the ark of 
the Constitution. "(l) 
Lord Bryce is not the only Scotsman who has been 
interested in the feature of American government which' 
has been the storm centre of that nation's politics 
during the past few months. James Wilson, recognised 
by many as the greatest constitutional lawyer of the 
American constitutional convention, and later an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, was born and 
educated in Scotland. In a less direct way, the famous 
Adam Smith was said to have influenced decisions of 
the Supreme Court, in that the concept of unlimited 
freedom of making contracts, long protected by that 
high tribunal, has been traced to the influence of the 
economist's doctrine commonly called laisser faire {2) 
One/ 
(i) Bryce, The American Commonwealth, chap. XXII . 
(2) Pound, Roscoe, Yale Law Review, Vol. 18, "Liberty 
One American author has claimed that the doctrine of 
natural rights, and the social contract, were intro- 
duced to the American colonists by independent sects 
influenced directly by the Scottish Presbyterians.(1) 
Forty -seven years ago the Juridical Review pub- 
lished an article on the Supreme Court of the United 
States which, in the eloquent language of the nine- 
teenth century, praised the Supreme Court as the keeper 
of "the light that burns with a constant radiance upon 
the high altar of American constitutional justice. "(2) 
How different was the tone of President Roosevelt 
when he declared on 17th September last, in his speech 
commemorating the 150th anniversary of the signing of 
the American Constitution: "Nearly every attempt to 
meet demands for social and economic betterment has 
been jeopardised or actually forbidden by those 
(Supreme Court Justices) who have sought to read into 
the Constitution language which the framers refused to 
write into the Constitution." 
The effort of President Roosevelt to reconstitute 
the Supreme Court may be explained to a large extent 
by the failure of the Supreme Court to declare certain 
legislative Acts of the "New Deal" programme, such as 
the National Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjust- 
ment/ 
(1) Martin, Introduction to the American Constitution, 
p.273. 
(2) Phelps, "The Supreme Court of the United States." 
Juridical Review, Vol. II. p.122. 
Adjustment Act, in accord with the provisions of the 
written Constitution. The action of the President is 
based, to a degree, on political expediency; but not 
entirely of contemporary significance is the issue of 
judicial supremacy. At various periods in American 
history this feature has been the object of political 
debate. The Court has endured many unfavourable re- 
actions of public opinion and of chief executives - 
notably Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Johnston, and 
Roosevelt. 
It is commonly believed, even in the United. States 
that the written Constitution gave the express right to 
the Supreme Court to declare Acts of Congress void, if 
in the opinion of the Justices the Act was in conflict 
with the written Constitution. This is not so. 
It is known that certain leaders of the constitut- 
ional convention, and in particular Alexander Hamilton, 
believed in the doctrine of judicial review of legis- 
lative Acts. In 1788 Hamilton wrote: "A Constitution 
is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, 
fundamental law. It must therefore belong to them to 
ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any 
particular Act proceeding from the legislative body. "(l 
Not until 1803, however, in the case of Marbury v. 
Madison,(2)did the Supreme Court declare its right to 
pass/ 
(1) Federalist Papers, Number LXXVIII. 
(2) 1 Cranch 137 (1893). 
pass on the constitutionality of Congressional Acts. 
The argument which Chief Justice Marshall offered 
to support his decision has not always been considered 
very strong, and one is led to believe "that the best 
judges, in passing on constitutional questions, are not 
always uninfluenced by political considerations 
It would be unfair, however, to claim that Mar- 
shall's decision, any more than President Roosevelt's 
plan, was prompted solely by political considerations. 
In Marshall's day the great need was for a strong 
national government, and a declaration of the Supreme 
Court's right to pass on the constitutionality of Con- 
gressional Acts strengthened federal control. 
In -Franklin Roosevelt's day the great need is for 
social and economic betterment, and Roosevelt has chosen 
to align himself with those who believe a more liberal 
interpretation of the Constitution will insure progress. 
Each man has pressed his point within the sphere of his, 
governmental position. 
What is Roosevelt's plan? The newspapers have 
called it "packing" the Court. "Reconstituting," it i 
submitted, is a more neutral term. Briefly, President 
Roosevelt's plan would provide for retirement of Just- 
ices who have reached the age of seventy, or, if they 
do not choose to retire, an additional Justice would 
be appointed to the Court for every Justice who has 
decided/ 
(1) See Mathews, The American Constitutional System, 
p. 210 and following, for an account of the 
decision. 
decided to remain on the bench after he has reached 
seventy. The Court at present could be increased from 
nine to fifteen members. The President later modified 
his plan, providing that one new Justice be appointed 
every year for the next six years (in case the Justices 
over seventy are still living and do not choose to re- 
tire). Since the President, with the approval of the 
Senate, has the right to appoint new Justices, Presi- 
dent Roosevelt could thus appoint men who shared his 
views regarding the constitutionality of his "New Deal "1 
programme. To many Americans this would mean executive 
rather than judicial supremacy. 
The Supreme Court has not always had nine members. 
By an Act of 13th February 1801 it was provided that on 
the death or resignation of a Justice the vacancy should 
not be filled, which would leave the Court at five 
members. As none died until the passage of the next 
law, this Act did not create any change. In 1807 the 
Supreme Court membership was increased to seven, and 
it remained at this figure for thirty years. In 1837 
the membership was increased to nine. In 1865 the 
Court had an additional member added, bringing its 
number to ten, the largest number ever to sit on the 
Bench. By the Act of 10th April 1869 the Court Justices 
were placed at nine, after they had been reduced to 




Why did Congress refuse to pass President Roose- 
velt's proposal? Congress is sensitive to public 
opinion. In 1935 the Institute of Public Opinion pub- 
lished figures indicating that 53 per cent. of the 
people favoured the Supreme Court's review of disputed 
Congressional Acts, 16 per cent. had no opinion, and 
only 31 per cent. favoured some check on the power of 
the Supreme Court. 
In 1937, after the President had made his proposal 
to reconstitute the Supreme Court, the Institute again, 
through a process of sampling, endeavoured to test 
public opinion. Out of nearly 400,000 consultations, 
255,136 people indicated they were opposed to the 
President's plan, while only 131,320 supported Mr Roose- 
velt. 
These figures indicate that while only a slight 
majority favour judicial review, a two -thirds' majority 
oppose the specific plan proposed by the President. 
Why should the American people oppose the President 
on this issue shortly after they had returned him to 
office by an overwhelming majority? Using the words 
with which Professor D. Oswald Dykes has described the 
British Crown, the American people regard their Supreme 
Court as "an element of stability in a rapidly shifting 
political kaleidoscope." They may oppose a single 
decision, but see wisdom in many others. There is a 
feeling/ 
feeling of safety in knowing that a non -political body 
is prescribing the constitutional limits of Congres- 
sional Acts. A study of Supreme Court decisions re- 
veals a tendency to respond, slowly yet surely, to the 
demands of an enlightened public opinion.(1) While 
President Roosevelt admits this, he condemns it as a 
"twenty year lag. "(2) 
A second reason for opposition to the President's 
;proposal is because he was silent about the Court during 
his re- election campaign, but waged open warfare on the 
Court when his own position was again secure. The 
claim that he had received a mandate from the people 
to reconstitute the Supreme Court was not supported by 
the evidence. However astute the President's move was 
on grounds of political strategy, it did not meet with 
public approval. Lincoln opposed a certain decision of 
the Supreme Court, but he made his criticisms during the 
election campaign. I.n 1924 Robert La Follette, an in- 
dependent candidate for President, advocated submitting 
to the people a constitutional amendment providing that 
Congress might effectively enact a statute over judicial 
veto. Like Lincoln, he raised the question during his 
election campaign. 
A third reason for the failure of President Roosew 
volt's proposal is that it is only one of many plans 
which/ 
(1) Consult Bryce, The American Commonwealth, Vol.I . 
p.274, and Bharp, Movement in Supreme Court Ad- 
judication," Harvard Law Review, Vol.46, p.361. 
(2) See text of Presidea RooseveTtt s Address on the 
Constitution, 17th September 1937 (printed in the 
New York Times, 18th September, 1937). 
which have been suggested, and those who have been 
united in the belief that the Supreme Court has exerted 
too much authority have not been agreed on means of 
curbing the tribunal's power. 
Since Thomas Jefferson's day, when his political 
associates, perplexed by the practice of the Federal 
Courts of declaring State laws unconstitutional, sug- 
gested that judges give their opinions seriatim, after 
the manner of the English Courts, there have been pro- 
posals to change the Supreme Court. 
During the post -Civil War period, several attempts 
were made to have Congress pass an Act declaring that 
no Court had the right to declare any Act of Congress 
unconstitutional. None of these attempts were success- 
ful. 
A much -discussed proposal would provide that Con- 
gress, by a two-thirds' majority, could reverse any 
judicial decision holding an Act of Congress unconstitu- 
tional. It is argued that Congress is more sensitive 
to public opinion, while the Justices of the Supreme 
Court are apt to interpret the Constitution as a 
lawyers' contract. 
The obvious objection to this plan is that it 
would tend to destroy the system of checks and balances 
between legislature and judiciary. Congress, it is 
argued, would be influenced by the immediate whims of 
the people, and might interpret the Constitution to 
please a passing popular fancy. 
One/ 
One of the greatest objections to previous de- 
cisions of the Supreme Court has been the divided opin- 
ions of the Justices. When a question of the validity 
of a statute providing that no labourer shall work in 
a bakery over ten hours in one day is presented to the 
Supreme Court, and five Justices say that the pro- 
visions of the statute are in conflict with the Con - 
stitution and four Justices dissent, it is only natural 
that the people should begin to believe, "We are under 
a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the Just- 
ices say it is*" 
Suggestions have been made that either a two - 
thirds' majority or a unanimous opinion be required 
to declare Acts of. Congress unconstitutional in order 
to eliminate the five -four decision. At present it is 
doubtful whether any of these suggestions will prove 
acceptable to the American people. Judicial supremacy, 
with its apparent defects, is the will of the people. 
THE INCORPORATION OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM. 
The records of the American constitutional con- 
vention make it clear that either a legislative or 
executive negative, patterned after the colonial pre- 
rogative of the English Crown by which the King had 
power to negative colonial laws conflicting with the 
laws or policy of Great Britain, ware not acceptable 
at that time. The question of a judicial negative was 
raised quietly and died out before serious debate on 
the subject could take place. 
The written constitution states: 
"The judicial power of the United States shall 
be vested in one supreme Court ... the judicial power 
shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising 
under this constitution, the laws of the United States, 
and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
authority. ..."1 
The Supreme Court's right to declare acts of con- 
gress which are contrary to the constitution, void, was 
first stated under the peculiar circumstances of the 
Oase of Marbury v. Madison.2 
1. Constitution of the United States Art III, Sections 
1, 2. 
2. 1 Cranch 137. 
The first two Presidents of the United States had 
been members of the Federalist Party. Chief Justice 
Marshall was also a member of that Party. Before John 
Adams, Second President of the United States, had com- 
pleted his term, he had appointed William Marbury 
Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia. 
The appointment had been confirmed, but had not been 
delivered. When Jefferson, a member of the Anti - 
Federalist party became third president of the United 
States, he ordered James Madison, his Secretary of 
State, to refuse delivery of the commission to the 
appointee of the out-going President. The disappointed 
office seeker sought from the Supreme Court a writ of 
Mandamus to Secretary Madison. Here was a real con- 
stitutional crisis. Could the Supreme Court, composed 
of members of one political party, dictate to the 
Supreme Executive of the United States, who was the 
member of another political party? 
The immediate question before the Court was, has 
the applicant a right to the commission he demands? 
The Court answered affirmatively. 
The question then asked was, if he has the right, 
and the right has been violated, do the laws of his 
country afford him a remedy? The Court answered that 
a remedy is afforded by the laws. 
The third question was, is he entitled to the 
remedy/ 
remedy for which he applies? It is at this point that 
Marbury began to lose his case, and Chief Justice 
Marshall began to declare the power of judicial review 
of congressional acts. Marbury sought his remedy unde 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 which authorized the Supreme 
Court to issue writs of mandamus to any Courts appoint =d 
or persons holding office under the authority of the 
United States. The Court held that such a power was 
not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court as defined by the Constitution. Therefore the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which had been passed by Con- 
gress as a legislative act, was repugnant to the 
Constitution of the United States. The last question 
raised was, can a jurisdiction conferred by Congress, 
not warranted by the Constitution, be exercised? 
May an act repugnant to the Constitution become the 
law of the land? The answer was in the negative. 
The Court stated that the American Government was 
one of limited powers. Legislative powers are defined 
by the written constitution. If an act of Congress 
is on the same level with the written constitution, 
"then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on 
the part of the people, to limit a power in its own 
nature illimitable." The written constitution must 
therefore be considered as fundamental law, and acts 
of Congress are laws inferior to the fundamental law 
of the land. 
Thus/ 
Thus a Federalist Court gave the decisión to an 
Anti Federalist President, but in doing so, established 
the right of the Supreme Court to pass on the validity 
of congressional acts. 
Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion, 
gives no precedents for the theory of judicial review. 
Bonham's Case is not mentioned. Blackstone and Mans- 
field are mentioned, not on the point of judicial re- 
view, but in connection with the definition of Mandamu- 
In rendering the decision great emphasis is place 
on the necessity of the written constitution being re- 
garded as fundamental law. 
The Fundamental Law. 
In 1788, Alexander Hamilton wrote: 
A constitution is in fact, 
and must be regarded by.judges 
as fundamental law. (1) 
Chief Justice Marshall declared in the case of 
Marburg v. Madison that the constitution was superior 
(2) 
law, and that acts of Congress were inferior. Con- 
gressional acts in conflict with the constitution are 
void. Did this theory originate with the founders of 
the American constitutional system? If not, from 
whence did it come? 
The answer cannot be given without investigat - 
ing the fundamental law concept in the Civil Law as 
well as the Common Law. A comprehensive study of thes 
systems would require volumes, and thus an effort will 
be made here to limit the study to evidence which bear 
to some extent on the American concept of fundamental 
(3) 
law. 
(1) Federalist Papers., lxxviii. See my article in 
the Scots Law Times, December 4, 1937, p. 249. 
(2) 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
(3) See Mullett, Fundamental Law and the American 
Revolution, p. 13, n.1, 
The investigation follows two channels of thought 
in the first place, a study of the concept of funda- 
mental law held by political theorists, and in the sec 
and place, a study of the references to fundamental 
law made by the North American colonists in their 
tracts, books, and speeches. 
It should be noted in passing that periods of 
political and legal stress are not conducive to the 
development of careful judicial thought. In Seven- 
teenth Century England, the conflict with the King 
over the use of the Royal Prerogative brought forth 
a new interpretation of the Magna Carta. It was used 
to support the arguments of Coke, Hampden, and Pym. 
In obscure passages of the famous document were found 
precedents for the arguments of these men. So too, in 
the period of the American Revolution, many of the 
appeals to fundamental law can be recognized as at- 
tempted justifications for those who opposed certain 
acts of Parliament. Actual knowledge of the leading 
writers on the subject of fundamental law was con - 
(1) 
fined to a few Americans. 
(1) Aristotle was frequently cited in the footnotes 
of pamphlets but there is no evidence to indicate 
that all those who cited him had actually read his 
works...Cicero had an extensive usage...Scarcity of 
writers is....apparent with regard to Mediaeval 
writers...although it should be remembered that ideas 
of these earlier writers filtered into colonial Amer- 
ica through more popular channels. See Mullett, Funda 
mental laid and the American Revolution, pages 31-32. 
* 4raWaEVi:; ,W yzflfr-.r- i .`rr-'aeL.., ;V:741,11`" i_.a `3`-a 
Ct. 
Various Forms of the Fundamental Law; the Laws 
of Nature, of God, and of Reason 
Little attention is paid at the present time t 
the law of nature, but if we turn back to the pages of 
histQa7 to the last half of the eighteenth century, we 
discover that the American colonists were studying and 
expounding the law of nature, the law of reason, and 
the law of God. Certain acts which had been passed by 
Parliament at Westminster caused the colonists to pro- 
test that these acts were null and void, because they 
were contrary to nature, reason and God. 
James Otis became the expounder of the American 
position in his protest against the Writs of Assistance 
The three points on which Otis based his protest were: 
(1) That there is a natural 
right, sacred beyond the 
power of any government. 
(2) That which is vaguely 
called the British Con- 
stitution limits Parlia- 
ment with respect to 
natural right. 
(3) That an Act of Parliament 
contrary to the Constitution 
is null and void. (1) 
(1) See McElroy, in Hearnshaw, Social and Political 
Ideas of the Revolutionary Era, p. 17. 
4 
2 ll, 
Otis was an advocate, not a philosopher. There 
can be found little that is novel in his contentions. 
He was using as prodf, the philosophical and poli- 
tical theory of writers of past centuries. Yet the 
contention of Otis gave definite expression to the 
attitude of a large group of colonists. 
The leaders of the American Revolutionary move- 
ment were men of diverse professions and occupations; 
(1 
doctors, lawyers, clergymen, tradesmen, and farmers. 
They came from different parts of Great Britain, and 
it Inza :s only natural that there wá ä variance of 
opinion. Yet many were agreed on one point, that a 
law contrary to fundamental law is void. The law of 
nature, the law of reason, the law of God, all form- 
ed a part of that vague concept, the fundamental 
law. 
(1) For example, Mr. D. P. Heatley, in his essay on 
"An American Independence Group ", which may be found 
in his book, Studies in British. History and Politics 
Chapter ii, cites from Edinburgh University alone, 
(1) John Fothergill, Doctor of Medicine (who said 
the British Parliament has the power to do 
things which it has not right to da). 
(2) James Wilson, Lawyer and later Associate 
Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court (who 
argued that obedience was due the Crown, 
but not the British Parliament*). 
(3) John Witherspoon, Clergyman (who said from 
the pulpit that the cause of the colonists 
was the cause of justice, liberty, and human 
nature). 
It may appear pedantic to define the law of 
nature, the law of reason, and the law of God, when 
describing the use of fundamental law concepts dur- 
ing the American Revolutionary period. It is reasen.- 
onable td assume that most of thé arguments advanced 
at that time were b=,sed on expediency rather than on 
theory. The pamphleteers used fundamental law con- 
cepts for the purposes of revolutionary propaganda, 
and had little regard for nice distinctions and care- 
ful definitions. The law of nature represented the 
will of the colonists, and the laws contrary to 
the law of nature, of reason, and of God, were certain 
acts of Parliament. 
Yet for the purposes of this thesis, the ideas 
w.. 
of political theorists must be considered as well as 
the opinions of practical politicians, in order that 
an estimate may be made of the service which the 
theorist rendered to the colonists. Definitions of 
various forms of fundamental law may be found in the 
writings of legal scholars. Professor Holland des- 
cribes the law of nature as "that portion of morality 
which supplies the more important and universal rules 
which are for the governance of the outward acts of 
(1) 
mankind." 
(1) Holland, Jurisprudence -(12th Ed.) p. 31. 
7s 
Pollock defines ius naturale as "the rules of 
conduct deducible by reason from the general con- 
(1) 
ditions of human society." He enlarges upon this 
statement by giving an account of the etymological 
development of the words, and an historical account 
of the concept. Indeed, as Professor Bryce states, 
" it would be impossible, within the compass of any- 
thing less than a substantial volume, either to pre- 
sent a philosophical analysis of the ideas comprised 
or implied in the term law of nature, or to set forth 
and explEin the various senses in which that term has 
in fact been employed, and the influence which in 
those various senses, it has exerted upon political 
(2) 
theory and upon positive law. "' 
Thus the explanation of the various senses in 
which the term natural law has been employedT and the 
influence which it has exerted upon political theory 
and positive law, will be limited here to the subject 
of this thesis, the British backgroùnd of. the Amer- 
ican theory of judicial supremacy. 
(1) Pollock, Essays in the Law, p. 35. 
(2) Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, 
(1901) Volume ii, p. 112. 
In general, the natural law concept may be said 
to have assumed two forms; first :, elemental and 
fundamental rules of the Universe, and secondly, 
principles of right, principles which are establish -- 
- (1) 
ed or should be established if justice is to prevail." 
The utility value of an appeal to natural law 
can be recognized immediately. It can be employed in 
the attempt to seek relief against arbitrary power; to 
protect the individual against bodily harm, to presery 
and secure his property. It can be employed in the of 
fort to secure political freedom, to bring about socia 
reform. 
Aristotle drew a distinction between written law, 
and what he called "the common law;t which is in ac- 
(2) 
cordance with nature and immutable. 
According to the Stoics, justice is revealed by 
(3) 
nature, and not by the imposition of human beings. 
Cicero claimed that law, the highest reason, is 
implanted by nature. He also pointed out that it is 
natural for us to love mankind, and that this is the 
(4) 
basis of law. 
(1) Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law, 
p.. 
(2) Aristotle, Rhetoric, i, 16. Cited by Holland, p.33 
(3) Holland, ibid. 
(4) Ibid. 
C ICERO AND JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
Claims have been made that Cicero made 
contributions to the American theory of judic- 
ial review. While this thesis is concerned 
with British contributions to the American 
theory, the writer has considered in the 
briefest possible manner, the evidence 
which might indicate that Cicero made, eith- 
er directly or indirectly, contributions- 
to the theory. 
4 
Cicero. 
Professor E. S. Corwin states that Cicero made 
(1) 
contributions, either directly or indirectly, to the 
theory of judicial review: 
Certain Roman procedural 
forms connected with the 
enactment of law suggest- 
ed to Cicero, in answer- 
ing this question, some- 
thing strikingly like ju- 
dicial review. It was a 
Roman practice to incorpor- 
ate in statutes a saving 
clause to the effect that 
it was no purpose of the 
enactment to abrogate what 
was sacrosanct or jus. (2) 
(1) Corwin, The Higher Law Background of American 
Constitutional Law" 42 Harvard Law Rev. 
(2) Professor Corwin gathers his information from a 
1754 edition of Barnabae Brissonii, De Formulis 
et Sollemni'ous Populi Romani Verbis. The National 
Library of Scotland has an edition dated 1583. 
(Parisiis). Liber II, page 153, records the 
customary form of saving clause, 
Si quid sacri sanctiáue est, 
quod jus non sit r2. ari, ejus 
hac lege nihil rogatur. 
(If something is sacrosanct, 
such as is not lawful to pro- 
pose, nothing ,hereof ift ro- 
persedo_° by this law.) 
2:1 
On another occasion, however, Cicero argued 
against the extension of such a saving, clause to 
a certain treaty, that nothing can be Sancrosanctum 
nisi quod 22pulus plebesve sanxisset , whereas the 
treaty in question had been made by the Senate. (1) 
Cicero suffered himself from a use of the clause 
by his enemy, Clodius, who endeavoured to render 
the law exiling Cicero irrepeelable. (2) 
(1) Pro Balbo. 
(2) See Cicero's Oration, cap. 13 to cap. 16. 
It was Cicero's contention that the enact- 
ment which banished him was no law. It is 
true that it had been abrogated, yet Cicero 
furnished several reasons why he believed 
it to be a nullity. The most interesting 
to mention here is Cicero's claim that as 
it had been passed upon the rogation of 
Clodius as tribune, the rogation was a 
nullity, as the "pseudo- plebeian was in- 
competent to be a tribune. For additional 
references, see Ersch and Grueber, Cicero 
197, cf. 196, cited in Coxe, Judicial Power 
and Unconstitutional Legislation. p. 110. 
De Formulis et Sollemnibus Populi Romani Verbis 
records some interesting variants of the customary 
form of the saving clause. For example, an enactment 
of Sulla is cited: " Si quid ius non esset rogari, 
eius ea lege nihilum rogatum." ( Whatever it is un- 
lawful to propose, nothing of that nature has been 
proposed by the aforegoing law.) Again, from Pro 
Domes Sua, " Ut si quid ius non esset rogari, ne esset 
rogatum." ( Whatever it is unlawful to propose, let 
it not be proposed.) 
Alexander Hamilton possessed some knowledge of 
the Roman conception of higher law. In his notes for 
(1) 
his argument in the case of Rutgers v. Waddington, 
Hamilton wrote: " And here the rule of Cicero, De. In. 
L. 4, No. 145," 
Primus igetur oportet con- 
tendere comparando utra 
lex ad maiores hoc est ad 
utiliones ad honestiones ac 
magis necessarios res pertin- 
eat, ex quo confisitur ut si 
lepes duae aut si plures aut 
quot quot erunt conservare 
non 222sunt qua discreperunt 
inter se ea maxime conservanda 
sunt quae maximus res pertinere 
videatur. (2) 
(1) Mayor's Court, New York City, 1784. 
(2) Evidently Hamilton wrote from memory, as the 
above quotation is full of errors. Hamilton's 
reference is wrong, states A. M. Hamilton, 
Hamilton, page 462. However, A. M. Hamilton 
is mistaken--, for Alex. Hamilton refers to 
the old para.:,raph notation. It can now be 
found in De. Inventione, ii, 49. 
2 cif 
Although the case commenced and ended in the 
Mayor's Court of New York, it was considered of great 
importance, for it appeared that a conflict between a 
recent state statute and a treaty of peace signed by 
federal authority might develop. In case the court de- 
cided there was a conflict, it would be forced to de- 
cide whether state or nation should give way to the 
other. The court made every effort to avoid such a 
decision , and held that if the statute were properly 
interpreted, there would be no conflict between the 
statute and the law of nations, hence no conflict be- 
tween the statute and the treaty of peace contracted 
( 
by the central 
1 
Hamilton's citation, according to Mueller's De 
Inventione, is as follows: 
Firstly therefore, comparison 
of laws should be made by re- 
flection. as to which law deals 
with matters of the greater im- 
portance- -that is, of greater 
practical, of greater moral, of 
more essential importance. From 
this the result is that, if there 
be two or more laws, or however many 
there may be, they cannot be pre- 
served, inasmuch as they differ 
from each other: but let that law 
be considered especially worth 
preserving which deals with the 
most important matters. (2) 
(1) See Alexander Hamilton's letter, Ame -ican_ State 
Papers, i, p. 232. 
(2) Mueller's text is in Latin. An English translation 
is submitted here. 
It is important to note that Hamilton was famil- 
iar with certain passages of Cicero, and especially 
those passages which referred to a higher law, because 
(1) 
Hamilton stated in the Federalist that the Consti- 
tution must be regarded as higher law. However, the 
reference to the passage from Cicero does not prove 
that Hamilton was influenced by Roman law concepts to 
formulate his theory of judicial review, for (1) Hamil- 
ton was acting as an attorney for the defence when he 
cited the example from Cicero, and was not expounding 
his theories regarding the American judicial system, 
and (2) the case came to trial in 1784, three years 
before the adoption of the American constitution. Sinc 
Hamilton's chief argument for judicial review was dev 
veloped from the idea that judges must act as guard- 
(2) 
ians of the written constitution, it seems reason- 
able to conclude that the influence of the writings 
of Cicero on Alexander Hamilton's theory of judicial 
review, was fragmentary and indirect. 
It would be extremely difficult, if not impossibl 
to prove that Cicero made any direct contribution to 
the establishment of judicial review, although attempt 
(1) Federalist Papers lxxviii. 
(2) Ibid. 
w.,s-.';,x r _. 
3u. 
(1) 
have been made by several writers. They furnish 
evidence which tends to prove that the ideas of Cicero 
were used to justify the establishment of judicial re- 
view, but when attempts are made to use the same evi- 
^ence for the purpose of proving that judicial review 
was established as a result, the case is unconvincing. 
In many instances, it is obvious that Roman law maxims 
may be selected for the justification of a theory which 
is different from the idea which the writer of the max- 
im had when he wrote it. 
Two ideas traced to Cicero are of sufficient im- 
portance to mention here: 
(1) His assertion that natural law needs no 
other interpreter than the individual himself. "Necque 
est quaerendus explanator, aut interpres eius alius." 
( "And we need not look outside ourselves for the inter- 
preter of it" that is, the Lex Vera ). (2) 
(2) His description of the magistrate as being 
"law speaking ". "Magistratum legem esse loquentem, 
legem autam mutum ma.gistratum." ( The magistrate is a 
speaking law and the law a silent magistrate.) (3) 
(1) C. F. Mullett, Brinton Coxe, F. S. Corwin. 
(2) De Rep. 3, 22. 
(3) Cic., Lea., 3, I, 2. 
3 
Ideas similar to these were repeated by leaders 
in Great Britain and the United States. 
Bacon speaks of rules which are indicative of 
the law. Human rules do not establish-the law. They 
are like the needle of the sailors which indicates the 
poles. " Regula enim legem ( ut acus nautica polos) 
indicat, non statuit." (1) 
In Calvir., 's Case, Coke stated that the judges do 
not have the power to judge according to that which thy 
think fit, but according to that which they know to 
be right and consonant to law. "Let the good judge 
do nothing on his own in4tive, or by the intent of 
private desire, but let him rather make his decisions 
adhering to the law and its enactments." Iudex bonus 
nihil ex arbitrb suo faciat nec Eroposito domesticae 
voluntatis, sed iuxta leges iura pronuntiet. (2) 
Burke stated that all human laws "are properly 
speaking only declaratory. They may alter the mode 
and application, but have no power over the substance 
of original justice." He argues that it would be hard 
to point out any error more subversive than the belief 
that human laws can derive any authority whatever from 
their institution. (3) 
(1) Bacon, De Iustitia Universali, Aph. lxxxv. 
(2) Coke, Calvin's Case, 4 Coke I (1609). 
(3) Burke, "tract on the Popery Laws ", 6 Works, 322- 
(1867 ed 
James Otis said, "The supreme power in a state 
jus dicere only, and not jus dare; iius darn, strictly 
Ç1) 
speaking, belongs only to God." However, Otis 
is undoubtedly Indebted to Bacon, for this idea, rather 
than Cicero, for Bacon wrote, "Judges ought to remember, 
that theirroffice is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to 
(2) 
interpret law, and not to make law, or give law." 
The idea persisted in the judicial decisions of 
the United States courts. For example, in the case of 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, "Judicial Power 
as contradistinguished from the power of laws, has no 
(3) 
existence." 
The idea has been repeated by a recent Supreme 
Executive of the United States. Calvin Coolidge said: 
Men do not make laws (4) 
They do but discover them. 
Thus we see how the idea has persisted that there 
are certain fundamental principles of right and justic 
which humans can discover and declare, but which are 
(5) 
not of human creation. 
(1) Otis, Rights of the British Coltnies, etc. p. 70 
(2) Bacon, " Of Judicature" Essays, p. 158. (1894 ed.) 
(3) 9 Wheaton, 738, 866. (ä.S.1824) 
(4) Coolidge, "Have Faith in Massachusetts'; o. 4. (1919) 
(5) See Pollock, Essays in the Law, Charter II; Bryce, 
Studies in History and Jurisprudence,ii, Chapt. XI 
St. Thomas Aquinas explains that Divine Law is 
needed because " the final end of man is beyond human 
reason, because of the uncertainty of men's judgments, 
because human law can only deal with the external 
actions of men, and because human law cannot punish 
or prohibit all evil actions, lest it should do more 
(1) 
harm than good." 
St. Thomas has no difficulty in recognizing both 
natural law and Divine Law. The natural law is more 
important than human law, for it is fundamental. "The 
Divine Law does not contradict or annul the natural 
law, but it was added that men might participate in 
(2) 
the eternal law in a higher manner." 
It is doubtful whether the early Puritan s of 
New England would understand the explanations of St. 
Thomas regarding Divine Law. To them, Divine Law was 
the word of God revealed in the Scriptures. It was a 
practical explanation. They had little time for 
speculative thought. . In an environment of undevelQ 
oped land, a vast wilderness where man had to battle 
against the elements and the ravages of the Indians, 
there was little opportunity to develop finely spun 
theory. Thus there is a sharp contrast between the 
(1) Carlyle, Mediaeval Political Theory in the ";Vest 




conception of the mediaeval scholars who lived in 
that of 
universities and monasteries, and /the Puritan settlers 
in America. 
It would be a mistake to claim that the early set 
tlers in America were not influenced at all by such 
writers as St. Thomas Aquinas, Isidore of Seville, 
William of Occam and John of Salisbury. One might 
suggest that the writings of these men were not found 
to any great extent in colonial libraries; yet it is 
possible that the ideas of these men were transmitted 
to the colonists throueh secondary sources. To claim 
that the influence of these men was not felt in New 
England would indicate that the colonists knew little 
about mediaeval theology. This is quite reasonable, 
for even the few who claimed to be scholars were first 
of all Puritans. One concept shared by American Pur- 
itans and ?mediaeval saints was the belief in a 
fundamental law; eternal, immutable regulations for 
the Universe. Is this belief common to all mankind, or 
did the Puritans receive it as a part of their intelle 
ual heritage? 
state 
Such writers as Bryce and Pollock /Isidore of 
Seville and John of Salisbury made definite contri- 
(11 
butians to the natural law concept. The ideas of 
these men, as well as the ideas of William of Occam, 
will be considered. 
(1) Pollock, Essays in the Law, p. 40. 
* Perhaps more commonly spelled Ockham. 
t- 
3( 
THE CONCEPT OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW DURI MG THE MID- 
DLE AGES 
Isidorus of Seville. 
During the Middle Ages the concepts of. Roman 
Jurists were recorded by the priests and scholars of 
the Church. The law of nature was identified very 
often with the law of God. Questi_ ons of political 
and legal importance were discussed in the writings 
of many canor_ists, such as Isidorus of Seville, Wil- 
liam of Occam (Ockham), and John of Salisbury. 
Both Bryce and Pollock mention Isidorus, or St. 
Isidore of Seville, as a distinguished writer au nat- 
(1) 
ural law. Isidorus lived in the seventh centúry, and 
some of his writings were given wide circulation be- 
cause portions were incorporated in the first part 
of the Decretum of Gratian. 
Isidorus divides law into two classes, Divine 
and human. The nature of Divine law corresponds to 
human laws, but human laws d.if.fr in that they vary 
according to the nation in which they are promulgated. 




(1) Pollock, Essays in the law, p. 40 . Bryce, Studies 
in History and Jurisprudence, vol. ii, p. 157. 
(2) "Omnes autem leges aut divinae sunt aut humanae. 
Divinae natura® humanae moribus constant, ideoque 
hae discrepant, quoniam aliae a.liis gontihus 2lacent 
Fas lex divina est: iiis lex humana. Transire per 
agrum alienum fas est, ius non est." Isidorus, 
OEerum, Tom I. 
Isidorus explains that the human race is ruled 
by two things -- namely, natural law and ch.aracter.Hifs 
idea of natural law is influenced by his religious 
views. He states that natural law is containe'? in the 
Gospel, and his explanation makes it apparent that he 
is referring to certain passages found in the sermon 
on the mount. The individual is bidden to do to 
what 
another as he wishes done to himself , and forbidden 
to do harm to another which he wotkll not wish done to 
(1) 
himself. 
The Decretum is important bec -ruse it is the first 
organized system of canon law on record. 
"Natural law," says Grat &an, "is Divine law, and 
all laws which are contrary to this are null and void. 
Thus we find an expression (which follows the 
thought of St. Thomas Aquinas and earlier writers) in 
the Decretum which is similar to that used by the 
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States 
when a congressional act is in conflict with the 
Constitution of the United States. The concept of 
"higher ", or "fundamental" law was known before the 
common law was an organized system and before the 
British Constitution had been developed. 
Footnotes (1) and (2) will be found on the next page. 
(2) 
Footnotes (1) and (2) for the preceding nage. 
licet 
(1) " Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturali vide - 
iure et moribus Ius naturale est quod in lege 
et evangelio contineAtur quo quisque iubetur 
alig facere quod sibi vult fieri et prohibetur 
alïit inferre, quod sibi nolit fieri. Unde 
Christus in Evangelio. "Omnia quaecumque vultis 
ut faciant vobis homines et vos eadem facite 
illis. Haec est enim lex et proph.etae it 
(2) Carlyle, Mediaeval Political TheoLE in the West 
(l92 °) vol. v., page 460. 
William of Occam. 
A departure from the conventional threefold 
classification of law, namely, ius naturale, or 
the rules or instincts common to all animals, ius 
gentium, or the rules common to all mankind, and 
ius civile, or the particular laws of this or that 
commonwealth, is noticeable in the writings of 
William of Occam. He divided ius naturaletto three 
possible categories: 
(1) Universal rules of con- 
duct dictated by natur- 
al reason. 
(2) Rules which would be ac- 
cepted as reasonable, and 
therefore binding, in a 
society governed ( or in 
any society so far as gov- 
erned) by natural equity 
without any positive law 
or custom of human ordinance. 
(3) Rules which may be justi- 
fied by deduction or anal- 
ogy from the general pre- 
cepts of the law of nature, 
but not being in fundamen- 
tals, are liable to Mod- 
ification by positive author- 
ity. (1) 
(1) See Pollock, Essays in the Law, page 38, 
where refeence is "made to Dia,, pars.III, 
tr. ii, 1. 3. c. 6, page 932 in Monarchia 
Tom. II. 
The ideas of this brilliant Englishman were 
dniiditioned, undoubtedly, by his disputes and 
controversies over both political and ecclesiasti- 
cal matters, with the Emperor, the Pope, and the 
University authorities. One idea expressed by 
William in a discourse on the standards of right 
and wrong clearly indicates his independent think- 
ing, and is interesting to note here because of 
its similarity to a question which was raised in 
Bonham's Case. 
That is the standard by which 
what is right is to be distin- 
guished from what is wrong? 
The ecclesiastic find it in 
the decrees of the Fathers, 
and in the statutes and ordi- 
nances of the Popes, but the 
soldier, in reply, shows the 
injustice of making one of 
the parties in the dispute 
the arbiter in the debate.(1) 
Thus William of Occam uses this illustra- 
<c an 
tion to indicate that a marmot be both judge and 
party to the same dispute. 
(1) Private Pamphlet, A. 171, Reference Room, 
Carnegie Library, Edinburgh. 
(2) 8 Coke 114a, ff. 
John of Salisbury. 
The famous author of Policraticus, John of 
Salisbury, who lived in the twelfth century and 
served as Bishop of Chartres, attempted to write 
a systematic treatise on Politics. 
From Cicero to Isidorus on through Gratia:n's 
Decretum a concept was transmitted which may be 
found in the Policraticus. 
There are certain precepts 
of the law which have per- 
petual necessity, having 
force of law among 
tions,which absolutely can - 
not be broken. (1) 
John of Salisbury made his contribution in the 
line of Mediaeval writers to the concept of a gov- 
ernment of laws and not of men, through his dis- 
tinction between a prince and a tyrant. The tyrant 
is one who oppresses the people by rulership based 
upon force, while the prince is one who rules in 
accordance with laws. It is unláwftii for him to 
have a will apart from that which law or equity en- 
(2) 
joins, or from what the common interest requires. 
(1) Dickinson, The Statesman's Book of John of Salis- 
bury, p. 33. Cited in Harvard Law Rev. p.164 
(2) Carlyle, Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, 
vol. v. pages 460 -4 -31. 
John of Salisbury also gave expression to an 
important mediaeval political theory, a distinct 
contribution of the middler.ages to modern political 
thought, that government on earth is intrinsically 
limited. Political authority is not absolute, be- 
cause it is limited by the principles of divine reas- 
on and moral order. Human law is either the expres- 
sion of these, or it deals with subjects compatible 
to divine reason and moral order. Any human law in 
conflict with these is a bad, unjust law. It be- 
comes, then, the test of a legitimate or illegitimate 
government, and the test of whether the rules is a 
true prince or a tyrant. 
"The law is supreme because it is just, and so 
far as it is just, and all other authority is sub- 
ject to the law. This is the foundation of the rule 
(1) 
of law." 
This contribution of the middle ages, the rule 
of law, found expression in the writings of another 
Englishman, and was definitely established as a 
political concept. The other Englishman was not an 
ecclesiastic nor was he a philosopher. He was a 
practical jurist. His name was Bracton, or Henry of 
Bratton. 
(1) Carlyle, Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, 
volume v, p. 460. 
Bracton. 
Bracton, or Henry of Bratton, was a judge in the 
reign of Henry III, and it is believed that he wrote 
the second general treatise on the common law, the 
first having been written by Glanvil. Tottel, in 
1569, published Henrici de Bracton de Legibus et 
TI) 
Consuetudinibus Angliae. 
Bracton was expounding English law, yet his ex- 
position of it, written in Latin, was in form like 
Justinian's Institutes. Maitland has declared that 
Bracton was a disciple of the glossators, a:nd perhaps 
(2) 
had studied in the Roman school, at Bologna. 
Bracton revealed that English law had its foundations 
in writs and cases decided in the courts. Law embraced 
customs, decisions of prudent men, and rules made by 
King in Council. The Magna Carta was designated by 
(3) 
him as Carta Libertatum. 
(1) Beale, Bibliography, p. 150, cited in Levy- Ullmann 
The English Legal Tradition, p. 134. 
(2) Maitland, "Select Passages from the Works of 
Bracton and Azo" Selden Society Publications viii. 
(3) Holdsworth, History of the English. Law, ii, p.243 
It is explained that Glanvil is primarily a book 
on procedure, and Bracton, although little con- 
cerned with the law of nature, reveals more 
Roman law influence. 
The period in which Bracton lived was one of un- 
certainty regarding the relationship of the King to 
the common law. The victory won through the Magna 
Carta caused new questions to develop which were of the 
utmost importance in the development of- constitutional 
(1) 
law. There were two possibilities, to take the 
view of Roman authorities, t',-,at the common law was the 
King's law, or to follow Teutonic traditions, with 
to 
modifications caused by the Great Charter, and /consider 
(2) 
law as a rule of c ondtct independent of the King. 
While Bracton argued that the King was supreme in his 
own realm, he contended that the royal power should be 
subject to the law, and that law should be passed by 
the consent of the magnates "after due deliberation 
(3) 
and discussion." It was fitting that the King 
should respect law, which would repay the debt which 
the King owes to law, which gives him his rights. As 
(4) 
Professor Maitland points out, this is a change 
from the earlier period. In the rein of Henry II, 
(1) Holdsworth, History of English Law,ii,pp.252 -290, 
also Maitland, Bracton's Mote Book, Introd.pp.l -8. 
(2) Holdsworth, ibid. 
(3) Holdsworth, ibid. "Quicquid de consilio et consens 
magnatum etrepublicae communi sponsione, auctori- 
tate revis sive principis praecedente, .juste fuerit 
definitum et aonrobatum. 
(4) Maitland, Bracton's Note Book, Introd. pp.1 -8. 
when Glanvil wrote de leEibus Anpliae, the King's 
will was law. Bracton stated ( and he was undoubted- 
ly propounding theory rather than describing the 
practice) that there existed not only the power of 
the King, but the law which made him King. 
This let the King obey, 
so doing, he loses no 
whit of majesty or power, 
becomes subject to none 
but himself. Our Blessed 
Lady, even our Blessed 
Lord, were thus obedient 
to the law for man. (1) 
Holdsworth points out that there is a passage in 
Fleta which indicates that the Barons are the King's 
(2) 
masters, who must restrain him if he breaks the law. 
Yet the question remained unsettled until the seven- 
teenth century, says Figgis, because until that time, 
(3) 
the problem of sovereignty had not become clear. 
Then the writings of Bracton were important in effect- 
ing " a reconciliation between the dogma of the person- 
al superiority of the King to the law, and the dogma 
(4) 
that the royal prerogative is subject to the law." 
Bracton's writings were used by Fitzherbert when 
he composed his Graunde Abridgement., which, in turn, 
was one of the sources of information for Coke. 
(i) Quoted bST Maitland, Bracton's Note Book, i, p. 3. 
(2) Holdsworth, History of the En;lish Law, it, p. 255 
(3) Figgis, Divine Right of Kingg.pp. 32 -33. 
(4) Holdsworth, History of English Law, ii, p. 255. 
Holdsworth points out that Coke relied on Brac- 
ton and Fitzherbert when he resisted the new courts 
and councils which threatened the supremacy of the 
common law courts. The issue of the contest would 
have been more doubtful had. not Coke been able to 
draw on Bracton. Coke was able to use Bracton as an 
authority in his attempt to liberalize the law, and 
Bracton was used as an authority by leaders when 
they endeavoured to argue that the royal prerogative 
1) 
was subject to law. The Ship Money Case (1637) 
and the Trial of Charles I are cited as specific ex- 
amples. 
It is reported that Coke used Bracton's words, 
quod Rex non_ debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et 
lege in reply to James I when he told Coke that it 
would be treason to affirm that he would be under law 
Thus Bracton's influence became strong again, after 
loss of prestige in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen- 
turiep, and in 1765, the American colonist James Otis 
cited Bracton as an authority on the law of nature, 
probably because Coke, whose statements were quoted 
again and again by the colonists, had cited Bracton 
as an authority in his disputes with James I. (3) 
(1) Holdsworth, History of English Law,ii,pp288 -289. 
(2) Holdsworth, ibid, v, p. 430 
(3) Quincy's Reports, page-202 and following. 
Mullett, page 34, states Drayton and Arthur Lee 
also cited Bracton. 
The Mirror of Justices. 
Mention will be made here of the book which 
(1) 
Winfield describes as almost a "practical joke ". 
The book is believed to have been written by one 
Horne or Horn, a fishmonger, between 1285 and 1290. 
The book was of little importance in its own age, 
but in the sixteenth century, when lawyers were 
eagerly searching for precedents to suport their 
views, the Mirror of Justices came into favor, and 
in the words of Maitland, Coke "devoured its con - 
(2) 
tents with uncritical voracity." 
Through the writings of Coke the Mirror of 
Justices was given wide circulation, and much that 
was faulty passed into English decisions through 
(3) 
Coke's citations. 
It is stated in the Mirror of Justices that 
although the King should have no peer in the land, 
yet if he should sin, writs and plaints done by him 
should be tried in the parliaments, since neither 
(1)Winfield, Chief Sources of English Legal History 
page 266. 
(2) Selden Society_ Publications, Vol. vii, p. ix. 
(3) Winfield, page 267. 
King nor his commissioners could judge, as the King 
(a) 
would be a party to the case. This is noted hase 
because of the question raised by Coke in Bohham's 
Case ( 8 Coke 118a) whether a man could be both 
judge and party to the same case. 
Holdsworth speaks of the author of the Mirror 
of Justices constructing his ideal system of law 
(2) 
out of his head, assisted by the Bible. 
Horn stated that law was nothing more than the 
rules laid down by the Scriptures. It is called 
the common law because it has been given to all in 
common by God himself. For specific definitions, 
the author claimed one could turn to the ordinances 
to 
of Alfred, and /the forty articles of the Magna Cart as 
They were the fundamental rules of the realm, and 
all acts contrary to this fundamental law were said 
(3) 
to be void. 
In conclusion, it may be said tha t the Mirror 
of Justices was taken seriously at a time when men 
were falling back upon the appeal to fundamental law. 
Although it must be admitted that the book was full 
of foolish statements, it nevertheless helped to 
serve as background for the American Colonists when 
theyopposed acts of P..rliament as contrary to funda- 
mental law. 
(1) Selden Society, Vol. vii, p. 7. 
(2) Holdsworth, History of. English Law, Vol. ii,p. 330. 
(3) Selden Society, Vol. vii, pp. 8 et seq., 175 -200. 
The Writings of Sir John Fortescue. 
The fifteenth century produced an English 
6hief Justice whose writings were familiar to the 
(1) 
colonial lawyers of America. De Natura Legis 
Naturae was written between 1461 and 1464, while 
(2) 
Fortescue was in Scotland. It was written in 
support of the Lancastrian claims to the Throne, 
and Fortescue uses the law of nature to justify 
his position in making his statements. De Laudibus 
Legum Angliae, which has been characterized as a 
(3 
treatise about the law rather than a law treatise, 
was written while Fort -scue was in France, and con- 
tains instruction to the young Prince concerning 
the law. The relation of the King to the law is 
described: 
A King og England can 
not at his pleasure, 
make any alterations in 
the laws of the land, . for 
the nature of his govern- 
ment is not only regal, 
but political. (4) 
(1) "Chief Justice Fortescue occupied no inconsid- 
erable space in the political education of 
colonial lawyers." Mullett, page 37. 
(2) Winfield, Chief Sources of English Legal History 
page 315 
(3) Ibid. t4) De Laudibus Legum Angliae (Amos Ed.) 
page 26. 
Law consists of "customs, statutes or acts 
(1) 
of Parliament, and the law of jature." In con- 
nection with the law of nature, Fortescue states 
that the laws of England are neither better nor 
worse than those of other states, as far as they 
are deuced from or as far as they agree with the 
laws of nature, for, quoting the "philosopher" 
in the fifth chapter of his Ethics, "the law of 
nature is the same and has the same force all 
over the world." F ortes;cue is more concerned 
with the proper education of his Prince; he is 
desirous of acquainting him with the laws of 
England, rather than in giving any detailed ac- 
count of the law of nature, yet his declaration 
that the King cannot change nor alter the laws 
without the consent of his subjects, nor burthen 
them against their will, in order that the people 
might enjoy their property without worry of being 
deprived of it by the King or others, inplies that 
the royal power itself is subject to a higher law. 
Fortescue points out that the Prince himself 
need not act as a judge. "Such matters may be left 
to your judges." (2) 
(1) Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Anglise (Amos Ed.) 
p. 20. 
(2) Proprio ore nullus regem Angliae judicum 2roferr 
usus est. Amos Ed. p. 23, n. b. 
This was almost a century and a half before the 
time that Lord Coke faced James I and spoke regard- 
ing the administration of justice by the courts rath- 
er than by the King. 
Other portions of De Laudibus Legum Angliae 
reveal attitudes towards the common law which prov- 
ed important in later years. In particular, it is 
of some importance to notice the reference to human 
laws as " rules whereby the perfect notion of justice 
can be determined." Arguing thathappiness is the 
summum bonum, he points out that the Peripatetics 
placed it in virtue, the Stoics in honesty, the Epi- 
cureans in pleasure, and Aristotle, in the exercise 
of all virtues. 
This being granted, I desire you 
to consider what will follow from 
these premises. Human laws are no 
other than rules whereby the per- 
fect notion of justice can be de- 
termined, but that justice, which 
those laws discover, is not the 
commutative, or distributive kind, 
or any one distinct virtue, but it 
is virtue absolute and perfect, and 
distinguished by the name of Legal 
Justice. (1) 
The influence of Fortescue's words can be found 
in Coke, Blackstone, and other writers who frequently 
cited De Laudibus Legum Angliae. 
(1) Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae,(Amo.$) p. 11 
It should be noted here that Fortescue identi- 
fies human rules, or positive laws, with perfect 
justice. It would appear to some that this is mere- 
ly an example of Fortescue's enthusiasm for the com- 
mon law. Corwin thins this statement to be singular- 
) (1 
ly significant. He indicates this as an example 
of the way in which common law, or parts of the 
common law, became the higher, or fundamental law. 
These fundamental laws were incorporated in the 
(2) 
Constitution of the United Sates. It has been 
previously noted that during the middle ages, Div- 
ine Law and Natural Law were identified with justice 
and human laws were of less importance. If the Ius 
Civile were contrary to the Ius Naturale, justice 
could not prevail unless the Ius Naturale were fol- 
lowed. Fortescue, in his enthusiastic praise of 
the common law, writes much more about the good 
qualities of the law than he does about the law it- 
self. It is neRcessary to have due regard for his 
purpose in writing the book. He was writing for the 
instruction of the Prince, and was not acting in his 
capacity as a judge. 
(i) 42 Harvard Law Review, pp 170, 180 
(2) Ibid, note 66. "Many of the rights which the 
Constitution of the `? noted States protects at 
this moment against legislative power, were 
protected by the common law against one's 
neighbors." 
Fortescue's praise for the common law, and his 
conception of the law as a " professional mystery," 
a peculiar science of Bench and Bar, must have ex- 
erted an influence on later judges ( Coke in particu- 
(1) 
lar ) to consider the judges as the only competent 
(2) 
authorities concerning the common law. 
(1) Coke states: 
True it was, that God Had endowed 
His Majesty with excellent science...but His Majesty 
was not learned in the laws of His realm of England, 
and causes which concern the life or inheritance or 
goods or fortunes of his subjects are note to be 
decided by natural reason, but by the artificial 
judgment and reason of the law, which law is an act 
which requires long study and experience, before 
can attain to the cognizance of it, and that the 
law was a golden met wand and measure to try the 
causes of His subjects, and which protected His 
Majesty in safety and in peace. 
( Prohibitions del Roy, 7 Coke 63 -65, 1509 Ed 
(2) Professor E. S. Corwin, who has attacked the 
theory of Judicial Supremacy as it exists in 
the United States, eagerly siezes the oppor- 
qi 
tunity to make the most of Fortescue's praise 
of the common law. Corwin sties: 
But the distinctive contribution of De 
Laudibus has still to be mentioned, that feature 
of it which discriminates it sharply from all earlier 
eulogies of higher law. This is Fortescue's conception 
of the law as a professional mystery, as the peculiar 
science of the Bench and Bar. 
Corwin, "The Higher Law Background of American 
Constitutional Law" 42 Harvard Law Review,180. 
In the Amos Edition (1825) of De Laudibus Legum 
Angliae, there is an extensive note at the conclusion 
cf chppter sixteen regarding the law of nature. The 
question is raised whether there are any dictates of 
nature apart from the question of utility, and it is 
pointed out that even the philthsopher cannot find an 
easy solution to the problem. It is indicated that 
the friends of the institutions of Great Britain will 
be careful when such a vague standard as natural right 
enters into any question capable of being determined 
by pobitizelaw. It is then pointed out that much un- 
certainty and perplexity has existed amonst legal 
authorities concerning this question. 
Mention is made here of this note because it 
would indicate that De Laud ibus Legum Ang.li ae , even 
as late as 1825,had aroused interest in the natural 
law. Another point to note is the doubt thrown upon 
the claim that there exists any uniform dictates of 
nature independent of the consideration of utility. 
In 1825 the utility value of the colonists' reliance 
upon the law of nature must have been clearly ap- 
parent. 
Amos concludes: 
Examples abound in the 
history of this country, in which 
the injunctions of the law of nature 
have been pleaded as a sanction for 
the most flagrant violations of civ- 
il rights. (Amos Ed. n. a, pp48 -49. 
JS 
Doctor and Student. 
It is reported that Thomas Jefferson was so 
impressed with St. Germain's Doctor and Student 
(I) 
that he planned to annotate it thoroughly. It 
was the philosophical approach to law which held the 
interest of Jefferson. 
The book was well known to English lawyers in 
(2) 
the latter half of the sixteenth century. Coke 
and Fitzherbert make reference frequently to this 
book. 
Developed in the form of a dialogue between a 
student of the laws of England and a doctor of divin- 
ity, the books explains how laws were influenced by 
the ideas of the times. 
(1) Mullett, Fundamental Law and the American 
Revolution, p. 39. 
(2) Winfield, Chief Sources of English Legal History± 
states: 
Doctor and Student was well known and 
well liked in the legal profession. Great men 
like Fitzherbert and Coke cited it frequently, 
and there is reason to think that it partially 
filled a gap which only Blackstone's Commentaries 
were destined to close. 
( Winfield, p. 323.) 
A Doctor of Divinity, that 
was og great acquaintance and 
familiarity with a student:: in 
the laws of England, said unto 
him, 
" I have had a great desire 
of a long time to know whereupon 
the law of England is grounded; 
But because the law of England is 
written in the French tongue, there- 
fore I cannot througi - my own study 
attain the knowledge thereof, for 
in that tongue I am nothing expert. 
And because I have found thee a 
faithful friend to me in all my 
business, therefore I am bold 
to come to thee before any other, 
to know thy,mind, what be the 
very grounds of the Law of England, 
as thou thinkest." (1) 
The student consents, but asks the Doctor to 
explain other laws which are sognate to English law. 
The Doctor classifies the other laws as (1) Eternal 
Law, (2) The Law of Nature of Reasonable Creatures, 
or The Law of Reason, (3) The Law of God, (4) The 
Law of Man. 
After the Doctor of Divinity has explained his 
division of other laws, he asks the student regarding 
the law of nature in England. 
(1) Doctor and Student, (1721 edition) p. 1. 
The student replies that when "anything is ground- 
(1) 
ed upon the law of nature" it is said that reas- 
on wills that such and such be done. There are two 
kinds of laws under the classification of reason. 
Murder, perjury, deceit, and burglary are prohibit- 
ed by reason primarily. An example of what would 
be void according to the law of reason is given: 
" Any promise made by man as to the body, it is by 
the law of reason void in the laws of England." (2) 
The law of a secondary reason is grounded on 
the general law or the general custom of property. 
Thus there is little in the student's explanation 
of the Law of Nature of Reasonable Creatures which . 
could be identified with the conventional concept 
of the law of nature. When the student '.fives an 
example of the Law of God, however, one notes a 
similarity to the traditional explanation of funda- 
mental law concepts. 
St. Germain states: 
" If it were ordained that 
no alms should be priven for no necessity, the cus- 
(3) 
tom and statute were void." However, he points 
out that a law which would prohibit alms to a beggar 
(1)St. Germain, Doctor and Student (1721 E.) p. 15. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid, p, 18. 
cJ 
who could work is not void, for it observeth the 
(1) 
intent of the Law of God." 
Vinogradoff cites St. Germain as one who had a 
stimulating influence on English Jurisprudence of the 
fifteenth and bixteenth centuries, although he stress- 
es the point that many of the ideas in Doctor and Stud- 
ent were taken from the works of John Gerson. (2) 
Potter mentions the influence of Doctor and Stud- __ 
gnt on the Chancellors, who derived many of their i- 
(3) 
deas from legal philosophers and canonists. The 
Chancellors were influenced by the theory that the law 
of God governed the Universe. A law made by man could 
not be valid if it were in conflict with a law of God. 
Potter states: 
In the Doctor and Student 
these f7vc propositions are 
clearly stated. " When the 
law eternal or the will of 
God is knoune to His creatures 
reasonable by the lieht of 
natural understanding, or 
by the light of natural reason 
that is called the law of 
reason: and when it is show- 
ed of heavenly revelation... 
then it is called the law 
of God." (4) 
(1) St. Germain, Doctor and Student (1721) pp.18-19. 
(2) Vinogradoff, " Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth 
Century Jurisprudence ", 24 Law Quarterly. Rev. 373. 
(3) , (4) Potter, Historical Introduction toTnclish 
Law and Its Institutions, pp.49495. 
St. Germain continues: 
Thus: 
...If any law made 
of men bind any person 
to anything that is a- 
ainst the said laws 
the law of reason or 
the law of God) it is 
no law but a corruption 
and a manifest error. (1) 
Consequently the Chan- 
cellor arrogated him- 
self the right to inter- 
fere with the course of 
law in a particular instance, 
even where the general 
rule was just, if accord- 
ing to the conscience it 
would work against the law 
of God. (2) 
In conclusion one may state that the discussion 
concerning the Law of God, and the general philosophi- 
cal approach to the explanation of English law, exert- 
ed an influence upon the lawyers and judges of England 
and through them was transmitte^ to the colonists in 
(3) 
Amerthcá. 
(1) Cited by Holdsworth, History. of English Law, 5 rd E 
Vol. iv, p. 280, nn. (1), (2). Also by Potter, An 
Historical Introduction to English Law and Its 
Institutions, pp. 494-:475. 
(2) Potter, p. 495. 
(3) Mullett, Fundamental Law and the American Revolu- 
tions pp. 38 -41, 43, 63, 78. 
It must be noted, however, that the author of 
Doctor and Student made it clear that "the term law 
of nature is not used among them that be learned in 
(1) 
the law of England." Not until the turn of the 
century- -the beginning of the seventeenth, did the 
law of nature, or the law of reason, find itself def- 
initely and boldly set forth in English case law. Thus 
we find in Calvin's Case ( 7 Coke I, 4b,1610 ): 
(1) That ligeance or obedience of the subject 
to the Sovereign is due by the law of nature. 
(2) That this law of nature is part of the 
laws of England. 
(3) That the law of nature was before any 
judicial or municipal law in the world. 
(4) The law of nature is immutable and 
cannot be chpnged. 
Coke argues that the law of nature was infused 
in the heart of man at the time of the creation, 
"written by the finger of God in the heart of man" 
until Moses, the first law reporter, recorded it. Coke 
mentions Aristotle, Bracton, Fortescue, and cites 
Doctor and Student, cap. 2 and 4. 
It is now time to consider Coke's dictum in 
Bonham's Case. The case has been cited in the United 
States as a British precedent for judicial review. 
(1) St. Germain, Doctor and Student (Muchall ed.1787) 
pp. 12-13. 
1. B ONHAM' S CASE. 
Bonham's case did not receive as much attention at 
the time the decision was rendered as it did when Amer- 
icans discovered statements of Lord Coke which were 
similar to the ideas held by the Colonists immediately 
before the American Revolution. The case is of little 
interest to the people of Great Britain to -day, who 
know that the Supremacy of Parliament has been recog- 
nized since 1688. 
What was the statement which the Colonists quoted 
as an authority for their stand against the Stamp Act ?1 
And it appears in our books that in 
many cases the common law will con- 
trol acts of Parliament and some- 
times adjudge them to be utterly 
void; for when an act of Parliament 
is against common right or reason, 
or repugnant or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will con- 
trol it and adjudge such an act to 
be void. 2 
What caused Coke to make this statement, and what 
are his authorities? 
It will be noted in the case that the Statute 10 
Henry VIII provided that the Royal College of Physicians 
were granted power to fine practitioners who were not 
admitted by them, and that one-half of the fine was to 
go/ 
1. See John Adams, Works 9: 390, 391, note, and 
Appendix, Quincy-75W. 
2. 8 Coke 114a (C. P 1610) . 
go to the King and one -half to the college. This means 
that the Royal College of Physicians were both judges 
and parties to the case, according to Coke, who states, 
The Censors cannot be judges, ministers, 
and parties; judges to give sentence 
or judgment; ministers to make summons; 
and parties to have moiety of the for- 
feiture, quia aliquis non debet esse 
Judex in propria causa i o inicauám est a úem suce rei esse u ioem; and one 
cánnot be judge and attorney for any 
of the parties. i 
One of the cases which Coke citas to sustain the 
contention that a man cannot be a judge in his own case 
contains the following, 
(Y .B . 8 Henry VI, at page 20.) 
Rolf: I will tell you a fable. 
Once upon a time there was a Pope who 
had created a great offense and the 
Cardinals came to him and said, 
"Peccasti," and he said, "Judica me." 
And they said, "Non posse uus a-- 
caput es ecclesiae; judica teipsum." 
Am-Eh e rope ssaid suá cá me cremari," 
and he was burnt. And in this case 
he was his ovum judge, and afterwards 
he was a Saint. So it is not incon- 
venient for a man to be his own judge. 2 
In the Case of the Earl of Arundel against Lord 
Windsor and Another, 3 Edw. VI 65, (Dyer's Reports, 
Vol. I), another authority cited by Coke, it was de- 
cided that one cannot be both a judge and an attorney 
for/ 
. Thomas and Fraser Edition (1826), Coke's Reports, 
Coke 114a, ff. .
2. Rolf was counsel for the Chancellor of Oxford. The 
question before the Court was whether a charter of 
Richard II gave the chancellor jurisdiction in cases 
where he was himself a party. See 10 En Historical 
Rev. p. 536. 
for any of the parties. This, without a doubt, is an 
authority for his statement. However, if one turns to 
kblle's Abridgment, volume II, pages 92 and 93, one 
finds, written in old legal French, fourteen exceptions 
to this maxim. 
In Quincy's Mass Reports, 525, Dr. Bonhamts Case 
is cited by Otis in the Writs of Assistance. The ques- 
tion of whether a man can be judge in his own case is 
considered in an elaborate footnote. Numerous examples 
are given to show that a man may be both judge and 
interested party. 
Now let us consider B onham's Case in some detail: 
There are two Reports: 
(1) Coke (8 Coke 114a (C .P . 1610) 
Coke presided at the trial as Chief Justice of Common 
Pleas.) 
(2) Brownlow (2 Brown], (C. P. 1610) 
Browniow was present at the latter stages of the case 
in his capacity of Prothonotary of the Court.) 
Browniow reports earlier proceed- 
ings than Coke, while the latter natur- 
ally preserves his own judgment at 
greater length. Taken together, the two 
sources enable us to reconstruct the 
argument in the case with considerable 
detail and fair certainty, although, 
as we shall see later, the accuracy of 
Coker s reports have been attacked. (This 
is a reference to the attack attributed 
to Lord Ellesmere.) 1 
1. 40 Harvard Law Review, p. 31. 
A DIGEST OF BONHAM' S CASE.1 
Dr. Bonham claimed £300 damages for false im- 
prisonment by the President and hoyal Censors of the 
Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons. The defend- 
ants entered a plea of not guilty, and issue thereon 
as to force and arms. As to the residum of the tres- 
pass they plead in bar. 
The defendants set out the letters patent of Henry 
VIII, who commanded that among other things, a certain 
College of Physicians should have the overseeing, 
searching, and correction of the Physicians who prac- 
ticed in the City of London, and said College of Phys- 
icians had the right and power to punish any physician 
who was not properly practising his profession in the 
City of London. It was provided that the President 
and College should be authorized to "search, examine, 
correct, and punish all transgressors, and should send, 
disobedience, or contrary to any article or clause ! 
contained in the grant, to any prison ... except the 
tower of London." 
2 
The plaintiff, contrary to the letters patent, 
had not been admitted by the President and College, 
because he had been examined and found insufficient to 
practise physic._; . He was forbidden to do so, yet he 
continued/ 
1. 8 Coke 114a. 
2. 8 Coke 114a. 
continued to practice. Bonham was then fined 100 
shillings, and was enjoined from practising physic in 
London. The plaintiff continued to practise his pro- 
fession. He was then advised to make his appearance, 
before the Censors, but he did not do this.. He was 
then amerced ten pounds and was ordered to be arrested 
and delivered into custody. The Plaintiff appeared 
before the president and censors, and refused to yield 
obedience. Bonham stated that he had practised and 
would continue to practise without leave of the College. 
He denied that the College had any authority over him, 
he was a graduate of the University of Cam - 
'bridge, and had taken the degree of Doctor of Physic. 
The censors ordered Dr. Bonham to prison, and the 
order was executed. In the case for false imprison- 
ment, the Court held for the plaintiff, because: 
(1) The censors had not the power to 
commit the plaintiff for any of the 
causes mentioned in the bar. The 
college did not possess the powers 
they claimed over unlicensed (as 
distinct from incompetent) pract- 
itioners. 
(2) Even if they did they had not pur- 
sued their powers aright. 
To support the first point, five reasons were 
given. It is the fourth reason which has been quoted 
as an authority for the American theory of Judicial 
Review. 
"The Censors cannot be judges, ministers, and 
parties: judges to give sentence or judgment; ministers 
to make summons, and parties to have the moiety of the 
forfeiture." 
1 
Thomas and Frazer (1876) Ed. 8 Coke 118a. 
COKE'S AUTHORITIES. 
Coke's first precedent is T'regor' s Case. As will 
be shown later, the use of this case as an authority 
Ifor Coke's contention received criticism almost immed- 
iately, in "Egerton's Observations." Mr. Brinton Coxe 
makes no comments on the case, but Professor :.Plucknett 
attacks the case in the following account in his book, 
Interpretation of Statutes in the 14th Century: 
Tregor's Case. (Y. B. Pasch. 8 Edw. III, 26.) 
Coke misquoted the Year Book. 
Herne saith some statutes are fade 
against law -and E?:..ltaL which those who 
made them pereiu.nn, would not put 
them into execution. 
The italicized words are inter- 
polations by Coke which do not appear 
in the original, and introduce an idea 
of some superior right which Herne 
certainly did not entertain. The 
only meaning which Herle's words can 
reasonably be made to bear is that 
sometimes the legislator has repented 
of a hasty piece of work and has been 
content to allow it to become a dead 
letter. Secondly, whoever reads the 
whole of Herle's remarks can see that 
he did not regard the statute then 
under discussion as falling within 
this category; on the contrary he sug- 
gested a perfectly obvious and straight- 
forward interpretation of it, in which 
Hilary concurred. It cannot be denied 
that Coke's first authority is far 
from convincing. 
My conclusions concerning Professor Plucknett's asser 
tion will be considered later. 
Coke's/ 
Coke's second authority is Fitzherbert, Cessavit 
42. Professor Plucknett states, 
In the Graurede Abridgement of 
Fitzherbert it occupies but two lines, 
and they are not altogether intellig- 
ible, but in Coke's telling the story 
gains an aunt and a niece as well as 
considerable clarity --all derived from 
an unspecified and an unidentified 
source. However, even in the form in 
which it appears in Fitzherbert, it 
is plain that the judgment was in com- 
plete accordance with that in the ear- 
lier case, Copper vs. Gedderings Y. B. 
3 Edw. II 105 which is more fully re- 
ported and for our knowledge of which 
we are indebted to the Year Books of 
the Selden Society. 
The facts of the case are these: 
Statute of Westminster 2nd enacted that the right 
of action in Cessavit should descent from a lord to 
his heir; but when an heir brought his writ, Chief 
Justice B ereford refused to maintain it on the ground 
that if it were maintained, certain general principles 
of the common law would be disturbed. 
It has been claimed that Bereford often embodied 
his distinctly original views upon legal problems in 
his judgments, "but in this case the same decision was 
given half a century later in the case of Cessavit 42 
quoted by Coke, and duly enshrined in the books of 
authority as the final law upon the subject. "1 
N atura/ 
1. See 40 Harvard Law Review, p.36. "Here then is no 
mere caprice of one particular judge but a catena 
of authorities extending down to: Coke' s own WI.` 
Natura Brevium (1553) CLVI ID , 
Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium (Haler s Ed. 1755) 209; 2 Co. 
Inst. 407740.------- 
The statement of Sir Frederick Pollock (Pollock, 
First Book of Juris, 3rd ed. 1911, 264) "that no case 
is known, in fact, in which an English Court of Justice' 
has openly taken on itself to overrule or disregard 
the plain meaning of an act of Parliament," is thus 
,open to objection. Here the statute was disregarded.l 
However, it must be pointed out that this is not 
'necessarily a precedent in constitutional law. The 
decision does not definitely declare that judges have 
the power to declare a statute null and void in certain) 
instances. It woi.ld appear that Coke has claimed too 
much for the case. 
Cokets third precedent is found in Fitzherbert, 
Annuitie 41. A good translation of Annuitie 41 should 
be accredited to Miss Klingesmith in 1 Statham (1915) 
114, where it appears as Annuitie 11. It is to be noted 
that she has translated "impertinent" by "impossible." 
This follows the traditional view. 
One Rotes brought a writ of annuity against an 
abbot and showed a deed for the annuity made by the 
predecessor of this same abbot and sealed with the/ 
1. See 40 Harvard Law Review, p36. 
the seal of the Convent, which annuity was for certain 
bread, and ale, and robes and other things, etc. 
Pole: The Statute of Carlisle says that Cister- 
cienses and Premonstratensians and others who have a 
convent and a common seal, that the common seal shall 
be in the keeping of the prior, who is under the abbot 
etc. and four others, the wisest of the house,and that 
any deed sealed with the common seal which is not thus 
in their keeping shall be void. And we say that at the 
time this deed was sealed, the seal was out of their 
keeping. And the opinion of the Court was that the 
(impertinent) 
Statute was void since it is impossible to be observed, 
for when the seal was in their keeping the abbot could 
not seal anything with it for when it was in the hands 
of the abbot it would be out of their keeping, ipso 
facto. And if the statute shall be observed every 
common seal will be defeated by a simple allegation 
which cannot be tried, etc. See E the case for it was 
well debated and many exceptions were taken to the 
place, etc. (Note: Must see manuscript, for no 
printed Paschal for 27 Henry VI.) 
Professor Plucknett points out several discourag- 
ing features of the case as a precedent: (1) Only an 
opinion of the judges is rendered; judgment is not 
reported and may never have taken place; (2) The word 
void is not used of the statute; (3) We have no access 
to/ 
to documents earlier than forty years after the event, 
and all of the arguments have been lost; (4) Mr Brinton 
Coke's conjecture that the decision was influenced by 
consideration of canon law (although Professor Pluck - 
nett minimizes the importance of this argument). 
Professor Plucknett does emphasize the importance 
of the word "impertinent," as contrasted with impos- 
sible, found in Coke (2 Coke Inst. 587 -88) and Black- 
stone (1 Blackstone Common. 91) . 
Thus the case is of some strength, but not alto- 
gether convincing as a precedent for Coke's contention. 
In 118 B, Coke cites 14 Eliz. Dyer 313, and 
Strowd's Case. The cases developed out of a situation 
which arose out of the upsetting of legal titles of 
religious houses at the time of the Reformation. 
The report of the 1572 case is as follows: 
"Memorandum, that it was resolved by the opinion of 
the Court on the Bench, that the Seignory and tenure of 
obit land, or Chantry land, is extinct by the possess- 
ion of the King, by the act of 1 E. 6 (C. 14) notwith- 
standing the saving in the act; propter absurditatem. "1 
Thus to impossibility and impertinence is added ab- 
surdity. The solution is explained by Professor 
Pluoknett as one where 
the court refuses to recognize the 
express words of the Statute in favor 
of rent services; but what it takes 
away With one hand, it prudently re- 
stores with the other, for it con - 
cedes/ 
1. 3 Dyer, 313 (K. B. 1572) 
concedes that the quondam lord - we 
may no longer call hilt lord after the 
king's seisin - may still exact his 
rent by way of distress. i 
Last of all, Coke states, in Strowd's Case, this 
imaginary situation: 
So if any act of Parliament gives to 
any to hold., or to have cognisance of 
all manner of pleas arising before 
him within his manor of D, yet he 
shall hold no plea, to which he him- 
self is party, for,2as hath been said, 
iniquum est aliquem suae rei esse 
judicem. 
Beginning with the idea that letters patent could 
not make a man judge in his own case, thus an act of 
Parliament would be just as ineffective.3 
1. Plucknett, 40 Harvard Law Review, 43. 
2. 8 Coke 118 B. 
3. Corwin, in The Doctrine of Judicial Review (1914) , 
p. 69, accepts the Manor of Dale case as a real 
precedent: 
LORD CHANCELLOR EGERTON'S OBSERVATIONS ON LORD COKE'S 
REPORTS AND CRITICISMS OF LORD EGERTON'S OBSERVATIONS 
1. The criticism of Bonham's case by Lord Egerton 
(British Museum Library 694 m 4) 
A. Comparison of Coke's statement with that of 
Merle (8 Edw. III, 30) 
2. Sergeant hill's Observation on the stricture of 
Lord Egerton (Inscribed in Hill's handwriting, 
in the copy of the report in 
Lincoln's Inn Library, London. 
The statement of Hill is printed 
in a footnote, volume 4, Coke's 
Reports, page 376 (Thomas Frazer 
Edition, 1826.) 
3. Holdsworth's comments on Lord Egerton's Observa- 
tions (5 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law 478, n.l) 
A. 36 Law Quarterly Review 4 
4. Plucknett's comments on Lord Egerton's Observations 
(40 Harvard Law Review at page 52) 
A. Moore, 828, K. B. 1616 
B. 36 Law , luarterly Review, pages 5, 6. 
Note by Sir Frederick Pollock, reviewing 
a case Bourne v. Keane (1919) A. C. 815 
, 
What Reception was Accorded the 
Doctrine by Coke's Contemporaries? 
The criticism of Bonham's Case by Lord Egerton 
In the library of the British Museum may be 
found an interesting document, which, it is reported, 
was written by the Chancellor Lord 7.gerton, criticizin 
Coke for his "extravagant" opinions. 
Coke's rapid rise from the Chief Justiceship 
of the Common Pleas to the King's Bench and his ambition 
to be recognized as the "Chief Justice of England" 
brought opposition from several sources, and it was not 
long before he found himself fighting the Court of Chan- 
cery, and even offending the King. In 1616 he was 
directed by the King to correct his reports, and while 
this matter was pending he was removed from his office 
as Chief Justice of the King's Bench. His removal will 
not be discussed here. We are concerned with the 
charges against his reports, which were prepared by 
Francis Bacon, and approved by the then Chancellor, 
1 
Lord Ellesmere (Egerton). It was charged that Coke 
actually went out of his way to state opinions which 
to advance 
were "extravagant" and also /opinions that were not 
essential to the decisions in the cases. 
1. For an account, see Birkenhead, Fourteen English 
Judges, p. 8. 
Five cases were cited: (1) The Case of Isle 
of Ely (10 Coke), (2) Darcy's Case (11 Coke), (3) God- 
frey's Case (11 Coke), (4) Bonham's Case (8 Coke), (5) 
1 
Bagge's Case (11 Coke). A portion of Lord Egerton's 
Observations is directed to Bonham's Case. Coke is 
criticized for placing his opinion above that of the 
Three Estates- -The King, The Lords, and the Commons. 
The claim is to frustrate the labour of the Estates, 
"which degradeth much the wisdom and power of Parlia- 
ment." 
The following statements are taken directly 
from the copy in the British Museum Library: 
Lord Chancellor Egerton's Obserations on Lord 
Coke's Reports 
-- Touching the Power and Jurisdiction 
of Courts and Commissioners 
. . . which are established by the Common Law, by 
Continual Life and Practice within the realm, or 
by Act of Parliament, it is a point of great dan- 
ger, and breedeth occasion of much contempt in the 
inferior subjects, when they see the same either 
questioned., impeached, or weakened, and therefore, 
as it is fit, that each streami should keep his 
own current, yet is it as unfit in an unsettled 
state, that the current should be stopped or made 
straighter, than by continual life it hath been. 
Yet the Chief Justice, in his reports, hath 
scattered many sudden opinions in Diminution of 
the lawful power of many courts, not only in 
abridging, but in a manner wholly upsetting the 
jurisdiction of some of them, to give instances 
of a few: 
1. A summary of these cases may be found in Boudin, 
Government by Judiciary, I, 492 -494. 
(1) Godfrey's Case. C 0 L 1: 1 F 4 4. 
(2) Dr. Bonham's Case. COL8F118. 
The case in question being, what power the 
College of Physicians had by their charter, and 
by the Act of Parliament, 14H8 to imprison any 
other physician that practiced in London, with- 
out the License of the College, he letteth fall 
not at unawares but de industria this paradox, 
that in many cases, the Common Law shall control 
Acts of Parliament, and sometimes shall adjudge 
them to be utterly void; for, saith he, when an 
Act of Parliament is against Common' Right and 
Reason the Common Law shall control it, and ad- 
judge it to be void, which degradeth much from 
the wisdom and Power of the Parliament; that 
when the three estates, the King, the Lords, and 
the Commons, have spent their labour in making 
a law, then shall three judges on the bench de- 
stroy and frustrate all their pains, because the 
Act agreeth not (in their particular sense) with 
Common Right and Reason; whereby he advanceth 
the reason of a particular Court above the 
judgment of all the realm. Besides, more tem- 
perately did that Reverend Chief Justice Herle, 
in the time of Edw. III deliver his opinion, 8 
Edw. III 30, cited by my Lord Coke, when he saia, 
some Acts of Parliament are made against Law anc 
Right which they that made them, perceiving, 
would not put them in execution; for it is Ibzagis 
Congruum, that Acts of Parliament should be cor- 
rected by the same pen that drew them, than to 
be dashed to pieces by the opinion of a few 
judges. 
The Observations considered only one prece- 
dent listed by Coke; an investigation of some of the 
others would have strengthened the criticisms. Evi- 
dently Bacon and Egerton did not check original source 
for recent studies of the Year Books have brought to 
light even more temperate words than those which the 
Observations point out. Plucknett claims that Coke 
1 
added the words but this would mean either (1) Bacon 
1. 40 Harvard Law .review, 35 ff. 
and Egerton used Coke's Reports as a basis for their 
distinction between the words of Herle and Coke, or (2) 
that other reporters of Tregor's Case had added the 
words "law and right," and Coke, using this reporter's 
account of the case, cannot be held responsible for the 
additional words. 
It is important to note, however, that soon 
after the publication of Coke's report of Bonham's Case 
there was objection raised both to the decision and to 
at least one of the authorities he cited. One wonders 
whether Egerton's distinction is not sufficient to de- 
stroy the effectiveness of Tregor's Case as an authorit 
without accusing Coke of making additions to Herle's 
statements, as Plucknett has done. 
In the Thomas and Frazer edition of Coke's 
Reports, the editors devote a considerable amount of 
footnote space to the Observations of Lord Egerton and 
the comments of Sergeant Hill. Winfield, in the Chief 
Sources of English Legal History, mentions Hill as the 
editor who produced the fifth and best edition of 
Burrow's Reports (1756 -1772). Hill's edition was print 
in 1812. He was undoubtedly one of the respected 
editors of the time, and editors Frazer and Thomas, 
who published their edition of Coke's Reports in 1826, 
considered. Hill's comments on the Egerton Observations 
of great footnote value. 
d 
It will be noticed in the following account 
of hill's comments, that Hill definitely comes to the 
defense of Coke. Furthermore, Hill reports that in 
Forbes' Parliamentary Debates, volume VII, pages 84, 8t, 
one may find several examples of Parliamentary Acts 
,;that ;. have been declared void. A thorough search was 
made through the files of the British Museum Library, 
and no trace could be found of Forbes.' Debates. Whether 
this was a mistake of Sergeant Hill, or a mistake of the 
editors, or a mistake of the British Museum Index, has 
not yet been determined. If there were such a volume, 
it could be found in the British Museum Library, accord 
ing to the head librarian. It is possible that the 
author's name was confused with the printer's. At the 
present time, the library staff of the British:useum 
are trying to locate the volume to which gill refers. 
In the Thomas and Frazer edition (1826) of 
Coke's Reports the following quotation is given from 
Lord Ellesmere's Observations on the Reports, page 21. 
And as for novelty in Dr. Bonham's Case, the 
chief justice having no precedent for him, yet 
doth he strike in sunder the bars of government 
of the College of Physicians and without any paus- 
ing on the matter, frustrate the patent of King 
Henry VIII, whereby the college was erected, and 
tramples upon the act of Parliament, 14 and 15 
Henry VIII whereby the patent was confirmed, blow- 
ing them both away as vain, and of no value, and 
this in triumph of himself, being accompanied but 
with the opinion of one judge only for the matter 
where three other judges were against him, which 
case possesseth a better room in the press than 
is deserved. 
Appended to this portion of the Observations 
is found: 
Sergeant Hill's Observation on Stricture 
of Lord Ellesmere (Egerton) 
(Inscribed in Hill's handwriting. Copy Lincoln's 
Inn Library) Footnote -- Thomas Frazer (1826) Vol. 4. 
Coke Rep. P376. 
In page 117 of the Report of Dr. Bonham's Case, 
8 co. it appears that two of the other judges 
agreed with Coke as to the two points of which 
they gave judgment. The 2nd point is in 117b, 
and the matter of law in support of it, which is 
condensed here, is in page 118, viz., that a 
statute against reason is void, and is supported 
by many authorities, then, and by others before, 
and since, in our courts; and the antiquity of 
it is still more ancient. Just. Inst. Lib. Title 
2, Text 1. Dr. Bonham's Case is reported in 2 
Brownl. 255 to 266, and in page 260, it appears 
that the case was argued by all the Justices of 
C. P. and at two several days it was argued by 
Foster, Daniel, and Warburton, are not reported 
by Brownlow; but he reports fully, 1st, the ar- 
gument of Walmsley for the Plaintiff, and after- 
wards-that of Coke against him, and in page 265, 
the like reasons and authorities are given by 
Coke, for his opinion as it appears in his re- 
ports; and then Brownlow mentions, only at the 
end, that so he (Coke) concluded that judgment 
shall be entered for the Plaintiff, which was 
done accordingly. This last report, I think, is 
a confirmation of Lord Coke's report; though 
Lord Coke only reports the effects of the argu- 
ments of the justices, who were of opinion agains 
the Plaintiff, fol. 116. There is, it is true, in 
some parts of the argument, some things that savo r 
of the pedantry and quaintness peculiar to the 
time, but nothing to impeach that part of it whic . 
is the part objected to by Lord Egerton, and, es 
observed, Coke's opinion as to that part at least, 
is confirmed by many authorities before Dr. Bon - 
ham's Case. 
It is interesting to note that the copy of Eg-r- 
ton's Observations has been attacked not only because f 
content, but by many legal historians who have doubted 
authenticity. The following summary of attacks is off 
1. There is considerable doubt whether Lord 
Egerton is the author. (See Holdsworth, History of E 




2. In the preface, to the Observations, writ en 
by George Paul, considerable time is spent attempting 
reassure others that the observations were written by ord 
Egerton (as if it wre necessary to reassure, indicating con - 
siderable doubt). 
3. Also, there is added (by Mr. Paul) 
For may part, I have but one scruple about it, and 
that rises from a particular expression in Dr. 
Bonham's Case, page 11, but, that, I believe, wil 
appear a difficulty to a very few readers, and 
not be taken notice of by a great many. 
Query: That expression? 
4. Plucknett, in 40 H. L. R. at p. 52, point 
out that even Lord Egerton, in his address to Chief 
Justice Montagu, commending those judges who do not 
declare statutes void for being contrary to reason and 
common right, makes one exception: "I speak not of im 
possibilities or direct repugnances." (Moore, 828 (K. 
1616)). 
5. 36 Law Quarterly Review, pp. 5 -6, note b 
Frederick Pollock, reviewing a case Bourne v. Keane (1'19) 
A. C. 815 89 L. T, ch. 17, says: 
A tract entitled the Lord Chancellor Egerton' 
Observations on the Lord. Coke's Reports was cited 
in the argument, and is referred to in the judg- 
ments. Its attribution to Lord Ellesmere appears 
to rest on very slender evidence. It was printed 
early in the 18th Century, as appears by 
typographic indications, with a preface by one 
George Paul (not learned in the law by his own 
statement, and not to be confused with Ellesmere's 
contemporary, Sir G. Paule, tracing it to the 
manuscripts of the late Mr. Laughton, of Cambridge 
a person not discoverable in the D. N. B.). The 
heading on thia first page describes the observa- 
tions as taken out of his (Lord Ellesmere's) 
papers written with his own hand; this being, 
according to Mr. Paul, the very same title ... 
prefixed to them by Mr. Laughton. Now the tract 
is such a memorandum as the Secretary or officer of 
the Court might very well have prepared under Lord 
Ellesmere's direction, and Lord Ellesmere himself, 
conceivably, though not very probably, have copied 
from the subordinate draft --it might even be with 
amendments or added touches of his own. But it 
does not seem at all likely that he should have 
been at the pains of going through Coke's Reports 
himself to pick out passages for censure, Mr. 
Laughton's opinion (whoever he may have been) to 
the contrary notwithstanding. 
6. Volume 5 Holdsworth, W. L., History of Eng- 
lish Law, 234: "There is no warrant for ascribing to 
him (Egerton) the volume of Observations on Coke's 
Reports, which sometimes passes under his name." 
BRITISH CASES AND TEXTS BEFORE AND AFTER BONHAM'S CASE 
WHICH CONSIDERED SIMILAR ISSUES 
1. Prior of Castle Acre v. Dean of St. Stephens 
(21 Henry VII, pages 1 -5) 
This case involved the exercise of Spiritual 
Power by a Temporal Legislature. The case con- 
sidered the question whether an act of Parlismen 
could make the king, a temporal man, the parson 
of a certain church. This act would therefore 
give spiritual jurisdiction to a temporal man 
without the consent of the spiritual power. 
2. Sheriff of Northumberland's Case 
(Y. B. 2 Henry VII, page 6) 
Although the Year Book reports record,.; no decisin 
in this case, it is reported in Calvin's Case (7 
Coke la, 14a, C. P. 1608) that the judges did 
agree, and in Godden v. Hales (2 Shower 478) it 
is recorded that "the sheriff's case in the 2nd 
year of Henry 7th was law, and always was taken 
as law." It is recorded in Shower that the judge 
in the Sheriff's case held a statute invalid be- 
cause it was judicially ascertained to deprive t e 
king of a part of his rightful prerogative. 
3. Day v. Savage (87 Hobart's Rep. 1614) 
Asserted that an act of Parliament may be void, 
although the case did not turn on that point. 
4. Mayor and Commonalty of London v. Wood 
(12 Modern Reports, 669, 687) 
This case involved a by -law of the City of Londo 
rather than an act of Parliament. Holt referred 
to Coke's doctrine and definitely supported it i 
his opinion. 
5. Certain statements of Coke (2 Institutes 4) and of 
Blackstone (I Commentaries 91) regarding the con 
struction and interpretation of actsof Parliamen . 
6. Opposition to the Coke Doctrine 
Streater's Case (1653) 
Parrish of Great Charte v. Parrish of Kennington 
(1742) 
8- 
1. Prior of Castle Acre v. Dean of St.Stephens 
It is possible to find several cases which 
developed because a statute caused conflicts over 
jurisdiction or appeared to be opposed to some maxim, 
or fundamental law. Naturally before the reformation, 
there were several cases which developed over spiritual 
and temporal powers, and the conflict between the 
Common Law Courts ptnd the Ecclesiastical Courts. 
One of the cases often cited is that of Castle 
Acre v. Dean of St. Stephens. Here the question 
developed in the common law court regarding the validit 
of an act which would give spiritual jurisdiction to a 
temporal man without the consent of a spiritual power. 
The question is only of historical interest now, for 
the reformation gave Parliament power and control of 
ecclesiastical matters. However, in the time of 
Henry VIII it was decided that an act of Parliament 
could not make the King, a temporal men., a parson of a 
certain church. We are indebted to Brinton Coxe for 
his translation and summery of the case: 
The Prior of Castle acre brought an action of 
annuity against the Dean of St. Stephens. In making 
his title, the plaintiff claimed that all his 
predecessors had been seized of the annuity by the hand 
of a certain A., Parson of the Church of N. and all his 
predecessors de temps dont memory ne court, and. that 
the annuity was in arrear. The defendant claimed that 
the parsonage was and had been appropriated to the 
Priors of B. devant temps de memory. Their priory was 
a cell of the Abbey of Caen in Normandy. In time of 
war King Edward III seized all lands which were 
temporalties of Alien Priors. This was the state of 
things until 2 Henry V, in which lands so seized by the 
King should remain in sa possession a luy et ses 
successors forever. Edward IV granted the parsonage to 
the Deans of St. Stephens, by letters patent, which wer 
produced by the defendant, who claimed that it was 
thereby given as it existed in the king's hands and so 
discharged of the annuity. 
One of the questions involved in the case was 
this: Whether or not the king could be made parson by 
the act of Parliament (sz le Roy puit estre parson per 
l'acte de Parlement). If the king had been made Parson 
of the Church of N. by the Alien Priors act of 2 Henry 
V, the plaintiff could not recover, because the annuity 
was determined for reasons of prerogative. But if the 
king had not been parson, then no reason of prerogative 
existed for the determining of the annuity. 
The following passages relating to the questio 
whether the king had been parson or not, are translated 
from the report. The proceedings reported are those 
of two separate days. The case was considered at much 
length. 
It was said by Palmes at the bar: 
It seems that the king can not be' called parson by 
the act of Parliament; for no temporal act can 
make it that temporal act can make temporal man have 
spiritual jurisdiction. For if it was ordained by 
act, etc., that such a one should not tender tithes 
to his curate, the act would be void (le Act' sera 
void), for concerning such thing as touches merely 
the spirituality, such temporal act can make no 
ordinance (tiel temporal 'acte ne pui -fa- e a:scun 
ordinance): the law is the sameTmeme la Ley) if it 
was enacted that one parson should have the tithes 
of another. So by this act which is merely one of 
a temporal court, the king can not be made to have 
any spiritual jurisdiction. 
Coningsby, in argument on the other side, main- 
tained that the king had divers benefices in Wales which 
are continually in his hand. Kingsmill, Justice, said: 
"The act of Parliament can not make the king to be par- 
son: fa. we can not by our law make any temporal man to 
have spiritual jurisdiction, for no one can do this ex- 
cept the Supreme Head (of the Church)." 
Fisher, Justice, said: "The king can not be 
parson by this act of Parliament, neither can any tem- 
poral man be called parson by this act." 
On the other hand Vavasor, Justice, observed: 
Whether the king can be parson or not: and it seemE 
to me that he can. And as to this I shall first put 
to you several precedents. I know of divers lords 
who have parsonages in their own use and we gave 
their names and places, so that it is not im- 
pertinent (impertinent) that the king should be 
called parson; and especially by the act of Parlia- 
ment. For in the time of king Richard II, there 
was division for the pope in time of vacation, as 
was afterward, and because it was certified to the 
king and his council, that certain priests in 
England had offended in divers points, they were 
deprived of their benefices by act of Parliament: 
so you can see bow spiritual things were taken by 
act of Parliament from them who were spiritual men 
Those things were, indeed, mixed with the temporal y: 
for if they were purely spiritual, perhaps it woul 
be otherwise. 
The proceedings were terminated by Chief 
Justice Frowyke's opinion in which he said: 
As to the other matter, whether the king can be 
parson by act of Parliament;. as I understead, it 
is not a great matter to argue: for I have never 
seen that any temporal man can be parson without 
the agreement of the Supreme Head (of the Church). 
And in all those cases which have been put, namely 
those of the benefices in Wales, and the benefices 
which laymen have in their own use, I have seen to 
the matter; the king had them by the assent and 
agreement of the Supreme Head (of the Church); and 
so a temporal act can not, without the assent of 
the Su reme Hen--(of the Church), make the king 
parson issint un acte temporal sans le assente 
del Supreme Teste ne puit faire le Roÿ parson). 
Although mr. Brinton Coxe devotes several page 
to the discussion of this case in his book, Judicial 
1 
Power and Unconstitutional Legislation it is impossible 
to see how this case furnishes any direct precedent for 
the matter under discussion. True, the word "void." is 
used, in pointing out that the statute attempted to 
regulate a spiritual matter, but the case would seem to 
indicate that the statute could not operate in the 
ecclesiastical sphere, because the ecclesiastical spher 
at that time was similar to a foreign jurisdiction. At 
best, the case can be considered as an analogy, rather 
than a precedent, for the American system of judicial 
review. 
; 
1. Chapter :XIII. 
2. The Sheriff of Northumberland's Case 
The Sheriff of Northumberland's Case is of im- 
portance because it is quoted in Godden v. Hales and 
Calvin's Case. An examination of the Year Book report 
the case reveals that the judges did not reach an agree 
1 
ment in the end, while Coke in reporting Calvin's case 
indicates that the judges did agree. Shower's report 
the case Godden v. Hales gives the following account: 
Debt for five hundred pounds upon the statute 
of 25 Car. II. c.2, for accepting and exercising 
the office of colonel, etc., not having taken the 
oaths, and subscribed the declaration; and set for h 
an indictment, and conviction for the same,_ per 
quod actio accrevit. 
The defendant pleads in bar, that after his 
admission, and before three months expired, the 
king, by his letters patent, had pardoned, re- 
leased, and dispensed with said oaths. The plaint 
demurs. 
Mr. Northey for the plaintiff The king 
can not control and act of Parliament that disable 
a man 
Glanville, serjeant (for defendant) 
There is a great distinction between the laws of 
property and those of government 
The opinion of the court is as-follows: "The 
Lord Chief Justice took time to consider of it, an 
spake with the other judges, and three or four day 
after, declared that he and all the judges (except 
ff 
1. Y. B. 2 Henry VII, p. 6 ff: "Because this was the 
first time, the judges and Serjeants and attorneys 
of the King agreed that they should study well as t 
the matter, and they should be heard, and what they 
had said was for nothing, for they wished to be at 
their liberty to say what they wished and to think 
for nothing what they had now said." 
Street and Powell who doubted) were of opinion, 
that the kings of England were absolute sovereigns; 
that the laws were the king's laws; that the king 
had a power to dispense with any of the laws of 
government as he saw necessity for it; that he was 
the sole judge of that necessity; that no act of 
Parliament could take away that power; that thT 
was such a law; that the case of Sheriffs in the 
second year of Henry the Seventh, was law, and al- 
ways taken as law; and that it was a much stronger 
case than this. And therefore gave judgment for the 
defendant." 
It is to be noted that both the Castle Acre 
case and the Sheriff's case are concerned with things 
which are now a matter of history; in the Castle Acre 
case, the Ecclesiastical Court; in the Sheriff's case, 
the King's Prerogative- -which it is true, was of fore- 
most concern during Lord Coke's time, but which has been 
relatively unimportant since 1688. The cases are of 
value to prove that courts used the word "void" in 
connection with statutes, but the meaning of the word 
"void" here might well have been "inoperative."   
During the days of the American Revolution, Otis 
spoke of "void" acts as being no acts at all, and thus 
of no effect. James Wilson also spoke of 'void acts in 
the same way. Without trying to develop an argument 
around refined distinctions, it might be suggested tha . 
they might well have used their arguments in connectio 
with the two cases which have been discussed. The Act 
of a temporal Parliament was inoperative in Spiritual 
matters, just as it would be inoperative in another 
jurisdiction; and again, in the Sheriff's case, an act 
would be inoperative in the realm of the King's powers. 
The argument, of course,fhlls when applied to the second 
case, because of the continual struggle between Parlia 
ment and the King for prerogative power, and as histor' 
well records, the struggle was most bitter when Lord 
Coke threw the support of his court against King James 
in the struggle for Royal Prerogative. 
1 
3. Day v. Savadge 
In this case the City of London claimed that t 
possesses through an ancient privilege, possibly origi a- 
ting through royal patent, but confirmed by an act of 
Parliament in the reign of Richard the II, the right t 
vest in the recorder the power to declare what were the 
Customs óf the City. Day contended that this would 
make the City a judge in its own case. The words of 
Hobart follow: "Even an Act of Parliament made against 
natural equity, as to make a man a judge in his own 
case, is void Tura Naturae suet immutabilis and they 
are leges legum." 
Here Hobart does not expressly endorse Coke's 
theory, but he must have been a believer in the Coke 
Doctrine, for in Lord Sheffield v. Radcliffe, he states 
1. Hobart, 85 (K. B. 1614) 
If you ask me then, what rule the judges 
guide themselves in this diverse exposition of 
the self same word and sentence? I answer, it was 
by that liberty and authority that judges have 
over laws, especially over statute laws, accord- 
ing to reason and best convnience to mold them 
to the truest and best use. -L 
4. Mayor of London v. 7äood. 
This case if of interest because it came to t 
support of Coke and his statement in Bonham's case. Th 
support which Holt gave to Bonham's case has been fre- 
quently quoted in American cases during Colonial times, 
as will be seen later. 
This case was an action of debt brought before th 
court holden before the mayor and aldermen of Lon 
don. The question arose whether the very man (the 
Lord Mayor) who, as the head of the city, preside 
over the court, was not also a party to the suit. 
The action was brought in the court in the name o 
the mayor and commonalty of London and it was hel 
to be error.* Holt, C. J. said: "What my Lord Cok 
says in Bonham's case, in his 8 Co., is far from 
any extravagancy, for it is a very reasonable and 
true saying, that if an act of Parliament should 
ordain that the same person should be party and 
judge, or which is the same thing, judge in his o 
cause, it would be a void act of Parliament; for 
is impossible that one should be judge and party, 
for the judge is to determine between party and 
party, or between the government and the party; a d 
an act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it m -y 
do several things that look pretty odd; for it ma 
discharge one from his allegiance to the government 
he lives under, and restore him to the state of 
nature; but it cannot make one who lives under a 
government judge and party. An act of Parliament 
1. Hobart, 334, 346 (K. B. 1615) 
. 12 Mod. 669 (Mayor's Court, 1701) 12 Mod. does 
not have a high rating as an example of law report- 
ing. See Wallace, Reporters (4th Edition, 1882.) 
pp. 355 -56, 389 -90. 
9ei 
may not make adultery lawful, that is, it cannot 
make it lawful for A. to lie with the wife of B.: 
but it may make the wife of A. to be the wife of 
B., and dissolve her marriage with A. ** 
* 12 Modern, 687 reports the case as the City of 
London v. Wood, but the opinion states that the 
plaintiffs were as above mentioned. 
** On this case comparse Bank of U. S. v. Deveaux, 
5 Cranch, page 90. 
It will be noted that the case was decided in 
1701, after Parliament had been recognized as supreme. 
Lord Holt does not adopt the Coke doctrine, but mentions 
that it is "far from extravagancy" which of course is 
commenting on the Observations of Egerton and using the 
same expression negatively. Lord Holt indicates that an 
act of Parliament can do no wrong, although there are 
2 
many things it can do which look pretty odd. 
5. Comments of Coke and Blackstone upon the Subject 
In Coke's second Institute, he indicates that 
any statute contrary to the Magna Charta shall "be 
holden for none." At first glance it would seem that 
Coke regarded the Magna Charta much in the same way 
that Marshall regarded the Constitution. Yet further 
reading from the Second Institute would lead one to be- 
lieve that Coke. was referring to laws passed by the 
1. Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legisla- 
tion,p, 173. 
2. In King v. Earl of Banbury, Skin. 517,. 527 (K. B. 
1695) Holt declared it to be the judges daily task 
to "construe and expound acts of Parliament, and 
adjudge them to be void." See 40 Harvard Law Rev. P. 55, n. 72. 
Lords of the realm, or possibly decrees of the King, 
before the time of the Magna Charta. 
In the Proeme of the Second Institute, Coke 
indicates that it is by Act of Parliament that the 
Magna Charta shall be taken as "higher law:" 
A. Proeme - -Page 4 
And albeit judgments in the King's Courts ar 
of High Regard in Law, and Indicia are accounted 
as Iuris Dicta, yet it is provided by Act of Par - 
liament, that if any judgment be given contrary t 
any of the points of the Great Charter, or Charta 
de Foresta, by the Justices, or by any other of 
the King's Ministers, So, it shall be undone and 
holden for nought. 
And that both the said charters shall be sen 
under the great seal of all Cathedral Churches 
throughout the realm, there to remain, and shall 
be read to the people twice every yeare. 
The highest and most binding laws are the 
Statutes which are established by Parliament; and 
by authority of that High Court it is enacted 
(only to show their tender care of the Magna Char 
'and Charta de Foresta) that if any statute be mad 
contrary to the Great Charter, or the Charter of 
the Forest, that shall be holden for none. By whi 
words all former statutes made against either of 
those Charters are now repealed; and the nobles 
and great officers were to be sworn to the obsçr- 
vation of Magna Charta, and Charta de Foresta. 
Professor MoKecknie makes the observation tha 
the Magna Charta has been too often described i4terms 
of inflated -rhetoric, and he mentions that among others, 
Sir Edward Coke lost the faculty of critical and exact 
a 
h 
1. Coke's 2nd Institute, 1642 edition, London. Printe 
by Miles Flesher and Robert Young, for and are sol 
by Ephriam Dawson, R. Meighen, William Lee, and 
Daniel Polkeman, in Fleet Street, 1642. 
1 
scholarship in describing the Magna Charta. 
However, in this particular quotation, there 
should be no difficulty. Coke is merely indicating that 
Parliament has given its approval and support to the 
Spirit of the Magna Charta, and so firmly is it em- 
bedded in the minds of Englishmen, that all nobles and 
officers of the realm are sworn to observe its provisions. 
2 
As Professor Keith points out, Coke states in 
his Fourth Institute, page 36, that the power of Parlia1 
ment is so transcendent and absolutethatit cannot be 
confined for persons or causes within bounds. 
6. Opposition to the Coke Doctrine 
Even before 1688, we find cases such as 
3 
Streater's Case (1653). Here the Chief Justice even 
declined to let a counsel urge that an act of Parlia- 
ment was bad because it was against the laws of the land. 
Barrister: My Lord, every Return ought to have 
these two things in it, the cause and 
and how long he shall be prisoner; 
and so you have it in Magna Charta, 
p. 54. My Lord, all acts of Parlia- 
ment against the laws of the land are 
in themselves void. The law is above 
Parliament. 
Judge: Good Sir, do not stand to repeat thes 
things before us. 
1. :icKecknie: Magna Carta, p. 133 
2. Keith, The First British Empire, p. 349 
3. 5 State Trials, Charles II (1653), 372. 
In the case of the Parish of Great Charte v. 
1 
Parrish of Kennington it was held that if the only 
competent judge, assigned by a statute, was interested 
in the dispute, he nevertheless could proceed in the 
dispute. It was conceded under ordinary circumstances 
áS3 a. good principle that a man should not be a 
judge and a party to the same dispute. The principle 
2 
of this case was affirmed in 1849 although counsel 
urged such cases as Bonham's Case, City of London v. 
Wood, and Day v. Savadge as precedents against such a 
holding. This certainly destroyed the Coke theory as 
a valuable precedent. 
Blackstone's Rule Regarding Invalid Statutes 
Lastly, acts of Parliament that are impossible to 
be performed are of no validity: and if there 
arise out of them collaterally any absurd conse- 
quences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, 
they are with regard to those collateral conse- 
quences, void. I lay down the rule with these 
restrictions; though I know it is generally laid 
down more largely, that acts of Parliament .con- 
trary to reason are void. 
This is the famous tenth rule of construction 
of William Blackstone. However, the rule continues at 
some length to explain that if the Parliament positive 
enacts a law that is unreasonable, no authority can . 
control it, and he further indicates that the judges 
1. 2 Strange, 1173 (K. B. 1742) 
2. 12 Beay. 63, 77 (Rolls Court, 1849) 
y 
are not at liberty to reject it, because this would se 
the judiciary above the legislature and be subversive 
of all government. However, he points out, that when 
some collateral matter arises out of the general words 
which happens to be unreasonable, there the judges 
might conclude that this was not foreseen by Parliaments, 
and the judges are then at liberty to expound the 
statute by equity. 
Too often the first part of the rule has been 
quoted -- lifted out of its context and used to advan- 
tage in a particular case. It is clear that this rul 
is not as inclusive as the theory expounded in Bonham' 
Case. One does not know whether Parliament enacted 
the provisions for the licensing of physicians in 
London, well aware of the unreasonableness of the 
provision (an assumption in itself), but if this were 
true, the dictum in Bonham's Case is then limited. to 
Blackdopne' s rule. 
THE REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS 
DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD 
A. English Procedure in Administrative and Judicial 
Review of Colonial Acts 
1. Administrative Review and Disallowance of 
Acts by the Privy Council (The case of Win- 
throp v. Lechmere Privy Council (1727), 4 
Conn. Hist. Soc. Coil, 94 n.) 
a. Through charters granted to the 
colonies, provisions were made that 
colonial laws, usages, or customs, 
which were repugnant to acts relatin 
to the colonies, or were contrary to 
English Law were void. 
b. Through Parliamentary Acts which 
stipulated limitations on laws passed 
in the colonies. 
(1) "And it is further enacted an3 
declared by the authority aforesaid, that a 1 
Lawes, by- Lawes, usages or customs at tyme o 
which hereafter shall in practice or endeavour- 
ed or pretended to bee in force or practice in 
any of the said plantations which are in an 
wise repugnant to the before mentioned Lawe 
or any of them or which are wayes repugnant 
to this present Act or to any other Law her 
after to bee made in this Kingdome soe far 
as such Law shall relate to and mention the 
said plantations, are illegal and void to a 1 
intents and purposes whatsoever." National 
Library of Scotland, From an Act Preventing 
Frauds, and regulating abuses in the Planta- 
tion Trade. Statutes of the Realm, 7:105 
(1695 -6). 
c. No systematic review of Colonial 
legislation provided until 1660, an 
then not complete. 
d. After 1696, authority and procedure 
to place a check on undesirable act 
were delegated primarily to the Boa d 
of Trade and to the Colonial Goveno s. 
(1) The exercise of administrative 
review over legislative acts and 
ideas, and principles were devel- 
oped which in many respects pre 
pared the way for the adoption 
of the doctrine of judicial re- 
view of legislative acts when 
the colonial governments were 
molded to suit the conditions 
of the American State. 
e. In the case of the Royal Colonies, the 
English Government exercised a double 
check upon colonial laws. By instruc- 
tions to the governors, undesirable 
measures might be vetoed, and by re- 
quiring that all acts might be trans - 
mitted to England, there was an oppor- 
tunity for disallowance by the Privy 
Council. 
(1) Referring Acts to England 
necessitated machinery to be set 
up in order to have an orderly 
review of all acts. 
(a) Matters of a legal nature 
were referred to advisers 
of the crown to determine. 
Note: Material for this outline was gathered from 
Haines, American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, 
Chapter III; 
Labaree, Royal Government in America, pages 5 ff 
Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law, I. 
English Procedure in Administrative and Judicial 
Review of Colonial Acts 
It will be noted that the English Judiciary 
had very little to do with the colonies. During the 
first part of colonial history, the colonies were re- 
cognized as dependencies of the Crown and not of Par- 
liament. It was not until after parliamentary supremac 
was firmly established that Parliament took an active 
1 
part in the control of the colonies. 
Appeals from the colonial bench, except in Ad- 
miralty cases, lay to the Privy Council and not to the 
2 
courts at Westminster. 
An exposition and discussion of the case of 
Winthrop v. Lechmere will now be in order. This case 
has received the attention of almost every writer on 
the subject of precedents for the American doctrine of 
judicial review, and has provoked a considerable amount 
of discussion. 
1. In 1650 Parliament passed an act declaring that the 
colonies ought to be subject to such laws, orders, and 
regulations as or shall be made by the Parliament of 
England. C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, Acts and Ordinanc =s 
of the Interregnum, II, 425 -429. 
H. Scobell, A Collection of Acts and Ordinances of 
General Use, Made in the Parliament, 1640 -1656, II, 13. -4. 
Labaree's note: The very fact that it seemed necessar 
to make such a declaration at a time when the crown wa 
in abeyance lends emphasis to the general doctrine that 
the colonies were dependent upon the king, and not on 
Parliament. 
2. Labaree, Royal Government in America., p. 5. 
Privy Council as Final Court of Judicature 
1 
WINTHROP VS. T,FCHHjIERE , (17 2 7 ) 
The Privy Council held that an act of the 
colony of Connecticut, relating to the division of the 
property of an intestate among his children was null aid 
void as being contrary to the law of this realm, un- 
reasonable, and against the tenor of their character, 
and consequently the province had no power to make suc 
a law. 
The Privy Council maintained that in accordance 
with the common law of England, real estate descended to 
the eldest son, and that it was against reason as well 
as law that an only daughter should be co -heir with an 
only son. Thus a colonial act of nearly thirty years as 
invalidated. Such a procedure had a different effect rom 
1. 4 Conn. Hist. Soc. Coll., 94 n.; 5 Mass. Hist. Soc. 
Coll., 6th Series, 440 -511. References used for a 
explanation and exposition of the case: 
(1) James B. Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law, :136. 
(2) H. D. Hazeltine, "Appeals from Colonial Courts to 
the King in Council, with es 
pecial reference to Rhode Is 
land." 
Report to American Historical 
Association, 1894, pp. 319 ff. 
(3) A. M. Schlesinger, "Colonial Appeals to the Pr' y 
Council," 28 Pol. Science 
Quarterly (June and September, 
1912, 440 ff. 
(4) E. S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review 
TPrinceton, 1914), Chapter I. 
(5) C. G. Haines, American Doctrine of Judicial 
Supremacy. 
disallowance for it rendered void all actions under the 
law. Since the laws of Connecticut were not laid befor 
the Crown for approbat os or disallowance, it was con- 
tended that there was no other way of enforcing the to ri 
of the charter, which provided that the laws of the colony 
should not be contrary to the laws of England, than by 
considering acts beyond the charter as no laws at all. 
(See O. M. Dickerson, American Colonial Government 1696 
1765 (Cleveland, 1912), pp. 275 ff., on reasons why thi 
law was held void.) Contrary to the invariable practic 
the Board of Trade was not consulted in this case. The 
decision overtunmed the policy of settling estates whic 
hadprevailed in Connecticut since the foundation of the 
colony, and the colonial government set about vigorousl 
to have the decision of the Privy Council reversed. A 
case involving a similar issue was appealed from Massa- 
chusetts and the statute of that colony relating to 
intestate estates was upheld. On the strength of this 
decision the Government of Connecticut supported anothe 
appeal to the Privy Council and was successful in Navin 
the former decree of the Council reversed, and the 
colonial act of 1699 validated (Clark vs. Tousey -- 
Hazeltine, 321 -322, Schlesinger, 444). If an appeal on 
a colonial matter involved the validity of a law of the 
action of an officer it was regularly referred to the 
Board of Trade but if a purely judicial question was 
raised the judicial committee of the Privy Council 
might settle the question directly. 
There seems to be some dispute whether the de- 
cisions in such cases as those of Winthrop vs. Lechmere 
and Phillips vs. Savage were in the nature of judicial 
decrees, or whether they were rather legislative or ad- 
ministrative acts similar to the procedure in the dis- 
allowance of statutes. As a precedent for authority in 
courts of justice to declare laws invalid, it appears 
to make little difference whether these decrees be re- 
garded as legislative or judicial in nature. A cursory 
examination of English history during this period makes 
it apparent that anything like a well marked separation 
of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial, was 
lacking. Nevertheless, the fact that a colonial act . 
might be held invalid in the ordinary course of appeal 
to England, whether considered legislative, or judicial, 
or both, was recognized and well understood. 
Another objection raised to these cases as 
precedents for the American Doctrine is that the cases 
were not cited by those who were responsible for the 
adoption of the American Practice of Judicial Review. 
The colonists as a rule were not content under the 
arrangements for appeal of cases to the Privy Council. 
Frequently they did everything in their power to prevent 
appeals, refused to carry out orders of the Council, and 
criticized the practice of review as one of the chief 
causes of imitation between the home government and the 
colonies. It is not surprising then, that colonial and 
state justices, even if they knew of these decisions 
did not refer to these precedents when seeking to place 
limits upon legislative action. 
Haines is probably making reference to E. S. 
Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review (Princeton, 1910 
page 74, when he stateR: 
Finally, reference should be made to the early 
case of Winthrop vs. Lechmere in which, in 1727, 
the British Privy Council held that an act of the 
Colony of Connecticut relating to the division of 
the property of an intestate among his children wa. 
"null and void" as being contrary to the law of th 
realm, unreasonable, and against the tenor of their 
character, and consequently, the province had no 
power to make such a law. (Quoting Haines, 1st ed. 
65.) Professor Thayer urges truly that this decree 
was a judicial decree: "Cases on Constitutional Lá 
39 -40. It was argued before the Council as a case 
at law; (see C. M. Andrews in Select Essays in 
Anglo American Legal History, p. 1445). But this 
fact does not make it a precedent for judicial re- 
view. The provincial legislatures, were in law 
mere corporations possessed of the powers of legis 
lation of municipal councils. Such bodies to this 
day, as a general proposition, must not exercise 
their powers "unreasonably" nor the transgression 
of the Common Law. See the following cases: 3 Pic.: 
462, 6 if 187, 11 if 168, 16 if 121. The problem o 
judicial review arises, however, in the first in- 
stance because the legislature was supposed to 
possess supreme judicial powers, but latterly be- 
cause of the attribution of the legislature to 
sovereignty. The application of the idea of 
sovereignty to the state legislatures creates an 
absolutely impossible gulf between such alleged 
precedents as Winthrop vs. Lechmere, and the in- 
stitution of judicial review in the United States. 
Moreover, those cases were never referred to by 
those who developed the argument of judicial re- 
view. 
Professor Thayer takes issue with Brinton Coxe 
- 
on the question whether this was or was not in the 
nature of a Judicial Decree. His arguments are given 
in a footnote on page 39 of the first volume of his 
case book. 
Suggestions have been made from time to time 
that the decisions of the Privy Council prepared the 
way for the decisions of the Supreme Court. They may 
not have served as precedents, but it would seem reason 
able to conclude that they accustomed the people to the 
practice which was later carried out by the Supreme 
Court. 
Mr. Russell, after making an extensive study, 
concludes: The Power of Review Exercised by the Privy, 
Council 
was analogous to that assumed by the Supreme 
Court after the formation of the new government. 
The Privy Council, it is true, declared acts voi 
upon grounds other than the contravention of a 
fundamental law; but it frequently did disallow 
laws because they conflicted with the colonial 
charters, or with acts of the British Parliament 
or of the common law of England. Under its tutel -_e 
the colonists became accustomed to a limitation 
upon the power of their legislatures. In this se se, 
the work of the Privy Council constituted at once 
a precedent and a preparation for the power of 
judicial annulment upon the constitutional grounds 
now exercised by tie State and Federal Courts in 
the United States. 
1. Elmer Beecher Russell, "The Review of American 
Colonial Legislation by the King in Council," 
Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, 
and Public Law (New York, 1915, Vol. 64, 63, alsó 
221, 222. 
The Case of Giddings vs. Browne 
The first alleged Colonial precedent is the 
case of Giddings vs. Browne (1657). The case came 
before Symonds, a magistrate who had great respect 
for the learning of the lawyers of England. 
1 
Professor Reinsch cites this case as an 
interesting example of natural law philosophy, and the 
first case where power is claimed by courts to declare 
acts opposed to fundamental law void. Furthermore, 
the case indicates that the New England colonists 
accepted the law of England only so far as it was 
expressive of the law of God. 
Mr. Boudin objects to the citation of this 
case as a precedent for our theory of judicial review. 
He indicates that this is not a case of constitutional 
law, and that the objection is not because the 
regulation violates a charter, nor any constitutional 
document. The fundamental law here, is the Law of Go 
The case is as follows: 
3 
Giddings v. Browne 
A town meeting had voted x,,100 towards 
providing a house for Mr. Cobbett, a minister, and 
present case arose 
1. Select Essays in Anglo- American Legal History, 
2. Government by. Judiciary, I, 519 ff. 
3. 2 Hutchinson Papers, Prince. Soc., 1865, 1 -15. 
376. 
/vs 
out of T;r. Brown's refusal to pay. 
Symonds held that it is against a fundamental 
law in nature to be compelled to pay that which 
"others doe give." 
That positive law cannot prevail against 
fundamental law he supports with passages from Finch 
and Dalton. 97 Finch, Law, or a Discourse Thereof 
(1726), '74, develops the proposition that Common Law 
is nothing else but common reason and that positive 
laws contrary to it are void, as are those contrary to 
1 
the laws of nature. 
The precedents cited by Symonds are not 
English cases. Bonham's case is not mentioned. Two 
of the precedents are from the town of Ipswich, and 
one from Weymouth. Mr. Boudin is correct in pointing 
out that no question of constitutional law is directly 
involved, but that does not preclude the fact that 
magistrates were concerned with rules which were 
opposed to what they believed to be higher, or 
fundamental law. As colonial history developed, this 
idea became stronger, and judges and lawyers found 
support for their ideas in English cases, particularly in 
Bonham's case. It added weight to their ideas. In 
turn, the judges undoubtedly read into Lord Coke's 
doctrine more than Lord Coke himself had ever intended 
to state. 
1. This version of the case may be found in 40 Harvard 
Law Review. 
/Ö 
The Influence of Coke and Blackstone on Colonial Decisi 
It is stated in the Massachusetts Colonial 
Records that in 1636, the general court went on record 
as favoring a draft of laws agreeable to the word of 
1 
God. There seemed to be no reference to the common 
law of England. However, in 1647, the general court 
ordered Coke's Reports, two copies of Coke upon 
Littleton, Coke upon the Magna Charta, the Book of 
Entries, the New Terms of the Law, and Dalton's Justice 
2 
of the Peace. 
About twenty -five hundred copies of Blackstone 
were absorbed by the colonies on the Atlantic seaboard 
before the Revolution. James Kent found a copy when he 
was but fifteen years old, and John Marshall found a 
3 
ons 
copy in his father's library. 
Bacon, Comyn, and Viner repeated in rather 
vague and general terms, the Coke Doctrine. These men 
too, according to Professor Haines, must have exerted 
an influence. The following three passages are offered 
as examples of this: 
(1) "If a statute be against common right or reason, 
or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common 
law shall control it, and adjudge it to be void. 
It is to be holden, that a statute contrary to 
1. Massachusetts Colonial Records, I, 74. 
2, Hilkey, Legal Development in Colonial Massachusett 
37 Columbia University Studies,-No. 2 (1910), 66. 
3. From Select Essays on Anglo- American Legal History 
204. 
s. 
natural equity, as to make a man judge in his own case 
is void." 
(2) 
6 Bacon's Abridgement, Statute (A), 1735. 
"So when the words of an act of Parliament are 
against common right and reason, repugnant, or impossi.le 
to be performed, they shall be controlled by the common. law." 
4 Comyn's Digest Parliament (R27), 1762 -67. 
It appears in our books, that in several cases 
the common law shall control acts of Parliament, 
and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void 
for when an act of Parliament is agt.inst co 
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible 
be performed, the common law shall control it 
and adjudge it to be void. 
(3) 
19 Viner's Abridgement, Statutes (E,6), 1741 -51 
One cannot state definitely the first time that 
Coke's Doctrine was used in an argument in a colonial curt. 
As this paper indicates, the case of Giddings v. Brown- in 
1657, did not make any reference to Coke, although it 
expressed ideas similar to those of Coke in Bonham's C.se. 
The precedents, however, were from Ipswich and Veymouti 
In 1668, it is reported, Lord Coke was cited 
an authority: 
The vigorous rule of Andros in 1688 set Bos 
tonians thinking about Habeas Corpus, while at 
the same time the abrogation of their charter 
by James II provoked an outspoken claim to 
independence, in support of which they were said 
to "hold forth a law book and quote the autho ity 
of the Lord Coke to Justifie their setting up i or 
themselves," pleading the possession of 60 yeas s 
against the Crown." (1) 
1. An Account of the Colonys and Provinces of New E._land 
in general, More particularly of that of the Massachu- 
setts, printed from MS. Lambeth 841 in Perry -Pape s 
Relating to the History of the Church in Mass. (1873), 
39, 42. 
. 1 
This statement is not definite; it does not 
mention Bonham's case, and perhaps there was no reference 
to it in any of the arguments. The statement merely 
proves that the colonists were reading Coke, and that 
they found in his statements certain arguments which 
appealed to them. 
During the latter part of the 18th century, 
is on record that Coke's ._ideas were quoted frequentl 
Three outstanding examples are quoted here: 
I 
Paxton's Case, Quincy, 51, 401 (Mass., 1761, Published 1865) 
Coke's authority wa4used freely in Paxton's 
case by Otis in his -indecisive attack upon the 
writs of assistance but still more so in an even 
greater cause. The disaffection caused by the 
Stamp Act very early took a legal comp&ext.ion 
our friends to liberty take the advantage of a 
maxim they find in Lord Coke's that an act against 
Magna Charta or the peculiar rights of Englishmen 
is ipso facto void. 
(26 Ms. Archives of Mass., 153 -154 ff. (preserved 
in the State House, Boston). 
II 
Plucknett records, in 40 Harvard Law Review 
From 1774 on Coke's influence is obvious, 
and the practice of judidial invalidation of acts 
for unconstitutionality which had begun in 
Colonial days steadily grew. 
See Coid.en's Protest, July 5, 1759, New York 
Historical Society Collection (1869), 204. 
III 
Robin et al. v. Hardaway, et al. Jeff. 109 (Va.,1772) 
This case cited (1) 8 Coke, 118a, Bonham's Case 
(2) Day v. Savage, Hobart, 87 
(3) Calvin's Case, 7 Co. 14 
Here several persons of Indian descent tried 
to vindicate their freedom in spite of a statute of 
1682 which reduced them to slavery. 
The. Plaintiff's arguments were eloquent: 
All acts of legislature contrary to Right and 
justice are void.... A legislature must not ob- 
struct our obedience to him from whose punishment 
they cannot protect us. Such have been the adjudi- 
cations of our courts of justice .... 
The judges decided that the statute of 1682 
was repealed by the subsequent act of 1705, and thus 
the case did not turn on the point of the invalidity 
of the act. 
1,7 Ê a.._ 
THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY. 
A court is not without justi- 
fication in giving wei ht to histor- 
ical factors, prim ciples which may 
ave eÚ eñ begotten, and fundamental 
theories upon which constitutions and 
laws must be supposed to rest. In 
fact, this particular judicial power 
rests so plainly on purely historical 
forces, rather than on any piece of 
formal logical argument from a docu- 
ment, that anything less than a dis - 
cussion of historical influences 
leaves one in doubt concerning the 
Courtts authority.(1) 
The case of Marbur y . Madison(2) was the first 
to declare a congressional act void. Chief Justice 
Marshall, in rendering this now famous decision, stated 
that there was a distinction between limited and un- 
limited governments. The United States, he explained 
is a government of limited kind. Its limits are pre- 
scribed by the written constitution. 
The Constitution is either a sup- 
erior paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means, or it is on a level 
with ordinary legislative acts, and 
like other acts, is alterable when 
the legislature shall please to alter 
it.... Certainly all those who have 
framed written constitutions contem- 
plate them as forming the fundamental 
and paramount law of the nation, and 
consequently/ 
(1) McLaughlin, Constitutional His or of the U.S. 
(Students EdITIZE7 905 ages 309 -3lO. 
(2) 1 °ranch 137 (1803) 
consequently, the theory of every 
such government must be that an act 
of the legislature, repugn.n to 
the constitution, is void. a) 
It was Marshall's contention that the theory of 
judicial review was essentially attached to a written 
constitution. This we cannot accept to -day, for we 
have specific examples, such as that of France, where 
the country has a written constitution, but does not 
have judicial review of legislative acts. 
Since Chief Justice Marshall has based his argu- 
ment on the written constitution as superior law, it 
is necessary to study the historical background of the 
Constitution. "The Constitution of the United States 
was a growth... The Americans of 1776 were British.... 
In framing their Constitution, they simply used their 
own law and Constitution. "(2) Is this statement 
exaggerated? An investigation of the background will 
made here to find the answer. 
An analysis of historical factors indicates that 
the written Constitution of the United States was the 
result of ideas which had developed over a period of 
centuries. 
Those who favored the adoption of the Constitu- 
(1) Marbury .. Madison, 1 Cranch 137. (1803) 
(2) Hutchison, The Foundation of the Constitution. 
Constitution argued that its provisions would establish 
"organic living institutions transplanted from English 
soil." (1) 
The political argument developed by the leaders of 
the Revolution, - the concept of fundamental law, - 
inevitably led to the adoption of a written Constitu- 
tion which declared the fundamental law of the land. 
During the revolutionary period, it was better, for 
propaganda purposes at least, to leave the concept of 
fundamental law undefined. It could then be used in 
an argumentative protest against certain acts of 
Parliament. 
Methods of argument suitable for revolutionary 
purposes could not be used for the establishment of a 
stable government. Leaders of the country, such as 
Samuel Adams, James Otis, and Alexander Hamilton, re- 
alized that there must be stated laws, a "standing rule 
to live by. "(2)Thus the philosophy of fundamental law, 
used so effectively in developing opposition to acts 
of Parliament which had proved objectionable to many 
of the colonists, was to be used in developing a Con- 
stitution that would bind the States together into a 
united nation. 
The leaders of the constitutional movement had 
steeped themselves in historical facts and political 
philosophy/ 
(1) Elliot, Debates, IV 121-2, The Federalist, Nos.46,1 
47. 
(2) Samuel Adams, Works II, 357, quoted in 
Hutchinson, The Foundations of the Constitution 
19 :, page 
r 
philosophy, which, they believed, would furnish argu- 
ments to support their contentions. 
They must have realized then, as an American 
student does to --day, that what is known as the British 
constitution cannot be found in a single document or a 
group of documents; that'it consists of a great body of 
law, both common and statutory, as well as conventions,', 
precedents, and forms of procedure which are clearly 
established. 
(1) 
Yet they believed in the necessity of a single 
document, and they turned to the Magna Carta (1215) the 
Provisions of Oxford (1258) the Petition of Right(1628)' 
the Habeas Corpus Act (1679) the Bill of Rights (1689) 
and the Act of Settlement (1701), They were interested 
in the Agreement of the People (1647) and the Instru- 
ment of Government (1653) "the first written National 
Constitution which actually became operative. "(Z) 
American Colonial history is filled with examples 
of government under written charters. The Charter of 
the East India Company, December 31, 1600, which was 
in reality a written constitution for that important 
trading company, served as a pattern for many colonial 
(charters. 
A/ 
(1) See Labaree, Royal Government in America, (1930) p.l 
Dykes, Source Boo - of Constitutional. History. 
(2) See Hutchinson, "Foundations of the Constitution 
(1928) Chapter I. Also 7Goodnon, Princ %1es of 
Constitutional Government ( ) page 7. 
A study of the Church Covenant Will be made first. 
The influence of the Magna Carta, the concept of the 
sovereignty of the people,emphasized during the Common- 
wealth, and the plantatiòn covenants will then be con- 
1 sidered. 
The struggle for religious freedom by the early 
colonists caused them to think in terms of government 
as well as religion. They left England as a group of 
dissenters; they reached the New World as a "body 
politick." 
THE CHURCH COVENANT. 
We have thus found a conspicu- 
ous principle of American constitu- 
tionalism ... in the religious move- 
ments and aspirations of the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries. I make no assertion 
that the Church covenant or the 
philosophy of Separatism was the 
sole source of certain essential 
principles of profound significance; 
but the actual realization of cer- 
tain theories, the finding of ob- 
jective expression, takes the 
doctrines out of the rarefied air 
of philosophical speculation. 
A.0 . McLaughlin. ( 1) 
(1) McLaughlin, The Foundations of American Consti - 
tutionaTism, p. 29. 
It is believed by some that the idea of the cove- 
nant was carried from Scotland to England and hence to 
America.() Professor Hutchison says, "The origin of 
the church covenant is not clear. It may have been 
taken from the Bible and Guild Statutes, or borrowed 
from the Anabaptists or received from Geneva by the 
English Puritans.(2) 
Those who believe that the idea of the convenant 
was introduced by the Scots into England point out as 
evidence that in the life time of John Knox, the Lords 
of the Congregation entered into covenants or treaties 
of alliance. Presbyterianism spread rapidly all over 
Scotland, and by 1639 "a whole people had gathered 
g p to ether to swear a mutual com act"(3) . 
1 
The Covenanters of 1639 published a manifesto to 
Christians in the kingdom of England, in which they 
appealed from the King to the Parliament at Westminster 
and to the people of the nation 4) In 1643, "England 
adopted the system of covenants which had originated 
in Scotland.5 
(1) Chapin, "President itoosevelt and the Supreme Court" . 
Scots Law Times Dec. 4, 1937, p. 249. 
(2) Hutchison, Foundations of the Constitution:.. (1925) 
p. 3. 
(3) Borgeaud, Rise of Modern Democracy (1894), page 27 
1 (4) ibid, from Rushworth Collection of State Papere 
1680, pages 798 -802. 
(5) ibid , page 29. 
It is true that the power of the Presbyterians 
was soon to be taken over by the Independents, but 
enough has been said here to indicate the use of the 
Scottish Covenant by those who would resist King Charles. 
The important point is that an example was given to the 
American Colonists of a political, revolutionary use 
of the Covenant. 
Undoubtedly the followers of Knox believed that 
they found an example for their particular kind of 
covenant in Holy Writ, and that Knox and Melville had 
returned to Scotland from Geneva with ideas of Church 
organization. 
Both Borgeaud and McLaughlin trace the concept of 
the covenant such as we find in New England, to the 
teachings of one Robert Browne. He had been a follower, 
and student of Thomas Cartwright, Professor of Divinity, 
at Cambridge, who had been forced to resign because of 
his teachings concerning religion. 
In 1582, Browne published a book entitled, "A Booke 
which Sheweth the Life and manners of all true Christ- 
ians, and howe unlike they are unto Turkes and Papistes 
and Heathen folke.(1) 
He defines true Christians as those who "are united 
into a companie or number of believers who by a willing 
covenant/ 
(1) Middleburgh (1582) British Museum C.37 E. 57. 
covenant made with their God place themselves under the 
government of God and of Christ, keeping the Divine 
Law in a holy Communion." Again, he states, "The Church 
planted or gathered is a community or number of Christ- 
ians or believers which by a willing covenant made with 
their God, are under the government of God and Christ, 
and kepe his laws in one holie communion.- 
.(1) 
Professor McLaughlin(2)points out that fundamental 
principles are here plainly stated: "the independent 
gathering of a few believers into a self governing body, 
relying upon the Scriptures as their guide; the cove- 
pant with God to abide by his laws and follow in his 
ways." 
This necessitates the assumption of individual 
existence and individual right. Browne did not have 
much to say about the right of the individual to choose 
for himself the road to salvation, yet as Professor 
McLaughlin contends, the underlying philosophical prin- 
ciple must be the same - the actual existence of the 
individual man. 
The second idea which may be gained from Browne' 
thesis is that the separate individual, in agreement 
with others, could develop a church organization - 
(1) Ibid, Definitions I, Cf. Def. 35, Quoted by 
Borgeaud, supra p. 32. 
(2) McLaughlin, Foundations of American Constitution- 
alism, (1932) Chapter I. 
"a body that had its own life and being, and within a 
certain or uncertain area, its own authority. As the 
result of compact, covenant, and condition, men could 
form a new relationship and establish a new and real 
body.(1) 
Here wo find the doctrine of individual liberty, 
in an embryonic form to be sure, but nevertheless 
applied to an active organization. Organizations of a 
similar nature were soon to be found on the opposite 
shores of the Atlantic. 
Browne was a writer on religious, rather than 
civil, matters, yet he claimed that the truths which 
he announced should be applied to civil matters as 
well, and he declared that civil magistrates ought to ` 
be chosen with the consent, of the people . (2) 
The influence of his ideas was felt in two direc- 
tions, first, by the followers of John Robinson, who 
fled to Holland, and thence to America, and second by 
those who ultimately drew up the "Agreement of the 
People," a constitution in the senso in which a con- 
stitution is understood in the United States to- day.(3) 
Let us first consider the influence on the Pil- 
grims. They were not bound together by religious 
interests/ 
(1) ibid, page 12. 
(2) Borgeaud, Tho Rise of Modern Democracy page 34. 
(3) Borgeaud, The Rise of Modern Democracy 1894, 
page 43. 
interests alone. In order to secure the necessary 
funds to sail to America they had negotiated with the 
Virginia Company of London and had subsequently become 
participants in a joint stock company. Because they 
were to settle as one community it was essential that 
they act cooperatively. Thus the interests of this 
community were influenced by both religion and business'. 
The Pilgrims who embarked at Leyden in very good 
spirits arrived on the New England Coast full of fear 
concerning the future. 
lNhat could they see but a hideous 
and desolate wilderness full of wild 
beasts and wild men: ... If they 
looked behind them, there was the 
mighty ocean which they had passed, 
and was now as a maine barr and goulfe 
to separate them from all the civili 
parts of the world. (1) 
It was essential to draw up a separate pact, based 
upon their feeling of necessity to cooperate with one 
another, and over and above any agreement entered into 
as a part of the joint stock arrangement with. the 
1Virginia Company. 
The Virginia Company had previously passed the 
following order: 
"It/ 
(1) Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation (1912) I, 
155-156 quoted in c dug In, -PZURITI,TIEns of 
American Constitutionalism, (1932) page 18, note ll,. 
"It was ordered aliso by generali consent that such 
Captaines or leaders of Perticulerr Plantacons that 
shall go there to inhabite by vertue of their grauntes 
and Plant themseivs their tonnantes and Servantes in 
Virginia till a forme of Government be here settled for 
them, associatinge unto them divers of the gravest and 
discreetes of their Companies, to make orders, Ordin- 
ances and Constitutions for the better orderinge and 
directinge of their Servantes and business provided 
they be not repugnant to the Lawes of England." (1) 
McLaughlin believes that the Mayflower compact 
was not merely the exercise of the privilege of the 
Mayflower's passengers granted them by the above order. 
It was rather a covenant, compact, or constitution, of 
frightened people. Terrified by the wildness of the 
new country and the ravages of the elements they felt 
the necessity of associating, as free individuals, in 
form of constitutionalism. 
One other explanation has been offered. It has 
been claimed that the Mayflower Compact is but an ex- 
ample of "the old sea law. "(2) it was an ancient 
custom, seemingly, for the passengers on board a ship, 
who were not subject immediately to the skipper's dis- 
cipline, to organize a form of government during the 
period of the voyage. 
An/ 
(1) Quoted in McLaughlin, page 19. 
(2) Ibid, pages 21-23. 
An account of such an agreement is furnished by 
a record of the members on board a ship sailing from 
Riga to Tramund, thirty years before the Pilgrims 
l and ed at Plymouth. 
(1) 
After the boat had sailed for a half day from Riga, 
the Captain of the ship called the forty -seven passen- 
gers together, and after urging them to pray constantly' 
for a safe voyage, he said: 
"We will 
set about to ordain and establish a government by the 
most prudent according to the customary sea -laws; which 
office (as sea -law bath it) no man may refuse to under- 
take, but rather must be ready to exercise it strictly 
and without respect of persons, even as each desireth 
that God may deal with him at his last end and at that 
dreadful day, truly and without flinching, and with all 
diligence that may be." 
At first glance, it would appear likely, that the 
idea of the "Sea law" contributed to the development 
of the Mayflower Pact. However, the pact was drawn 
at the end of the journey, and the passengers were 
binding themselves together not for a journey on the 
sea, but for a period of hardship on land. Thus it 
would appear that the admonition of their leader, 
(who/ 
(1) Cited by McLaughlin, 22-23. From Life on a House 
Ship, in G.G. Coulton, A 
x 
Mediaeval G rner, pp.156- 
158. The document is e rac ed from J .0 :V.Frichard', 
Frank furtisches Archives, II 245 -246. 
(who did not make the journey) to become a body poli - 
tick"(1) resulted in the Mayflower Compact. 
(1) Lastly, whereas you are to be- 
come a body politick, using amongst 
yourselves civili governments, and are 
not furnished with any persons of 
spetiall eminencie above the rest, to 
be chosen by you into office of govern- 
ment, let your widsome and godliness 
appeare, not only in chusing shuch per - 
sons as doe entirely love and will pro- 
mote the commons good, but also in 
yielding unto them all due honour and 
obedience in their lawfull administra- 
tions; not beholding in them the ordin- 
arinesse of their persons but God's 
ordinance for your good, not being 
like the foolish multitude who more 
honour the gay coate then (than) the 
vertuous mind of the man, or glorious 
ordinance of the Lord." 
Bradford, History of Plymouth 
Plantation (1912 Ed.) I, 98. 
THE MAYFLOWER COMPACT. 
In ye name of God Amen. We whose names are under- 
written, the loyall subjects of our dread Soveraigne 
Lord King James by ye grace of God, of great Britaine, 
Franc, and Ireland king, defender of ye faith, &c. 
Haveing undertaken, for ye glorie of God, and 
advancemente of ye christian faith and honour our king 
& countrie, a voyage to plant ye first colonie in ye 
Northene parts of Virginia. Doe by these presents 
solemnly & mutually in ye presence of God, and one of 
another, covenant, & combine our selves together into 
a Civill body politick; for our better ordering, and 
preservation & furtherance of ye ends aforesaid; and 
by Vertue hereof to enacte, constitute, and frame such 
just & equall lawes, ordinances, Acts, constitutions, 
& offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most 
e & convenient for ye generali good of ye C olonie : 
unto which we promise all due submission and obedience.', 
In witnes whereof we have hereunder subscribed our 
names at Cap -Codd ye 11. of November, in ye year of ye 
raigne of our soveraigne Lord King James of England, 
France, & Ireland ye eighteenth and of Scotland ye 
fiftie fourth. Ano. Dom. 1620 
Martin: An Introduction to the Study of the American 
Constitution, page 349 as recorded in 
Martin etc. 
The idea of the Covenant seemed to be in the minds 
of leaders who sailed to America shortly after the 
Mayflower .Pilgrims . 
John Winthrop wrote on board the Arabella:- 
"The work we have in hand is by mutual 
consent ... to seek out a place of cohabitation 
and consortershipp under a due form of Govern- 
ment both civili and ecclesiastical. Thus stands 
the cause between God and us. We are entered into 
Covenant with Him for this worke ... The L.orde 
hath given us leave to drawe our own articles ...'! 
Now if the Lord please to hear us, and bring us 
in peace to the place we desire, then hath he 
ratified this Covenant and sealed our Commission, 
and will expect a strict performance of the 
article contained ir_ it." (1) 
(1) Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections. 
Third Series VII, 45-46. 
The Colonists and the Law of God. 
To the Puritans, the law of nature, 
the law which Locke and other phi17 
osophers postulated before govern- 
ment and social order were founded, 
this law which was all inclusive and 
permanent, inevitably assumed theolog -- 
icál significance. The law of nature 
was the law of God as well as the 
law of reason, and God Himself was 
the embodiment of unchanging reason 
and inviolable law. (1) 
When the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock in 
1620, problems created by a new environment raised 
questions of conduct and government, and answers were 
given at first by their leaders, but later solutions 
were advanced in the form of concrete regulations and 
laws.. 
The people who sailed from Holland and Plymouth 
(2) 
'were Brownist separatists of plebian origin'! 
Two fundamental principles they carried with them, 
democracy in religious faith, and the belief that 
government should be by and for the body politic. 
These concepts, however, could not exist for long, in 
a new country where the control was in the hands of 
trading companies, and in a land where ministers and 
magistrates consider-ed themselves interpreters and 
administrators of the Lord's will. 
771-7-cLaughlin, Foundations of American Constitutional- 
ism, pp. 26-27. 
(2) Ibid. 
One of the first ministers, and the first teacher 
to the church of ''few Boston, was John Cotton. He be- 
lieved in establishing a Presbyterian Commonwealth, 
with the Bible as the law of the land. The Bible, he 
believed, was of universal application; the scriptures 
furnished rules for all social and political problems, 
Human laws were inferior. "The more any law smells of 
(1) 
man the more unprofitable." 
In 1636 and 1637, Cotton drafted a code of laws 
which furnishes illustrations of his attitude. The 
code was drafted only after there had been frequent 
demands from the colonists that they have a definite 
set of statutes. Cotton presented a crude system, bast 
ed upon his into- rpretation of the Bible. Her is a refer;: 
ence to inheritances: 
Inheritances are to descend 
naturally to the next of kinne, 
according to the law of nature, 
delivered by God. 
If a man have more sonnes than 
one, then a double portion to 
be assigned and bequeathed to 
the eldest son, according to 
the law of nature, unless his 
own demerit deprive him of 
the dignity of his birthright. (2) 
(1) Quoted in Parrington, The Colonial Mind, Vol i, 
P. 32. (See Hutchinson, History of Mass. Bay Colonfl 
(2) References to Cotton's code, which was rejected, 
may be found in Wright, American Interpretations 
of Matural Law, pp. 17 -18. 
The last lines of Cotton's code are as follows: 
The Lord is our Judge 
The Lord is our Law -giver 
The Lord is our King. He will save us. 
Isay. 33:22. ( 1) 
Closely associated with John Cotton in the reli- 
gious and political development of the colony was the 
magistrate, John Winthrop, who can be classified more 
as a magistrate -elder than as a civil governor. 
(2) 
He had been a lawyer, squire, and magistrate in England. 
As a magistrate under the 
dominance of the English 
common law, he seems to 
have accepted the consti- 
tutional theory of Coke, 
who sought to interpose 
the customary and ancient 
law of the land between 
the crowing absolutism of 
the Crot.n and the increas- 
ing importance of the Com- 
mons, with sovereignty in- 
hering in the judiciary. 
As a Puritan, however, he 
superimposed the law of Moses 
on the law of the land, and 
by ignoring the King on one 
hand, and denying power to 
the representatives of the 
people on the other hand, he 
created the framework of a 
magisterial theocracy. (3) 
(1) Wright, pp17 -18. 
(2) Parrington, The Colonial Mind, Vol i, p. 38. 
(3) Ibid, p. 44. 
Winthrop was little given to speculative thought, 
and his contributions to political problés are short, 
yet they are perhaps more significant than the lengthy 
dissertations of ministers who wrote from a view point 
( 
which was far more ecclesiastical than political. 
1 
In his longest writing on the theory of govern- 
ment, Arbitrary Government Described and the Govern- 
ment of Massachusetts Vindicated from that Aspersion 
Winthrop clearly reveals that his beli ef,sthat the 
fundamental.laws of the state are from God. 
Those which God gave 
to the Commonwealth of 
Israeli were a sufficient 
Rule to them, to Guide all 
their Affaires: we Havinge 
the same, with all the 
Additions, explanations 
and deductions, which 
have followed: it is not 
possible we should want a 
Rule in any case: if God 
give wisdom to discerne it. (2) 
Thus Winthrop argues that it is not necessary to 
draft a code, for the magistrate can m::ke decisions 
in accordance with the word of God. 
(1) Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law, 
p. 26. 
(2) Winthrop, Life and Letters of John Winthrop, 
vol. ii, p. 445. Quoted by Winthrop, and by Wri`hi. 
Two other tracts written by Winthrop are of inter- 
est here: 
(1) Replye to the Answer made to the Discourse 
about the Negative Vote. 
(2) Speech on Libent/r and Authority. 
In the first tract he defends his attitude as 
governor and argues that the negative vote should not 
be abolished. Winthrop argues for a state held static 
1 
by exact constitutional arrangements. 
In the second tract, Winthrop states: 
n It is yourselves who 
have called us to of- 
fice, and being _ called 
by you, we have our 
authority from God, in 
way of an ordinance, 
such as hath the image 
of God emminently stamp- 
ed upon it, the contempt 
and violation whr.r.eof 
hath been vindicated with 
examples of Divine ven- 
geance. (2) 
In conclusion, Winthrop may be cited as one who 
believed in a fundamental law, a rigid constitution, 
and absolute power of decision in the magistrate. 
(1) Parrington, The Colonial Mind, vol. i, p. 44. 
(2) Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law, 
p. 28. 
The Magna Carta. 
Magna Carta is the declaration of 
one generally binding law. It e- 
nounces and it consecrates and it 
is in itself Lex Terrae , the law 
of the whole land, and of all per- 
sons therin. It is for us of the 
English stock the parent of all 
instruments defining the relation 
of the citizen and the sovereign. 
It is the ancestor of your own 
Federal Constitution, as well as 
the "Bill of Rights provisions 
of all state constitutions. (1) 
Thus did Lord Bryce address the American Bar ASSOC:- 
Tation on August 28, 1907. 
Bishop Stubbs has written that "the whole of the 
Constitutional history of England is a commentary on 
2) 
this charter." From the many references to the 
( 
MagtiaE Carta which may be found in American Constituti 
al law cases, it may be inferred that the influence of 
the great charter has been felt in America as well. 
The American colonists regarded the Magna Carta 
as a sacred document which,from the very first., had 
(3) 
protected the liberties of Englishmen. 
It is almost unnecessary to state that the view 
adopted by modern scholarship is very different. The 
merits of the charter must be considered with refer- 
ence to both past and present. 
(1) 24 Law Quarterly Review, p. 16 
(2) Stubbs, Select Charters, p. 296 
(3) Corwin, 42 Harvard Law Review,. p. 175 
McKecknie states: 
The importance of the 
Charter for the men of 
1215 did not lie in what 
forms its main value for 
constitutional theorists 
today. To the barons of 
Runymede its merit was 
that it was something def- 
inite and utilitarian -a 
present help for present 
ills. To them it was by no 
means what it became to the 
English lawyers and histor- 
ians of a later age, who 
looked on it as something 
intangible and ideal, a 
symbol standing for the 
essence of the constitu- 
tion, a bulwark of English 
Liberties. (1) 
It was the charter of the 17th century interpre- 
tations, the Magna Carta of Coke, Hampden, and Pym, 
rather than the original charter of 1215, that enter- 
ed into American constitutional theory. 
The feudal grievances had been forgotten by the 
seventeenth century, and Coke, "that unrivalled master 
of the intricacies of the common law" had found a new 
use for the old charter. It could be used as a precut 
dent for reform. Thus it was argued that an act which 
seemed socially undesirable was contrary <t,o right, 
reason, the law of nature, the law of God, and Magna 
Carta. Coke noted that in the confirmation of 1368, 
the declaration was added by statute that any statute 
passed contrary to Magna Carta "soit tenez p' nul." (2 
Footnotes on the following page. 
The footnotes below are for the preceding page. 
(1) nena Carta Commemoration Essays, p. 9. 
Professor McKecknie states: 
It would seem that three 
separate periods may be 
distinguished, in each of 
which the chief merits of 
the Charter have been 
differently rated, being 
found respectively in its 
reference to the present, 
the fûture, and the past. 
He indicates that the Barons at Runnymede 
found merit in the arter because it was some- 
thing definite and utilitarian. It would render 
immediate assistance to the ills from which they 
suffered at that time. English lawyers of a lat- 
er period looked upon it as something intangible 
and ideal, a symbol of liberty, standing for the 
essence of the Constitution. In the present 
day the charter is looked upon as a helpful way 
of reconstructing the past. " The vivid limpses 
that the Charter gives us of life in England in 
the early t'- .irteenth century open, as it were, a 
window into the past." 
(2) 5 Coke Inst. III. I Stat. Realm 388 (1368) 
Following the suggestion of Professor H. D. Hazel- 
tine in considering the influence of the Magna Carta 
on American Constitutional development, the constitu- 
tional history of the united. States might well be di- 
vided into three periods: 
(1) The colonial period, beginning with the 
grant by James I of the first Virginia 
Charter in 1606, and ending in 1760. 
(2) The period of the American Revolution. 
(3) The period dating from the Treaty of 
Paris in 1783. (1) 
In the first period the colonists developed the 
idea that they were entitled, by virtue of the fact 
that they were Englishmen, to the laws and privileges 
(2) 
of Englishmen. 
It will be remembered that Sir Edward Coke car- 
ried on his fight against the use of t?-le Xing's prerog- 
ative at the time that colonization was under / ay, and 
is 
it /possible that the colonists carried from Great Brit- 
ain, or more properly, from England, vivid memories of 
this insistent advocate, who urged limitations on royal 
power, and freedom of the judc,es in making decisions. 
(1) See Hazeltine's article in Ma na Carta Commemora- 
tion EssLls, p,180ff. .
(2) An application of Coke's statement (12 Coke 29) 
" the law and the custom of Englan is the 
inheritance of the subject." 
His praise of the Magna Carta and his dictum in Bon- 
ham's case that a law contrary to right and reason is 
null and void, caused the colonists in the next centur 
:,o continue their interest in his writings, and they 
noted that his statements could be quoted to advantage 
in pressing their case. 
It must be admitted that the colonists displayed 
an amazirg amount of independence in their reception 
of the common law. 
So far as the English common 
law protected them from the 
English Government and the 
royal officials they looked 
upon it as their right by 
birth; so far as it inter- 
fered with their develop- 
ment, it was to be di sre`:a.rd e, . (1) 
The great ocean which separated the colonists 
from the mother country helped them to maintain this 
attitude. When Parliament refused to recognize such 
an independent spirit, a feeling of hostitlity develop 
ed amon-; the colonists. 
From the very first, Magna Carta was considered 
as an instrument of help and protection. 
In 1606, when James I granted the Virginia Charte 
(1) Channing, Historu of the United Stites, (1905) vol. 
p. 529. 
the method of royal grant by means of charters com- 
menced in America. It is reported that Sir Edward 
Coke took part in developing the final draft of the 
charter to the Virginia Company, although it is 
supposed that Sir John Popham prepared .the first 
(2) 
draft. 
The charter and instructions reveal a mixed form 
of organization. It was in one sense private or propri- 
etary, in another, public or royal. The right to deve 
op property and trade was granted to the "loving subjec 
and their associates, but powers of government were 
not given directly to members of the Virginia Company. 
The King governed the colonies through three councils. 
The membeY s of the first council were selected by the 
Crown, while the members o the other two councils 
were selected by the first, or "royal" council. Thus 
a rudimentary form of colonial organization was develo 
ed which in time was bound to be changed because of 
insistence by' the colonists and people in England 
as well. 
The charter granted the same constitutional right 
to the people of Virginia as those possessed by Englis' 
(3) 
men in the homeland. 
(1) Magna Carta Com. Essays, p. 185. Also Osgood, 
American Colonies in the 17th Century v.i, p. 26 
(0 Ibid. (3) Ibid, p. 1 °7. 
The exact wording of the charter relative to the 
rights of the colonists is that they "shall have and 
enjoy all Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities... 
to all intents and purposes as if they had been abid- 
ing and born within this our realm of England, or any 
of our said Dominions." 
It appears to be a liberal grant with'regard to 
personal liberties, but »from the standpoint of consti- 
tutional law, the charter's grant of powers to the 
Virginia Company is very limited. Not until the third 
charter (1612) was there any definite plan of consti- 
tutional government. The 1612 charter grante' and 
distributed legislative, executive, and judicial power 
and served as a precedent for the later state constitu 
Lions. Hutchison speaks of this charter as a rough 
draft or outline for the later state constitutions, an 
(2) 
the Consti tu t I on of the United States. 
The early Britis?- colonists had definite views 
of justice an rip -ht. They brought with them the 
fruits of the "stru '-le for law" in England. 
(1) Quoted from the King James Charter. See Magna 
Carta Commemoration Essays, p. 188; also ,racllonald 
Select Charters and Other Documents Illustrative o 
American History, 1606 -1775, pp. 1 -11. 
(2) Hutchison, Foundations of the Constitutions, D. 3. 
;. 
Reinsch states that the colonists made their earliest 
appeals to common law considering more its public than 
private law aspects. They thought of the common law in 
)1` 
its character 6S a guarantor of English liberties. ' 
It is fair to conclude that the extreme ignorance 
of the colonists with regard to common law often caus- 
ed them to place an undue emphasis on Magna Carta. To 
some, Magna Carta was the complete emodiment of the 
common law, and it is reported in Virginia, whey' a gate 
tion arose whether an act was contrary to the common 
law, the committee examined the Magna Carta to settle 
(2) 
the question. 
The express declaration found in most colonial 
charters that the colonists did possess the legal riph 
of Englishmen in the homeland meant a great deal to th 
people in America. It would appear that settlers who 
claimed territory in the name of England wo,Ild be en- 
titled to the rights of the English constitutional 
system, regar'less of the express statement from the 
King. Yet to the colonists, this stipulation was re- 
garded as a compact between the King and themselves, 
and it was never forgotten. 
(1) Reinsch, "Colonial Common Law ", found in 
Select Essays in Anglo- American Legal Histort, 
vol. 1, pp, 41415. 
(2) Ibid, p. 414. 
Hazeltine says that this declaration of the Royal 
Charters was an extremely impórtant factor in the spre.d 
throughout the colonies of English constitutional prin 
ciples, including the rights and liberties aecured by 
(1) 
the Magna Carta and its confirmations. 
It cannot be said that Magna Carta served as a 
basis for the government of Plymouth. The Mayflower 
compact was more to the inhabitants of that territory 
than a guarvantee in a Royal charter. They depen'ed 
upon the Bible for their guide, and Divine law, as re- 
vealed by their ministers and magistrates, was applied. 
Yet even in this unique religious environment, we find 
John Winthrop, who had opposed too great a restraint 
upon the judges through fixed regulations and laws, ad- 
mitt ing that it would, be well to have a general law 
like Magna Carta, in order to restrict capital punish- 
2T 
merit. The people of Plymouth were anxious to 
have positive laws, but the ministers discouraged them 
for some time from adopting a written code. Finally, 
the deputies, deploring the lack of positive law, and 
believing that too much discretion upon the part of 
magistrates and ministers might cause unfortunate re- 
sults, decided to appoint a group of men who should 
frame a body of law, resembling Magna Carta.. 
(1) Magna Carta Commemoration Essays, pp. 189 -190 
(2) Ibid, p. 192. 
146- 
On May 25, 1636, the General Court ordered a body 
of laws drawn up agreeable to the word of God. This 
resulted in the "Body of Liberties" (December 1641). 
After a three weeks' session, the General Court 
adopted one hundred laws. They had been drafted by 
Nathaniel Ward, who had served as the pastor at Ipswich 
and who had also been trained in the common law. Ward's 
original draft was not accepted by the Court without 
alteration. After the Court had made several changes, 
the "Body of Liberties" was then sent to every town., 
where it was read, and suggestions were then sent to 
the Court for further consideration. This drawn out 
(1) 
procedure covered a period of three years. 
Eight years before this 'passachusetts had re- 
ceived its first charter, in which permission had been 
granted for the governor, assistants, and free men of 
the company to make, "ordeine, and establishe all 
manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, lawes, 
statutes, and ordinances, direction and instructions 
not contrarie to the lawes of this our realm of England 
(1) See R. C. Winthrop, Life and Letters of John 
Winthrop, p. 267. 
(2) Macdonald, Documentary Source Book of American 
History, 1606 -1698, p. 25. 
The provision in the colonial charters that the 
laws of the colonies should not be contrary to the laws 
of England encouraged the idea already existing in the 
colonies, that there is such a thing as a "higher" or 
fundamental" body of laws. 
According to Winthrop, the General Court had for 
many years opposed the enactment of laws in advance of 
actual necessity. The conditions in the colony caused 
problems to develop which the magistrates and ministers 
could not always anticipate, and they quite reasonably 
argued that the solution ror each problem depended 
upon the parties and facts of each case. Such a degrere 
of independence had been used by the of{'icials in decid 
ing the individual cases, that the colonists felt it 
nenessary, for their own security, to have a definite, 
established set of rules. 
The "irst article of the "Body of Liberties" , 
in the 7-ords of Professor Hazeltine, "echoes the spirit 
(1) 
of chapter thirty -nine of Magna Carta. It provides 
that "no man's life shall be taken away, no man's honor 
or good name shall be stained, no man's person shall be 
restrayned, banished, dismembered, nor any ways punish- 
ed, no man shall be deprived of his wife or children, 
(1) Ibid, p. 193. 
no man's goods or estaite shall be taken sway from 
him, nor any way indammaged under colour of law, or 
countenance of a,thority, unless it be by venue or 
equitie of some express law of the country warranting 
the same, established by an generall Court and suffici- 
ently published, or in case of the defect of the law 
in any particular case by the word of God. And in 
Capitall cases, and in cases concerning dismembering or 
banishment, according to that word to be judged by the 
(l4 
General' Court." 
The "Body of Liberties" was not the first code 
drawn up in 'Te ,aa England. As early as 1637 a written 
code had been drawn up in New 7n land to the south of 
Massachusetts, in the portion known as " hode Island, 
and even befo -e this a covenant had been drawn up in 
(2) 
New Hampshire for the control of political affairs. 
It has been claimed that the "Fundamental Orders of 
Connecticut'; 'yawn up by the towns of Windsor, Wethers- 
field, and Hartford, are evidence "of the first written 
constitution known to history that create:'1 a govern - 
(3)' 
ment." The "Fundamental Articles of New Haven" 
refer to a plantation covenant. This was different 
(1) MacDonald, Select Charters, pages 73, 74. 
(2) McLaughlin, Foundations of American Constitutional - 
ism, pp. 26 -27 
(3) Ibid. 
ßy.3, 
from the church covenant, although the form and pro- 
cedure is very much the same. The difference is in 
the subject matter, the -plantation covenant being con- 
cerned with civil affairs, the church covenant with 
religious affairs of the community. However, the civil 
or plantation covenants clearly show- the influence 
of religion. In the opening paragraph of the "Funda- 
mental Orders of Connecticut " one reads: 
" Well knowing where a 
people are gathered 
together the word of 
God requires that to 
maintayne peace and 
union of such a people 
there should be an order- 
ly and decent govern- 
ment established accord- 
ing to God..." (1) 
Thus the state constitutions and the Constit,tion 
of the United States were -patterned after other writ- 
ten instruments, and in particular, Magna Carta and 
the covenants, both religious and civil, of the New 
England colonists. Even where the covenant prescribed 
the plan of governs ;:ent, the colonists were aware of 
the Magna Carta as an example of a written instrument. 
(1) MacDonald, Select Charters, p. 61. 
The Puritan Revolution in England. 
The question has often been asked whether the 
colonists were influenced in matters of local govern- 
ment by the Puritan revolution in the British Isles. 
The men of New England, and in particular, Massachusetts, 
were acquainted with the history of the English rebe]L. 
ion, and "they fastened in their minds the login of 
(1) 
the contract origin of government ". 
President Goodnow of Johns Hopkins University 
has stated that the Americans were following the ex- 
(2) 
ample of their British forefathers. Certain events 
are interesting to note; (1) the destruction of thé" 
monarchy and the short -lived commonwealth under 
Cromwell, and (2) the adoption tß the written consti- 
tution in 1654, said to be the earliest written consti 
(3) 
tution in modern Europe. 
It is quite natural that the Puritans of New 
England should follow the rise and fall of the Crom- 
well government in their native land. The issues and 
consequences of that struggle interested the New Eng- 
lander from both the religious and political points 
of view. Many of the colonists had returned to New 
(1) McLaughlin, Foundations of American Constitution- 
alism, p. 102 
(2) Goodnow, Prince-. of Constitutional Government,p.7 
(3) Ibid. 
England after visits in the homeland. Other colonists 
returned to England and remained th. e re . Many of the 
Puritans had returned to England as early as the mid- 
dle of the reign of James I. They met secretly in Lon - 
(1) 
don and establ.is" el a congregation the-e. In 1640 
the dissenters returned in large numbers from America 
and Holland. The sermons of Cotton, Hooker, Mather, 
and other Divines were published and distributed open - 
(2) 
ly in London. 
Similarity of religious faith was the first cause 
of interest and influence, but this in turn gave rise 
to similarity of political belief, with primary em: -, 
phasis on the sovereignty of the people. D'ring the 
perio -' when the colonists were clarifying their polit- 
ical doctrines through written covenants and declara- 
tions, the Agreement of the People and the Instrument 
of Government were examples of the revolutionsts' de- 
sire to have a definite statement-of fundamental law. 
They desired something beyond and above the common law. 
Magna Carta was a fragmentary and incomplete statement, 
they thought; as Cromwell stated, " a beggardly thing" 
although he advocated "something like M gna Carta ". 
(1) Borneaud , Rise of Modern Democracy pp. 36-37 
(2) Ibid. See also, McIlwain, The High Court of 
Parliament, p. 92, n. 1. 
The revolutionists were aware of the -,pra.ct.ical 
value of Magna Carta . They argued that if an ancient 
document like the MeLLa Carta could curb the power of 
a King or the Parliament, then a new document could be 
used for a similar purpose. This new document would 
contain their conception of government. It would be 
free from the restrictions and encumbrances of the 
old law. There is evidence to i ndicate that the new 
document should be binding and unalterable. Thus we 
have the trial of something new in British history,- 
(1) 
the written constitution. 
In the heat of political controversy and revolu- 
tion. it is difficult to estimate the weight of 
chance statements. It is even more difficult to eTralu- 
ate them three centuries later. Just what influence 
the Magna Carta had on the political leaders of the 
period of the rebellion is somewhat uncertain. Lil- 
burne at one time made a plea for the observance of 
Magna Carta, agreeing with a contemporary that it wss 
"lying prostrated, besmeared and grovelling in her own 
(2) 
gore". Yet Lilburne made the same use of Magna 
Carta that the American Colonists did. Those who op- 
posed him or his beliefs opposed Magna Carta. 
(1) Mcllwain, The High Court of Parliament,pp.91 -92. 
Mcliwain quotes Cromwell cited supra. 
(2) Lilburne, Fundamental Liberties of England, 1549. 
[.iff-4T 
Mullett states that the name and the writings of Lil- 
burne were often. quoted in the footnotes of American 
(1 
colonial pamphlets. 
In his own defense, Lilburne relied on the rights 
granted by Magna Carta. In one place he writes, "Keith 
in 
er can I /reason or in justice conceive...how you can 
deprive me of the benefit of those just laws, viz. 
Perna Carta, Petition of Right..." (2) 
In a tract entitled John Lilburne Tryed and Cast 
or His Case and Craft Discovered, we read in answer, 
"Here he speaks home for liberty: malefactors are not 
only to choose their jury, but their judges too: 
that Magna Carta is to be understood of liberty grant- 
ed unto murtherers, Theeves, Traytors: But before true 
men, honest an faithful to .Te state, there is no hele 
(3) 
for them, as to their liberty and ecurity." 
It is unnecessary to state that such quotations 
are of little value if one observes them from a legal 
point of view. Such quotations regard the personal 
ri.:'Its of a single individual. The important point, how 
ever, is that Lilburne was quoted widely by the colonic 
and they considered his statements from a political, 
and even legal point of view, to be representative of 
their cause. 
(1) Mullett, Fundamental Law and the Amer, Rev. p. 54 
(2) Scottish National Library, Pamphlet T o. 16 p. 12. 
(3) Ibid, p. 133. 
ts, 
Lilburne wrote a pamphlet entitled, "The Peoples 
Prerogative and Privileges, Asserted and Vindicated 
( Against All Tyran Whatsoever ) By Law and Reason, 
Being A Collection of The Marrow and Soule of 'Magna 
Charta, and All The Most Principali Statutes Ever 
Made Since To This Present Yeare 1647, For the Pres- 
ervation of The Peoples Liberties and Properties." 
Professor ,IcIlwain states that we cannot help but 
notice the inconsistencies in Lilburne's writings. At 
the time of his trial he had much. to say concerning 
fundamental law 3 but at another time: he repeated the 
statement attributed to Cromwell, that the Magna Carta 
was but a beuardly thing, "containing much..and many 
marks of intolerable bondage, and the laws that have 
been wide ever since by Parliaments have in many ear- 




This attitude is easily understood when one re- 
alizes that these words came from a revolutionist who 
would be inclined quite naturally to oppose the govern- 
ment and Parliaments of the past. What Lilburne probabl 
meant was that Magna Carta wa.s not a sufficient grant 
to the people. uowever, when he made plea in his own 
behalf, he relied upon the traditional appeal to the 
rights of Enelishmen contained in the Mann. Carta. 
(1) nigh Court of Parliament, pp. 90-91. 
It is necessary to reject the idea that the Amer- 
ican colonists were influenced by the Puritan revolu- 
tionists in England to revere Magna Carta. The respect 
which Coke had for that document was not apparent a- 
mong the leaders during the English. Civil War. The con- 
tributions to colonial political thought were along 
different lines; namely, the example of a.written const 
tution for a national governement, and the emphasais 
on the sovereignty of the people. 
When Roger Williams of Rhode Island went to Eng- 
land. in 1643 to obtain a charter for Rhode Island, he 
found England engaged in civil strife. He remained a 
year before he gained what he desired. Williams stay- 
ed at the home of Sir Henry Vane, and through that 
gentleman he was able to obtain a charter from the 
colonial committee giving. the Providence Plantations 
liberty to develop the form of government which they 
(1) 
long desired. Vane was a believer in the sov- 
ereignty of the people. He suggested that the most 
natural way to form the government would be by a gen- 
eral council or convention "of faithful, honest, and 
discerning men chosen for that purpose by the free con- 
sent of the whole body of adherents." 
(2 ) 
(1) Borgeaud, Rise of Mom rn Democ rac1, p. 159. 
(2) McLaughlin, Foundations of American Constitutional- 
ism, pp.102 -103. - 
Vanes ideas may be found in Somer's Tracts 
..Which convention is not properly 
to exercise the legislative power, 
but only to debate freely, and - 
agree upon particulars; that, by way 
of fundamental constit,ltions, shall 
be laid and inviolably observed as 
the conditions upon which the 
whole body so represented doth 
consent to cast itself into a 
body politick incorporation... 
which conditions so agreed.. . 
will be without danger of being 
broken or departed from;consider- 
ing of what it is they are the 
conditions and the nature of the 
convention wherein they are made, 
which is of the people represented 
in their hiFhest state of sovereignty. 
(i) 
When Roger William returned to Rhode Island, the 
people of that colony entered into a new covenant in 
which they accepted the charter Rogers had procured 
from England. 
It is agreed... that the form of 
government established in Prov- 
idence Plantations is Democ at- 
icall.. , a government held by the 
free consent of all, or the great- 
er part of the free inhabitants. (2 ) 
(1) Somer's Tracts, VI, p. 312. Somer's Tracts 
are cited frequently by McLaughlin in his 
discussion of the covenant and its influence. 
(2) Records of Rhode Island, vol. i, p. 155. 
Yet the influence of Magna Carta is apparent, for 
the declaration of rights states that no person in the 
colony shall be imprisoned, or disseized of his lands, 
his liberties, or be exiled, molested or destroyed, but 
by " lawfull judgment of his Peers, or by some known 
law, and accor7ing to the letter of it, ratified and 
confirmed by the major part of the 7eneral assembly 
(1). 
lawfully met and orderly managed," 
Provisions similar to those found in the Magna 
Carta were incorporated in other charters of liberty, 
although some of them did not receive the Royal assent, 
because they granted too large a measure of freedom to 
the colonists, threatening the Crown's Prerogative and 
the legislative supremacy of Parliament. In the record 
New York, one may discover that the Duke of. Yerk se- 
cured trial by jury, provided for Habeas Corpus, and it 
charter 
contained many prolrisions of Magna Carta. This charter 
(2) 
of liberties did not receive Royal assent, 
In Maryland, the colonial assembly passed a bill 
to recognize Magna Carta as a part of the law, but this 
as disallowed by the King, as the Attorney General 
ad warned him that this might be inconsistent with 
(3) 
he Royal Prerogative. 
(1) Records of Rhode Island, vol. i, p. 157 
(2) magna Carta Commemoration Essays, pp. 195 -196. 
3) Ibid. 
In 1712 the colonial legislature of South Caro- 
lina adopted the English Common law, and a large num- 
ber of English statutes, including Magna Carta. In 
(1) 
1715 North Carolina passed a similar act. 
Hazeltine points out that Magna Carta became a 
generic term. When it was stipulated by a colonial 
legislature that Magna. Carta was to be adopted, it 
included other constitutional documents as well. The 
very mames Magna. Carta and Bill of Rights were trans- 
mitted, "and terminology in this case, as so often 
in the history of institutions and laws, masked no 
mere shadow but the very flesh and blood of living, 
(2) 
rights." 
Not only is there a great deal of evidence that 
Magna Carta, or the principles found therein, were 
embodied in the charters and written laws of the col- 
onial governments, but it can be shown that the princi 
pies of Magna Carta were incorporated in the colonial 
case law. 
According to Hazeltine, this was done by the 
courts in at least four ways. (1) In cases interpreti 
(1) Magna Carta Commemoration Essays, pp.195 -196. 
(2) Ibid, p. 20. 
and applying colonial legislation. Examples of this 
would be the Rhode Island Code of 1647, the Massa- 
chusetts "Body of Liberties ", and the New York 
"Charter of Liberties ", (2) Cases where the interpre 
tation and application of colonial acts which adopt- 
ed the whole text of the Ma_=na Carta were involved. 
(3) Cases decided where the colony had adopted all 
of the English law as the rule of colonial ad iudicatu e.. 
(4) "in decisions of the many courts that were en- 
gaged, together with other institutions of the colonies, 
in adopting and adapting, either consciously or uncon 
ciously, such portions of the English law as best 
suited the legal requirements of the colonial law 
(1) 
communities." 
In conclusi-)n, it is clear that the colonists 
continued to adopt and adapt Magna Carta, even dur- 
ing the period of civil war in the homeland, when 
Magna Carta did not have the same prestige as it did 
during the life of Sir Edward Coke. The two contri- 
buti a- s of the Commonwealth were (1) the written 
national constitlitio n, and (2) increased emphasis 
on the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. 
As will be seen in the next few pages, certain ideas 
in Magna Carta became incorporated in the Constitution 
of the United States and thus became fundamental law. 
(1) Magna Carta Commemoration Essays, pp. 202 -203. 
Magna Carta and the Constitution of the U. S. 
In the past few pages we have noticed the influ- 
ence of Magna Carta on early American charters, stat- 
utes, and cases. State constitutions adopted certain 
provisions of Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, and 
other important statutes in English constitutional 
law. With the failure of the Articles of Confedera- 
tion, plans were advanced for a written federal const 
tution which was destined to become the fundamental 
lay, of the United States of America. It is only nat- 
ural that the national constitution should incorpor- 
ate ideas of the early charters and state constitu- 
(1) 
tions. James Wilson, born and bred in Scotland, said 
to be the greatest authority on constitutional law 
in the American constitutional convention, was chief 
among those who advocated the adoption of the ideas 
of many British constitutional documents. 
Sir Frederick Pollock has stated, "Our fathers 
laboured and strove chiefly in the field of Crown 
law to work out those ideals of public law and liber- 
ty which are embodied in the Bill of Rights and are 
familiar to American citizens in the Constitt ion of 
the United States and of their several commonwealths.' 
(1) Born near St. Andrews; attenTed St. Andrews, 
Edinburgh, and Glasgow Universities.. 




Bryce, in American Commonwealth and Dicey, 
in Law of the Constitution consider the use of 
British Constitutional documents by the constitutional 
leaders of the United Sates. Specific examples are: 
(3) (4) 
(I) taxation by legislature only, (4trial by jury, (I I 
(5 ) 
for the prohibition of bills of attainder, (IV) laws 
(6) 
impairing obligation of contracts. 
The absence of a specific Bill of Rights brought 
forth criticism, and the first ten ammendments were 
incorporated to protect the liberties of the. people. 
Later the thirteenth, fourteenth anr9 fifteenth am- 
mendments were added, and these may be regarded as 
a part of the specific rights respecting the liberties 
(7) 
of the people. 
(1) Bryce, American Commonwealth (1910 vol. i, 
pp. 426 -463. 
(2) Dicey, Law of the Constitution (1915) P. 195,n.1 
(3) Art. I., section viii. 
(4) Ammen0Qment VII; Article III, section ii. 
(5) Article I, section --iì' , also prohibits ex post 
facto laws. 
(6) Article I, section x. 
(7) These ammendments were ppssed after the American 
Civil War. Theed- evèMth ammendment deals with 
judicial power, and the twelfth ammendment with 
the Electors. 
CONCLUSIO.?. 
Appendices D and E record some of the miscon- 
ceptions and confusion which exist in the minds of 
the American people concerning the historical back- 
ground of judicial review. This lack of understanding 
is the result of (1) fragmentary and incomplete ev- 
idence concerning the subject, and (2) biased opinions 
either for or against judicial review, upon the part 
of leaders in American political and intellectual 
life. For examples in political life, we have Mr. Roos 
evelt and the members 6f Congress in opposition to him 
on the Supreme Court issue. Mr. Brinton Coxe wrote a 
book on the Supreme Court for the purpose of defending 
judicial review, while Mr. Boudin wrote a book for the 
purpose of attacking the review of legislation by the 
(1) 
Supreme Court. Objective scholarship has been difficul 
when attempted in the heat of controversy. 
As has been stated, the purpose of this thesis 
is not to prove ̀ that judicial review is either desirab 
or undesirable, but rather, to evaluate the British 
background in three ways: (1) The Fundamental Law 
Concept; (2) Legal Precedent in British Law; (3) The 
Written Constitution. 
(1) Coxe, Brinton, Judicial Power and Unconstitu- 
tional Legislation. Philad?elp'_ria) 
(2) Boudin, L. S. Government by Judiciary ( N. Y. ) 
/j 7, 
(1) Fundamental Law, 
It is necessary to differentiate between the vagu 
theoretical concept of fundamental law, and the develo 
ment of certain portions of the common law into the 
American fundamental law ( i. e. the incorporation 
of trial by jury, etc. in the American written consti 
tution.) 
law 
The theoretical concept of fundamental /was develo 
ed long before the common law existed. In one form or 
another, it was recognized by the Greeks, the Romans, 
and the Mediaeval Canonists. While an effort has 
been made to trace the fundamental law concept from 
Bracton to Coke, it has never been recognized by,the 
common law courts to the same extent that it has been 
recognized by the civil law courts. 
el 
The concept of fundamental law devIped in the 
colonies because (1) Puritanism encouraged the idea 
of the law of God, and (2) the colonists discovered 
that an appeal to fundamental law was a means of ex- 
pressing their opposition to acts of Parliament. As 
their opposition to Parliament grew, they eagerly 
gleaned every reference to fundamental law that they 
could find in common law texts and cases. From early 
colonial days the colonists thought of Magna Carta 
as fundamental law. Charters and covenants also con- 
tained fundamental laws,. thought the colonists. 
/1g 
The colonists became used to disallowance of 
laws by the Privy Council and the Board of Trade, 
or by the King in the Royal colonies,when a local 
law was contrary to the laws of England, The laws 
of England were considered as laws of a fundamental 
nature. When Parliament passed acts which were dis- 
liked by the colonists, they took the next logical 
step, and argued that there were laws more fundamental 
than the acts of Parliament. Thus through religion, 
practice, and circumstance, the concept of fundamental 
law was encouraged. 
fin/ 
With the failure of the Articles of^ Federation, 
the American constitutional leaders realized that 
laws must be formulated which would bind the states 
together into one nation. Thus the concept of funda- 
mental law which had been used for revolutionary 
purposes was used for the purpose of uniting thirteen 
colonies into one nation. 
Alexander Hamilton was familiar with certain 
passages of Cicero's writings, but there is little 
evidence to indicate that he was thinking of the 
Roman law concept when he was speaking of fundamental 
law. Hamilton, Wilson, Marshall, and other consti- 
tutional leaders were thinking of (1) a fundamental 
law for preservation of specific "inalienable rights" 
and (2) a fundamental law that would preserve the 
union of states. 
LEGAL PRECEDENT I7 BRITISH 
LAW. 
For the purpose of clarity, a distinction should 
be made between British cases which furnish an analogy 
for judicial review, and those which serve as strict 
legal precedents for judicial review. 
An analogous situation can be found in cases wh.e 
a law or rule making body, exercises delegated authoriry, 
and passes what purports to be a rule of law which fal s 
before what is to it a higher or fundamental law. Thus 
colonial laws when inconsistent with their charters 
fell before them. Any ordinance of a British munici- 
pality contrary to its charter would like wise fall. 
The writer is of the opinion that it is futile 
to look for any " direct precedent " for judicial re- 
view in English law. The dictum in Bonham's Case is 
of historical interest, but does not serve as a direct 
precedent, because (1) the issue was not between the 
legislative and judicial powers of the nation, but 
between the power to declare law by the ordinary court 
and the power to declare law by the High Court of 
Parliament, and (2) no written constitution was in- 
volved in Bonham's Case. 
Apparently Coke had in mind the law of nature 
or the Divine law when he spoke of acts contrary to 
right and reason. One important U. S. Supreme Court 
decision, Loan 1 -1sccciation v. Topeka, 20 Wall. X55, 
appears to have been decided on similar reasoning. This 
case appears to be alone, and gene .rally speaking, Amer- 
ican Courts recognize no higher law unless it has been 
incorporated in a written constitution. 
Professor Plucknett's able discussion and analysis 
of Bonham's (lase in the Harvard Law Review has an un- 
fortunate closing paragraph, in which he seems to indi- 
cate that judicial review developed as a result of 
attel's theoretical discussions concerning a written 
onstitution, and Coke's statement in Bonham's Case. 
he writer trusts that Professor Plucknett was only 
hinking of an inte -esting ending when he stated, "Finally, 
here came the reception of Vattel's theoretical dis- 
from 
ussions, which coincided with the.4icta eg the English 
udge. It was due not only to that doctrine, but also 
'he firm faith that 'what my Lord Coke says in Bonham's 
ase is far from any extravagancy' that we 1491E owe the 
old experiment of making a written constitution which 
(1) 
hould have judges and a court for its guardians." 
lucknett, 40 Harvard Law Review. 
/6/. 
TT-TE ':vRITTFN C0n?STIiLTTION. 
Chief Justice Marshall made no reference to 
Bonham's Case when the case of Marbury v. Madison 
was decided, but he did state that "all those who 
have framed written constitutions contemplate them 
as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the 
nation, and consequently, the theory of every such 
government must be, that an act of the legislature 
repugnant to the constitution is void." 
From the very beginning, the American colonists 
had either written charters or covenants. The Pur- 
itans had scriptural authority for the covenant.(1) 
The charters contained guarantees of the rights of 
Englishmen. The written document became a symbol of 
good government. From the very first, the colonists 
indicated their desire to have a written covenant, 
charter or constitItion. Vattel, Locke, and other 
writers expressed ideas which the colonists held be- 
fore reading the discussions of political theorists. 
The hesitation of certain states to accept the Amer- 
ican Const tuti on indicates their belief in its bindir 
effect. 
(1) Joshua xxiv. 25 - -"So Joshua made a covenant with 
the people that day, and set them a statute and an 
ordinance in Shechem." 
g 
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It was clear to Marshall that the theory of the 
separation of powers could not work out in practice. 
Yet to argue for "government by judiciary" would have 
been fatal. 
Human nature was an important factor in the deve op- 
ment of the American Constitutional System. The leader 
in the constitutional convention decided that the 
country should not have a king, and they mistrusted 
legislative supremacy, for they had not forgotten thei 
conflicts with Parliament at Westminster. Furthermore 
the state legislative assemblies were unpopular at 
the time the constitution was being drafted. Marshall 
knew the mind of the American, he understood the citi- 
zen's faith in the written governmental instrument. 
True, there had been mistrust of the new constitution, 
but this mistrust had been overcome. The constitution 
had been accepted as the instrument of government. Thu 
Marshall appealed to the people. The constitution must 
be protected. Who could guard it but the judicial body 
The people of the United States still regard the 
Constitution as a sacred document, the outgrowth of 
faith in Magna Carta, early charters, and covenants. 
Judicial review is the result of the able arguments 
of Marshall at the appropriate time. It is possible to 
find analogies in British history, but no direct prece.ent, 
either in common law or civil law, has yet been found. 
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APPET.TD IX . 
The appendix contains material of a supplement- 
ary nature. Lists of earlier cases than Marbury y. 
Madison, quotations from the writings of the consti- 
tutional fathers, and evidence which would not lend 
itself to classification in the thesis proper. 
Appendices D and E contain some interesting 
documents from the reports of the Committee Upon the 
Duty of Courts to Refuse to Execute Statutes in 
Contravention of Fundamental Law. 
The writer is indebted to the New Yotk City 
Bar Association for the use of the Reports. The 
materials were compile by the committee. 
APPENDIX A. 
CASES IN THE SEPARATE COLONIES AND STATES. 
Connecticut. 
1785. In Symsbury case., Kirby (Conn.), 444, 
447, it was held that an act of the General Assembly 
of Connecticut confirming surveyor Kimberlay's line 
"operated to restrict and limit the western extent of 
the jurisdiction of the town of Symsbury, but could 
not legally operate to curtail the land before granted 
to the proprietors of the town of Symsbury, without 
their consent; and the grant to Symsbury being prior 
to the grant made to the towns of Hartford and Wind- 
sor, under which the defendant claims, we are of op- 
inion the title of the lands demanded as in the plain- 
tiffs." 
Kentucky. 
1801. In Stidger v. Rogers, 2 Kentucky Decis- 
ions, 52, headnote : 
"An act of the legislature which author- 
izes the court to assess the value of property 
where, prior to the constitution, the assess- 
ment could only be made by a jury, as in con- 
flict with the clause of the constitution 
which provides 'that trial by jury shall be as 
heretofore, and the right thereof remain in- 
violate,' and is therefore void. 
"An act of the legislature which author- 
izes the court to aware fifteen per centum 
damages for the non -performance of a contract, 
made before the act was passed, changes the 
obligation of the contract, and is void." 
Maryland. 
1802. In Whittington v. Polk, 1 Harris & Johnson 
(Maryland), 236, 241 -6 headnote s 
"An act of assembly repugnant to the con- 
stitution is void. The court have a right to 
determine an act of assembly void which is re- 
pugnant to the constitution." 
Massachusetts. 
1786. In Brattle v. Hinckley and in Brattle v. Put- 
nam, 7 Harvard Law Review, 415 -7, 419 -20; a Ban - 
croft's History of the Constitution, 473 (Letter 
Cutting to Jefferson), the Supreme Court of Massachu- 
setts declared void statutes providing that in suits 
brought by absentees during the Revolutionary War to 
recover debts, judgment for all interest accruing dur- 
ing the war should be suspended until further action 
of the legislature. 
New Jersey. 
1780. In State v. Parkhurst, 9 New Jersey Law, 
427, the court say (9 New Jersey Law) 444): 
"At an early period of our government, while 
the minds of men were yet unbiassed by party pre -; 
judices, this question was brought forward, in the 
case of Holmes and Walton, arising on what was them 
called the seizure laws. There it had been enac 
ted that the trial should be by a jury of six men; 
rG6 
and it was objected that this was not a constitu -' 
tional jury; and so it was held; and the act 
upon solemn argument was adjudged to be uncon- 
stitutional, and in that case inoperative. And 
upon this decision the act, or at least that part 
of it which relates to the six men jury, was re- 
pealed, and a constitutional jury of twelve men 
substituted in its place. This, then, is not 
only a judicial decision, but a decision recog- 
nized and acquiesced in by the legislative body 
of the state." 
1796 : 
"In later days, in the case of Taylor v. 
Reading, a certain act of the legislature, 
passed March, 1795, upon the petition of the de- 
fendants, declaring that in certain cases pay- 
ments wade in continental money shou7,.d be cre- 
dited as specie, was by this court held to be an 
ex post facto law, and as such unconstitutional, 
and in that case inoperative. 
"And with this decision before them (for 
the act was made pending the suit), and as I 
humbly conceive, fully acquiescing therein as to 
matter of principle, the legislature afterwards, 
in January, 1797, passed another act for the re- 
lief of the said defendant, Reading, in another 
way. These two cases in New Jersey, * * * 
both afterwards brought into the notice, and ac- 
quiesced in, and if I may so say, sanctioned by 
the legislature, would be sufficient to rule the 
question." 
1804. State v. Parkhurst, 9 New Jersey Law, 427, 
442-4, headnote : 
"The Supreme Court has power to declare an 
act of the legislature void, as being contrary 
to the constitution." 
New York. 
1784. In Rutgers v. Waddington, 1 Thayer Cases 
on Constitutional Law, 63, 68 -72, the Mayor's Court 
of the City of New York refused to execute a statute 
authorizing actions of trespass by the owners of hous 
es against the occupants thereof under orders of the 
British commander -in- chief. 
North Carolina. 
1787. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 Martin (North 
Carolina). 42, 44 -5, it was held that an act of North 
Carolina passed in 1875, "requiring the court to dis- 
miss on motion, the suits brought by persons,whose 
property had been confiscated, against the purchasers,! 
on affidavit of the defendants that they were purchas- 
ers from the commissioners of confiscated property,is 
unconstitutional and void." 
1802. In Ogden v. Witherspoon, 2 Haywood (North'. 
Carolina), 404 -7, syllabus 
"The legislature, by an act passed in 1799, de- 
clared that a law passed in 1715 has continued 
and shall continue in force; it was a question 
at the time of the passage of the act of 1799, 
whether the act of 1715 was not repealed by a law 
passed in 1789; held that the determination of 
this question belonged to the Judiciary and not 
to the legislature; and that therefore the act of 
1799, so far as it regards this question, contra -!. 
venes the fourth section of the bill of rights 
and is void." 
1805. In Trustees of the University v Foy, 5 
North Carolina (1 Murphey), 58, 81, 83 -9, it was held 
that a North Carolina act of 1800 repealing legislative 
grants made in 1789 and 1794 of all escheated and 
confiscated property to the University of North Caro- 
lina, and reverting the granted property to the State, 
was void, being in violation of the State Bill of 
Rights. 
Ohio. 
1807 -8. In Ohio the Court of Connon Pleas for 
the third circuit, constituting a majority of the 
State Supreme Court, held a State law of 1805, giving 
jurisdiction to justices of the peace in cases ex- 
ceeding 420, unconstitutional as impairing the consti 
tutional right of trial by jury. One of the judges 
was thereafter elected governor, and an attempt con- 
tinued through two legislative sessions to impeach all 
three of them failed. (I Chase's Statutes of Ohio, 
1833, pp. 38 -40; Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 
7th ed., 229 -30 note.) 
Pennsylvania. 
1793. Austin v. University of Pennsylvania, 
1 Yeates (Pa.), 260 -1, headnote :- 
"The act of assembly vesting Isaac Austin 
with a messuage, etc., passed 6th August, 1784, 
adjudged to be unconstitutional." 
1799. In Respublica v. Duquet 2 Yeates (Pa.), 
493, 501, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania asserted 
the power of the judiciary to declare a law unconsti- 
tutional. 
1808. In Emerick v. Harris, I Binney (Pa.), 
416, 419 -23, 425, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
again asserted the power of the judiciary to decide 
upon the constitutionality of Scots laws. 
Rhode Island. 
1786. In Trevett v. Weeden, Cooley Constitu- 
tional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 229; I Thayer Cases 
on Constitutional Law, 73 -4; 2 Chandler's Criminal 
Trials, 269 -350, the Superior Court of Rhode Island 
refused to execute a State law imposing a penalty 
upon every person who refused to receive State bills 
in payment for articles offered for sale, or should 
make distinction in value between State bills and 
silver and gold. 
South Carolina. 
1789. In Ham. v. M'Claws, 1 Bay (South Caro- 
lina), 93, 98, it was held that a State statute of 
1788 forfeiting any negro imported intc. South Caro- 
lina except from another State, and when owed by a 
citizen of the United States, was null and void. 
1805. In White v. Kendrick, 1 Brevard (South 
Carolina), 469, 470 -3, headnote : 
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"The act of assembly of 1801, extending the 
jurisdiction of justices of the peace to thirty 
dollars, was adjudged to be unconstitutional." 
Tennessee. 
1807. In Miller's Lesee v. Holt, I Overton, 
242, 244 -5, it was held that Tennessee had no right 
to pass an act perfecting titles within what had been 
North Carolina. 
Virginia. 
1778. In May, 1778, an act of Virginia attain - 
ted one Phillips unless he should render himself to 
justice within a limited time; after the time ex- 
pired he was taken and brought before the court to re- 
ceive sentence of execution pursuant to the attainder. 
But the court held the attainder invalid, and he was 
put upon his trial according to due process of law. 
(I Tucker's Blackstone) ed. 1803, p. 293, appendix; 
5 Political Science Quarterly, 235). 
1782. In Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Virginia 
(4 Call), 5, 8, 16 -20, it was held that a resolution of 
the house of delegates, without :the consent of the sen- 
ate, pardoning three persons condemned for treason,was 
unconstitutional inoperative and void. 
1788. In case of the judges, 8 Virginia (4 Call), 
135, 142 -6, it was held that the legislature had no 
/7/ 
power under the State Constitution to reduce the num- 
ber of judges of the Court of Appeals, but could re- 
move all the officers of the court. 
1792. Turner v. Turner, 8 Virginia (4 Call), 
234, 237 -8, headnote :- 
"Ex post facto laws are contrary to the 
principles, of the constitution." 
1793. In Page v. Pendleton, Wythe, Virginia 
Chancery, 211, 213 -8, headnote : 
"k debt due to a British creditor was not 
discharged by payment in paper money into the 
loan office, under the act of 1788, which enacted' 
that such payments should have that effect ". 
1793. In Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Virginia Cases, 
20, 23 -8, it was held that a statute requiring 
judges of the District Courts to exercise also the 
functions of the Court of Chancery was unconstitutional. 
Georgia, New Hampshire, Tennessee and Vermont. 
Vermont held that a State court had power to de- 
clare a State law unconstitutional in 1814 (Dupy v. 
Wickwire, I D. Chipman, 237) 238 -9): New Hampshire 
in 1826 (Wart v. Winnick, 3 N. H., 473); Tennessee 
in 1836 (Union Bank v. State) 17 Tenn. 490) and Georgia 
in 1848 (Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster) 5 Geor- 
gia. 194, 204 -5). 
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The principal judicial opponent of Chief Justice 
Marshall was Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania, who 
as late as 1825 contended that while it was the duty 
of the judiciary to refuse to execute any law, State 
or Federal, that was in violation of the Federal Con- 
stitution, it had no right to refuse to execute a 
State law which was in contravention of the State Con- 
stitution. (Eakin v. Raub. 12 Sergeant & Rawle, 345458, 
Gibson, J.) 
In Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. State, 277, 281 (1845); 
Chief Justice Gibson concurred with Chief Justice Mar 
shall's views, saying (281): 
"I have changed that opinion for two reasons. 
The late" State Constitutional "Convention, by 
their silence, sanctioned the pretensions of the 
courts to deal freely with the acts of the legis- 




IDEAS OF EARLY STATESMEN. 
Thomas Jefferson, Samuel edams and Patrick Henry,, 
the leaders of the radicals and fathers of the bill of 
rights embodied in the first to the tenth amendments, 
all believed it was the duty of the judiciary to re- 
fuse to execute laws in excess of or in contravention 
of the constitution, and particularly to enforce the 
bill of rights. 
As Jefferson put it, a constitutional bill of 
rights was necessary, because of "the legal check 
which it puts into the hands of the judiciary." 
5 Jefferson's Works (Ford ed.), 80 -1 : 
"In the arguments in favor of a declaration 
of rights, you omit one which has great weight 
with me, the legal check which it puts into the 
hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if 
rendered independent and kept strictly to their 
own department merits great confidence for their 
learning and integrity. In fact what degree of 
confidence would be too much for a body composed 
of such men as Wythe, Blair and Pendleton ? 
Samuel Adams, in his speech in the Massachusetts 
convention in support of the constitution,which turned 
the tide in that convention in favor of its ratifica- 
tion, said (2 Elliot's Debates, 131) : 
"It removes a doubt which many have enter- 
tained respecting the matter,and gives assurance 
that, if any law made by the federal government 
shall be extended beyond the power granted by 
the proposed Constitution, and inconsistent with 
the constitution of this State) it will be an 
error, and adjudged by the courts of law to be 
void." 
Patrick Henry, 3 Elliot's Debates (Virginia Con- 
vention), said (pp. 324 -4): 
"The honorable gentlemen did our judiciary 
honor in saying that they had firmness to counter- 
act the legislature in some cases. Yes, sir,our 
judges opposed the acts of the legislature. We 
have this landmark to guide us. They had forti- 
tude to declare that they were the judiciary, and 
would oppose unconstitutional acts. * * * 
I take it as the highest encomium on this coun- 
try, that the acts of the legislature, if uncon- 
stitutional, are liable to be opposed by the 
judiciary." 
Patrick Henry (Virginia Convention), 3 Elliot's 
Debates, 539 -41 : 
"In what a situation will your judges be, 
when they are sworn to preserve the Constitution 
of a State and of the general government I If 
there be a concurrent dispute between them, which', 
will prevail? They cannot serve two masters 
struggling for the same object. The laws of Con- 
gress being paramount to those of the states,and 
to their constitutions also whenever they come 
in competition, the judges must decide in favor 
of the former. * * * The judiciary are 
the sole protection against a tyrannical execu- 
tion of the laws. * * * When Congress, by 
virtue of this sweeping clause, will organise 
these courts, they cannot depart from the Consti- 
tution ; and their laws in opposition to the Con- 
stitution would be void. If Congress, under the 
specious pretence of pursuing this clause, alter- 
it, and prohibited appeals as to fact, the 
federal judges, if they spoke the sentiments of 
independent men, would declare their prohibition 
nugatory and void." 
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4. Jefferson's Works (Letter to James Madison, 
Dec. 20, 1787), 476 -7 : 
"Let me add that a bill of rights is what 
the people are entitled to against every govern - 
ment on earth, general or particular, and what 
no just government should refuse, or rest on in- 
ferences." 
5. Jefferson's Works (Letter to William Rute - 
ledge, Feb. 2) 1788), 4 : 
"I an glad to hear that our new constitution 
is pretty sure of being accepted by states enough 
secure the good it contains, and to meet such 
opposition in some others as to give us hopes it 
will be accommodated to them by the amendment 
of its most glaring faults, particularly the want 
of a declaration of rights." 
5. Jefferson's Works (Letter to James Madison, 
Feb. 6, 1788), 5 : 
"I am glad to hear that the new Constitution 
is received with favor. I sincerely wish that the 
nine first conventions may receive and the four 
last reject it. The former will receive it fin- 
ally, while the latter will oblige them to offer 
a declaration of rights in order to complete the 
union. We shall thus have all its good, and 
cure its principal defect." 
5. Jefferson's Works (Letter to James Madison, 
July 31) 1788), 45 : 
r"I sincerely rejoice at the acceptance of 
our new constitution by nine states. It is a 
good canvas, on which some strokes only want re- 
touching. What these are, I think are suffic- 
iently manifested by the general voice from North 
to South, which calls for a bill of rightd." 
/Th 
Id., 47 z 
"I hope therefore a bill of rights will be 
formed to guard the people against the federal 
government, as they are already guarded against 
their state governments in most instances." 
5. Jefferson's Works (Letter to Francis Hopkin- 
son, March 13) 1789), 76 -7 : 
"I approved, from the first moment of the 
great mass of what is in the new constitution. 
* * *ha.t I disapproved from the first 
moment also was the want of a bill of rights to 
guard liberty against the legislative as well as 
executive branches of the government, that is to 
say to secure freedom in religion, freedom of the 
press, freedom from monopolies, freedom from 
unlawful imprisonment, freedom from a permanent 
military, and a trial by jury in all cases`' 
determinable by the laws of the land. I dis- 
approved also the perpetual reeligibility of the 
President. * * * My first wish was that 
the nine first conventions might accept the con- 
stitution, as the means of securing to us the 
great mass of good it contained, and that the four 
last might reject it, as the means of obtaining 
amendments. 
But I was corrected in this wish the moment I saw 
the much better plan of Massachusetts and which 
had never occurred to me. With respect to the de- 
claration of rights I suppose the majority of the 
United States are of my opinion; for I apprehend 
all the anti federalists, and a very respectable 
proportion of the federalists think that such a 
declaration should now be annexed. The enlight -' 
ened part of Europe have given us the greatest 
credit for inventing this. instrument of security 
for the rights of the people * * *." 
5. Jefferson's Works (Letter to Noah Webster, 
Dec. 4) 1790), 254 -5: 
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"The purposes of society do not require a 
surrender of all our rights to our ordinary 
governors; that there are certain portions of 
right not necessary to.endp le them to carry on an 
government, and which experience has 
nevertheless proved they will be constantly en- 
croaching on, if submitted to them; that there 
are also certain fences which experience has 
proved peculiarly efficacious against wrong,and 
rarely obstructive of right, which yet the govern- 
ing powers have ever shown a disposition to wea- 
ken and remove. * * * 
These fences against wrong, which they meant', 
to exempt from the power of their governors, in 
instruments called declarations of rights and 
constitutions; and as they did this by conven- 
tions which they appointed for the express purpose 
of reserving these rights, and of delegating 
others to their ordinary legislative, executive 
and judiciary bodies, none of the reserved rights 
can be touched without resorting to the people to 
appoint another convention for the express pur- 
pose of permitting it." 
5. Jefferson's Works (Letter to President Wash- 
ington) Sept. 9, 1792), 104 -5 : 
"No man in the United States I suppose , ap -. 
proved of every title in the Constitution ; no 
one, I believe approved more of it than I did. 
* . * * My objection to the constitution was 
that it wanted a bill of rights. * * * Colo! 
Hamilton's was that it wanted a king and house of 
lords. The sense of America has approved my 
objection and added the bill of rights, not the 
king and lords. I also thought a longer term of 
service, insusceptible of renewal, would have made 
a president more independent. My country has 
thought otherwise, and I have acquiesced implicit- 
ly. * * * Notwithstanding my wish for a 
bill of rights, my letters strongly urged the ad- 
option of the constitution, by nine states at 
least, to secure the good it contained. I at 
first thought that the best method of securing the 
bill of rights would be for four states to hold 
off till such a bill should be agreed to. But the 
moment I saw Mr Hancock's proposition to pass tje 
17$ 
constitution as it stood, and give perpetual 
instructions to the representatives of every 
state to insist on a bill of rights, I acknow- 
ledged the superiority of his plan, and advo- 
cated universal adoption." 
5. Madison's Works (Letter to Thomas Jeffer- 
son) Oct. 24, 1787, enclosing a copy of the constitu- 
tion), 22 -3 : 
"The due partition between the general and 
local governments, was perhaps of all, the most 
nice and difficult. A few contended for an en -' 
tire abolition of the States; some for inde- 
finite power of legislation in the congress, 
with 'a negative on the laws of the states; 
some for such a power without a negative; some 
for a limited power of legislation, with such a 
negative; the majority finally for a limited 
power without the negative. The question with 
to the negative underwent repeated dis- 
cussions, and was finally rejected by a bare 
majority. As I formerly intimated to you my 
opinion in favor of this ingredient, I will take 
this occasion of explaining myself on the sub- 
ject. Such a check on the states appears to 
me necessary. 
1. To prevent encroachments on the general 
authority. 
2. To prevent instability and injustice in 
legislation of the states. 
1. Without such a check in the whole over the 
parts, our system involves the evil of imperia 
in imperio. If a complete supremacy somewhere 
is not necessary in every society, a controlling 
power at least is so, by which the general 
authority may be defended against encroachments 
of the subordinate authorities, and by which the 
latter may be restrained from encroachments on 
each other. If the supremacy of the British 
Parliament is not necessary as has been con- 
tended for the harmony of that Empire; it is 
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evident I think that without the royal negative 
or some equivalent control, the unity of the 
system would be destroyed. The want of some 
such provision seems to have been mortal to 
the ancient 'confederates, and to be the disease 
of the modern." 
Id. 26-8 t 
"It may be said that the judicial authority, 
under our new system will keep the states with -' 
in their proper limits, and supply the place 
of a negative on their laws. The answer is,that 
it is more convenient to prevent the passage of 
a law than to declare it void after it is passed; 
that this will be particularly the case, where 
the law aggrieves individuals, who may be unable 
to support an appeal against a state to the 
supreme judiciary; that a state which would 
violate the legislative rights of the Union, 
would not be very ready to obey a judicial de- 
cree in support of them * * *. 
2. A constitutional negative on the laws of the 
states seems equally necessary to secure indiv- 
iduals against encroachments on their rights. 
The mutability of the laws of the states is 
found to be a serious evil. The injustice of 
them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to 
alarm the most,stedfast friends of Republicanism. 
I am persuaded I do not err in saying that the 
evils issuing from these sources contributed more 
to that uneasiness which produced the convention, 
and prepared the public mind for a general re- 
form, than those which accrued to our national 
character and interest from the inadequacy of 
the confederation to its immediate objects. A 
reform therefore which does not make provision 
for private rights, must be materially defective. 
The restraints against paper emissions, and vio- 
lations) of contracts are not sufficient. Sup -' 
posing them to be effectual as far as they go, 
they are short of the mark. Injustice may be 
effected by such an infinitude of legislative 
expedients, that where the disposition exists 
it can only be controlled by some provision which 
reaches all cases whatsoever. The partial pro- 
vision made, supposes the disposition which will 
evade it." 
Igo. 
5. Madison's Works (Speech ón Amendments to 
the Constitution, June 8, 1879), 380 -1. 
"In the declaration of rights which that 
country 'Great Britain' has established, the 
truth is, they have gone no farther than to 
raise a barrier against the power of the Crown; 
the power of the legislature is left altogether 
indefinite. * * * Yet their Magna Char to 
does not contain any one provision for the se- 
curity of those rights, respecting which the 
people of America are most alarmed. * * * 
A different opinion prevails in the United 
States. The ripe ople of many states have 
thought it necessary to raise barriers against 
power in all forms and departments of govern- 
ment, and I an inclined to believe, if once 
bills of rights are established in all the states 
as well as the Federal Constitution, we shall 
find that although some of them are rather dnimt- 
portant, yet, upon the whole, they will have a 
salutary tendency." 
Id. 385 : 
"It has been said that it is unnecessary to 
load the constitution with this provision" (a 
bill of rights), "because it was not found ef- 
fectual in the constitution of the particular 
states. It is true, there are a few particu- 
lar states in which some of the most valuable 
articles have not, at one time or other, been 
violated ; but it does not follow but they may 
have to a certain degree, a salutary effect 
against the abuse of power. If they are incor- 
porated into the constitution, independent tri- 
bunals of justice will consider themselves in a 
peculiar manner the guardian of those rights ; 
they will be an impenetrable bulwark against 
every assumption of power in the legislative or 
executive; they will be naturally led to resist 
every encroachment upon rights expressly stipu- 
lated for in the constitution by the declaration 
of rights. Besides this security, there is a 
great probability that such a declaration in the 
federal system would be enforced; because the 
state legislatures will jealously and closely 
watch the operations of this government, and 
be able to resist with more effect every assump- 
tion of power, than any other power on earth 
can do; and the greatest opponents to a feder- 
al government admit the state legislation to be 
sure guardians of the peoples liberty. I con- 
clude, from this view of the subject, that it 
will be proper in itself, and highly politic, 
for the tranquility of the public mind, and 
the stability of the government that we should 
offer something, in the form I have proposed, 
to be incorporated in the system of government, 
as a declaration of the rights of the people." 
APPENDIX C. 
FRAMERS OF THE GONSTITUTION. 
All the framers of the constitution, who have 
expressed their opinions on the subject (except four) 
one of whom subsequently changed his views and agreed', 
with the majority) approved of the judiciary refusing, 
to execute acts in excess of or in contravention of 
the federal constitution. 
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 78 
(9 Hamilton's Works, Lodge's ed . 484 -6) 
"The complete independence of the courts of 
justice is peculiarly essential in a limited con- 
stitution. By a limited constitution, I under -' 
stand one which contains certain specified ex- 
ceptions to the legislative authority; such, for 
instance, as that it shall pass no bills of at- 
tainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. 
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in prac- 
tice no other way then through the medium of 
courts of justice, whose duty it must be to de- 
clare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of 
the constitution void. Without this, all reser- 
vations of particular rights or privileges would 
amount to nothing. 
Some perplexity respecting the rights of the 
courts to pronounce legislative acts void, be- 
cause contrary to the constitution, has arisen 
from an imagination that the doctrine would imply 
a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative 
power. * 
There is no position which depends on clearer 
principles, than that every act of a delegated 
authority, contrary to the tenor of the commis- 
sion under which it is exercised, is void. No 
legislative act, therefore-, contrary to the 
constitution, can be valid. To deny this,would 
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be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than 
his principal; that the servant is above his 
master; that the representatives of the people 
are superior to the people themselves; that men 
acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what 
their powers do not authorize, but what they for 
bid. 
The interpretation of the laws is the proper 
and peculiar province of the courts. A constitu- 
tion is, in fact, and must be regarded by the 
judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore be- 
longs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well 
as the meaning of any particular act proceeding 
from the legislative body. 
If there should happen to be an irreconcile- 
able variance between the two, that which has the 
superior obligation, and validity ought, of 
course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the 
constitution ought to be preferred to the stat- 
ute, the intention of the people to the intention 
their agents. 
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose 
a superiority of the judicial to the legislative 
power. It only supposes that the power of the 
people is superior to both; and that where the 
will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, 
stands in opposition to that of the people, de- 
clared in the constitution, the judges ought to be 
governed by the latter rather than the former. 
They ought to regulate their decisions by the 
fundamental laws, rather than by those which are 
not fundamental." 
ames Madison, 5 Elliot's Debates, 355 -6 : 
"Mr Madison thought it clear that the legisla- 
tures were incompetent to the proposed changes. 
These changes would make essential inroads on the 
state constitutions; and it would be a novel and 
dangerous doctrine, that a legislature could 
change the constitution under which it held its 
existence. * * * He considered the differ- 
ence between a system founded on the legislatures 
only, and one founded on the people, to be the 
true difference between a league or treaty, and a 
constitution. * In point of political 
operation, there were two important distinctions 
in favor of the latter. First, a law violating a 
treaty ratified by a pre -existing law might be 
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respected by the judges as a law, though an un- 
wise or perfidious one. A law violating a con- 
stitution established by the people themselves 
would be considered by the judges as null and 
void. Secondly, the doctrine laid down by the 
law of nations in the ease of treaties is, that 
a breach of any one article by any of the parties 
frees the other parties from their engagements. 
In the case of a union of people under one 
constitution, the nature of the pact has always 
been understood to exclude such an interpretation." 
(See also 2 Farrand Records of the Federal Con- 
vention, 92 -3). 
James Madison, 5 Elliot's Debates, 321 : 
"Mr Madison considered the negative on the 
laws of the State as essential to the efficacy 
and security of the general government. The 
necessity of a general government proceeds 
from the propensity of the states to pursue their 
particular interests, in opposition to the gen- 
eral interest. This propensity will continue 
to disturb the system unless effectual ly con- 
trolled. * * * They will pass laws 
which will accomplish their injurious objects 
before they can be repealed by the general leg- 
islature, or set aside by the national tribun- 
als. * * * In Rhode Island, the judges 
who refused to execute an unconstitutional law 
were displaced; and others substituted by the 
legislature, who would be the willing instru- 
ments of the wicked and arbitrary plans of 
their masters." (See also 2 Farrand, 27 -28). 
James Madison, 5 Elliot's Debates, 164 : 
"An association of the judges in his revi- 
sionary function would both double the advantage 
and diminish the danger. It would also enable 
the judiciary department the better to ,defend 
itself against legislative encroachments." 
(See also 1 Farrand, 138). 
It 
5 Elliot's Debates, 344-5 : 
"It would be useful to the judiciary depart- 
ment by giving it an additional opportunity of 
defending itself against legislative encroach - 
ments." (See also 2 Farrand, 74) . 
James Madison (Virginia Convention), 3 Elliot's 
Debates, 532: 
"The first class of cases to which its 
jurisdiction extends are those which may arise 
under the constitution; and this to extend to 
equity as well as law. It may be a misfortune 
that, in organizingany government, the ex- 
plication of its authority should be left to 
any of its coordinate branches. There is no 
example in any country where it is otherwise. 
There is a new policy in submitting it to the 
judiciary of the United States. That causes 
of a federal naturewill arise, will be ovious 
to every gentleman who will recollect that 
the states are laid under restrictions, and 
that the rights of the union are secured by 
these restrictions." 
William R. Davie, 4 Elliot's Debates (North Carolina 
Convention), 155 -6: 
"For my own part, I know but two ways in 
which the laws can be executed by any govern- 
ment. If there be any other, it is unknown to 
me. The first mode is coercion by military 
force, and the second is coercion through the 
judiciary. With respect to coercion by force,' 
I shall suppose that it is so extremely repug- 
nant to the principles of justice and the feel -', 
ings of a free people, that no man will support 
it. It must, in the end, terminate in the de -' 
struction of the liberty of the people. I take 
therefore, that there is no rational way of . 
enforcing the laws but by the instrumentality 
of the judiciary. From these premises we are 
left only to consider how far the jurisdiction 
of the judiciary ought to extend. It appears 
to me that the judiciary ought to be competent 
to the decision of any question arising out of 
the constitution itself. * * 
It is necessary in all governments, but par - 
ticu.arly in a federal government, that its 
judiciary should be competent to the decision 
of all questions arising out of the constitution 
* * * Without a judiciary, the injunctions 
of the constitution may be disobeyed, and the 
positive regulations neglected or contravened." 
John Dickinson (2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
Convention, 299): 
"Mr. Dickenson was strongly impressed with 
the remark of Mr. Mercer as to the power of the 
judges to set aside the law. He thought no 
such power ought to exist. He was at the same 
time at a loss what expedient to substitute. 
The justiciary of Aragon he observed became by 
degrees the law giver." 
In one of his Fabius letters written in advocacy of 
the constitution in 1788, Dickinson says (Ford Pamphlet 
on the Constitution, 184): 
"In the president, and the federal independ- 
ent judges, so much concerned in the execution 
of the laws, and in the determination of their 
constitutionality, the sovereignties of the 
several states and the people of the whole 
union, may be considered as conjointly repre- 
sented." 
Oliver Ellsworth, 2 Elliot's Debates ( Connecticut 
Convention), 196: 
"This constitution defines the extent of the 
powers of the general government. If the 
general legislature should at any time over- 
leap their limits, the judicial department is a 
constitutional check. If the United States go 
beyond their powers, if they make a law which 
the constitution does not authorize, it is void; 
and the judicial power, the national judges, who, 
tosecure their impartiality, are to be made 
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independent, will declare it to be void. On 
the other hand, if the states go beyond their 
limits, if they make a law which is a usurpation 
upon the general government, the law is void; 
and upright, independent judges will declare it 
to be so." ( See also 3 Farrand, 240 -1). 
5 Elliots Debates, 462 -3: 
"Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the precaution as 
to ex post facto laws unnecessary, but essential 
as to bills of attainder. 
Mr. Ellsworth contended, that there was no 
lawyer,; no civilian, who would not say that ex 
post facto laws were void of themselves. It 
cannot, then, be necesary to prohibit them. 
Mr. Wilson was against inserting anything in 
the constitution as to ex post facto laws. It 
will bring reflections on the constitution, and 
proclaim that w e are ignorant of the first prin- 
ciples of legislation, or are constituting a 
government that will be so. * * * 
Mr. Carroll, remarked, that experience overruled 
all other calculations. It had proved that, in 
whatever light they might be viewed by civilians 
or others, the state legislatures had passed. them 
and they had taken effect. * * * 
Mr. Williamson. - Such a prohibitory clause is 
in the Constitution of North Carolina; and though 
it has been violated, it has done good there, and 
may do good here, because the judges can take 
hold of it." ( See also 2 Farrand, 376.) 
Eibridge Gerry, 5 Elliot's Debates, 151: 
"Mr. Gerry doubts whether the judiciary ought 
to form part of it" (the council of revision , 
"as they will have a sufficient check against 
encroachments on their own department by their' 
exposition of the laws, which involved a power 
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of deciding on their constitutionality. In some 
states the judges had actually set aside laws, as 
being against the constitution. This was done, too 
with general approbation." (See also 1 Farrand, 
97.) 
Elbridge Gerry(1789 in debate on president's power 
of removal) 4 Elliot's Debates. 393% 
"We then proceed to lay a duty of twenty or 
thirty dollars per head on the importation of 
negroes. The merchant does not contrue the con- 
stitution in the manner that we have done. He 
therefore institutes a suit, and brings it before 
the supreme judicature of the United States for 
trial. The judges, who are bound by oath to 
support the constitution, declare against this 
law; they would therefore give judgment in favor 
of the merchant." 
,Elbridge Gerry (1789 on debate on Secretary of foreign 
affairs) , 1 Annals of Congress, 491 - 2: 
"Are we afraid that the President and Senate 
are not sufficiently informed to know their re- 
spective duties? * * * If the fact is, as 
we seem to suspect, that they do not understand 
the constitution, let it go before the proper 
tribunal; the judges are the constitutional 
umpires on such questions." 
William Grayson (Virginia Convention), 3 
Elliot's Debates, 567: 
"If the Congress cannot make a law against the 
constitution, I apprehend they cannot make a law 
to abridge it. The Judges are to defend it. 
They can neither abridge nor extend it." 
Governor Johnston (North Carolina Convention), 
Elliot's Debates, 187 -8: 
¡ST. 
"The Constitution must be the supreme law 
of the land; otherwise, it would be in the power 
of any one state to counteract the other states, 
and withdraw itself from the Union. 
The laws made in pursuance thereof by Congress 
ought to be the Supreme law of the land; other- 
wise any one state might repeal the laws of the 
Union at large. Without this clause, the whole 
Constitution wouldbe a piece of blank paper. 
Every treaty should be the supreme law of the 
land; without this, any one sate might involve 
the whole Union in war. * * * 
Every law consistent with the Constitution will 
have been made in pursuance of the powers granted 
by it. Every usurpation or law repugnant to it 
cannot have been made in pursuance of its powers. 
The latter will be nugatory and void." 
Rufus King (1 Farrand, Records of the Federal- 
Convention, 98): 
553: 
"Mr. King seconds the motion, observing that 
the Judges ought to be able to expound the law 
as it should come before them, free from bias of 
having participated in its forrnntion." 
Rufus King (1 Farrand, 109): 
"Mr. King was of opinion that the Judicial 
ought not to join in the negative of a law, be- 
cause the Judges will have the expounding of 
those laws when they come before them; and they 
will no doubt stop the operation of such as shall 
appear repugnant to the constitution." 
John Marshall, 3 Elliot's Debates (Va. Convention) 
"Has the Government of the United States power 
to make laws on every subject? Does he under- 
stand it so? Can they make laws affecting the 
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the mode of transferring property, or contracts 
or claims, between citizens of the same state? 
Can they go beyond the delegated powers? If they 
were to make a law not warranted by any of the 
powers enumerated, it would be considered by the 
judges as an infringement of the constitution 
which they are to guard. They would not consider 
such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. 
They would declare it void." 
Luther Martin, 5 Elliot's Debates, 346 -7f 
"Mr. L. Martin considered the association 
of the judges with the executive as a dangerous 
innovation asvell as one that could not produce 
the particular advantage expected from it. A 
knowledge of mankind, chd of legislative affairs, 
cannot be presumed to belong in a higher degree 
to the judges than to the legislature. And as 
to the constitutionality of laws, that point will 
come before the judges in their official character 
In this character they have a negative on the laws 
Join them with the executive in the revision, and 
they will have a double negative." (See also 2 
Farrand, 76.) 
Luther Martin's letter to Maryland Convention 
of which State he was Attorney General, I Elliot's 
Debates, 380: 
"Whether, therefore, any laws or regdlations 
of the Congress, any acts of its President or 
other officers, are contrary to, or not warranted 
by the Constitution, rests only with the judges, 
who are appointed by congress, to determine; by 
whose determination s every state must be bound." 
George Mason, 5 Elliot's Debates, 347: 
"It has been said (by Mr. L. Martin), that if 
the judges were joined in this check on the laws, 
they would have a double negative, sinceitheir 
expositorycapacity of judges they would have one 
negative. He would reply, that in this capacity 
they could impedein one case only the operation of 
laws. They could declare an unconstitutional law 
void." ( See also 2 Farrand, 78.) 
Gouverneur Morris 5 Elliot's Debates, 321: 
"Mr. Gouverneur Morris was more and more 
opposed to the negative. The proposal of it 
would disgust all the States. A law that ought 
to be negatived will be set aside in the judiciary 
department, and, if that security should fail, may 
be repealed by a national law." (See also 2 Farrand 
28.) 
5 Elliot's Debates, 355. 
"Legislative alterations not conformable to 
the federal compact would clearly not be valid. 
The judges would consider them as null and void." 
(See also 2 Farrand, 92). 
Carson's History,Supreme Court of the United 
States, 122, quotes Gouverneur Morris, "Address to. 
the Assembly of Pennsylvania against the abolition 
of the Charter pf the Bank of North America," de- 
livered in 1785, a s saying: 
"The boasted omnipotence of legislative author- 
ity is but a jingle of words. In the literal mean- 
ing , it is impious. And whatever interpretation 
lawyersmay give, freemen must feel it to be absurd 
and unconstitutional. Absurd, because laws can- 
not alter the nature of things; unconstitutional, 
because the Constitution is no more if it can be 
changed by the legislature. A law once passed 
in New Jersey which the judges pronounced to be 
unconstitutional, and therefore void. Such power 
in judges is dangerous; but unless it somewhere 
exists the time employed in framing a bill of 
rights and form of government was merely thrown 
away." 
Charles Pinckney (South Carolina Convention), 
4 Elliot's Debates, 25 7-8: 
"The judicial he conceived to be at once the 
the most important and intricate part of the 
system. That a supreme federal jurisdiction was 
indispensable, cannot be denied. * * * It 
may be easily seen that, under a wise management, 
this department might be made the keystone of 
the arch, the means of connecting and binding the whole together * * * that, in republics, 
much more (in time of peace) would always depend 
upon energy and integrity of the judicial than on 'i any other part of the government - that, to in- 
sure these, extensive authorities were necessary; 
particularly so were they in a tribunal constitu- 
ted as this is, whose duty it would be not only 
to decide all national questions which should arise within the Union, but to control and keep the State judicials within their proper limits whenever they shall attempt to interfere with its power." 
Edmund Randolph, 3 Elliot's Debate (Va. 
Convention), 205: 
"If Congrss wish to aggrandize themselves by 
oppressing the people, the judiciary must first be 
corrupted! No man says anything against them; they 
are more independent than in England." 
Edmund Randolph's letter to Washington, 
August 5, 1792 (10 Sparks' Life of Washington, 513): 
"It is much to be regretted, that the judici- 
ary, in spite of their apparent firmness in annul- 
ling the pension law, are not what sometime hence 
they will be, resource against the infractions of 
the constitutior on the one hand, rnd a steady as- 
serter of the federal rights on the other." 
Roger Sherman, 5 Elliot's Debates, 321: 
"Mr. Sherman thought it" (congressional power 
to negative all stete laws) "unnecessary, as the 
counrts of the States would not consider as valid 
any law contravening the authority of the Union, 
and which the legislature would wish to be negatived': 
(See also 2 Farrand, 27.) 
5 Elliot's Debates, 321 -2: 
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_''Mr. Sherman - Such a power involves a wrong 
principle - to wit, that a law of a state contrary 
to the Articles of the Union would, if not negatived 
be valid and operative." (See also 2 Farrand, 28.) 
John Rutledge (In Congress, 1802) endorsing 
Hamilton's views, said (4 Elliot's Debates. 446): 
"The complete independence of the courts of 
Justice is essential in a limited constitution; one 
containing specified exceptions to the legislative 
authority; such as that it shall pass no ex post 
facto law, no bill of attainder, etc. Such limita- 
tions can be preserved in practice no other way than 
through the courts of Justice, whose duty it must be 
to declare all acts manifestly contrary to the Con- 
stitution void. Without this, all the reservations 
of particular rights or privileges of the states 
or the peop.e would amount to nothing." 
James Wilson, 5 Elliot's Debates, 344: 
"It had been said, that the judges, as expositors 
of the laws, would have an opportunity of defending 
their constitutional rights. There was weight in 
this observation; but this power of the judges did 
not go far enough. Laws may be unjust, may be un- 
wise, may be dangerous, may be destructive , and yet 
may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the 
judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them 
have a share in the revisionary power, and they will 
have an opportunity of taking notice of those char- 
acters of a law, and of counteracting, bathe weight 
of their opinions,the improper views of the legis- 
lature. Mr. Madison seconded the motion." (See 
also 2 Farrand, 73). 
James Wilson, 2 Elliot's Debates (Pa.Convention) 
489: 
"The honorable gentleman from Cumberland (Mr. 
Whitehill) says that laws may be made inconsistent 
with the Constitution; and that therefore the powers 
given to the judges are dangerous. For my part,Mr. 
President, I think the contrary inference true. If 
a law should be made inconsistent with those powers 
vested by this instrument of in Congress,the judges, 
as a consequence of their independence, and the 
particular powers of government being defined, will 
declare such law to be null and void; for the power 
of the Constitution predominates. Anything,there- 
fore,that shall be enacted by Congress contrary 
thereto, will not have the force of law." 
Of the four framers of the Constitution, who 
during the debates in the .Federal convention or 
prior to its adoption expressed the opinion that 
Judges should not refuse to enforce unconstitutional 
laws, John Dickinson of Delaware changed his views. 
(See his later views quoted above.) 
Gunning Bedford of Delaware, John F. Mercer of 
Maryland and Richard Spaight of North Carolina were 
probably among the supporters of a council of re- 
vision (like the Federal Council of the German Em- 
pire), or a Congressional negative on State laws. 
VIII. The opposition to the Federal Constitution 
was led by three classes of popular leaders. 
Demagogues, like those who in Rhode Island 
ruled and preyed by playing upon the prejudices of 
the farmers as against the professional men, mer- 
chants and inhabitants of the towns. The dema- 
gogues advocated State bills of credit which were 
legal tender for their fiat value, but which were 
worthless in specie; stay laws; laws for the con- 
fiscation of loyalists' property, and others forms 
of State confiscation, repudiation, and spoliation 
q5. 
that the Federal Constitution was designed to and 
did put an end to. 
Patriots like Patrick Henry, who were ex- 
treme States rights men, and who believed that the 
new Ferderal Government armed with the purse in the 
power of direct taxation in lieu of requisitions 
upon the States; with the sword in the standing 
army and navy in lieu of requisitions for State 
militia, but without any bill of rights to restrain 
it from tyranny, would gradually absorb the rights 
of the States, and might suppress the rights of the 
citizen as well. 
Henry feared that the independence of the 
State judiciary would be destroyed, and that in the 
absenceof a bill of rights to restrain Congress, un- 
less the Federal courts rigidly upheld the Federal 
constitution, a consolidated congressional despotism 
might be substituted for the parliaaentary one that 
the revolution had overthrown. 
(3 E.-lliot s Debates, 49 -61, 137, 151 -5, 169, 314, 445- 
8, 539 -45; 4 Samuel Adams' Works (Cushing ed.), 324 -5 
333 -4). 
Melancton Smith, who in the New York Convention 
feared that Congress would interpret the constitution 
for itself, and thus create a consolidated congress- 
ional despotism, which the Federal Courts could not 
or would not cheep (Annulment of Legislation by 
Supreme Court, Horace A. Davis, 7 p merban Pol.Science 
Review, 575 -6.) 
Lawyers like Robert Yates, who claimed that 
the Federal Courts would gradually absorb the supreme 
power and subvert the State Governments. (Annulment 
of Legislation by Supreme Court, Horace A. Davis, 7 
!m.Pol. Science Review, 577 -9; see, also John Dick- 
inson's views quoted above.) 
The demagogues' fears have been forgotten. 
Henry's and Smith's fears were realised to 
some extent in the South during reconstruction: Yates b 
and Dickenson's fears have never been realised. 
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APPENDIX D. 
á TA`i'.ELIENT OF THE NEW YORK BI, R 1915. 
The Americ an revolution was a lawyers' revolu- 
tion to enforce the principle laid down in Lord Coke's, 
Lord Hobart's and Lord Holt's decisions that acts of 
parliament against common right or in violation of 
the natural liberties of Englishmen were void. Every 
colonial lawyer and some of the Royal Colonial Judges 
believed that Parliamentary taxation of the Colonies, 
without representation, although for imperial purposes, 
was unconstitutional. By the right of the sword, ES 
John Adams put it (IX Adam Works, 390 -1; Mcllwain, 
High Court of Parliament, pp.63. 309 -10), the Pmerican 
Revolution established Lord Coke's view of the common 
law as the constitutional law of the United States. 
It must be borne in mindthat after the repeal of the 
stamp act, the imperial import duty of threepence a 
pound upon tea, which led to the American Revolution, 
was intended to be laid for the service of the Imper- 
ial Government to make a more efficient Colonial 
Government and ultimately to support a Colonial army 
under the control of the British Cabinet, and not in 
any way for the local relief or benefit of the British. 
treasury. 
3 Lecky, England in the 18th. Century, 335, 
343 -58,370 -2. 
In Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 114a, Lord Chief 
Justice Coke says (118a): 
" And it appears in our books, that in many 
cases, the common law will control acts of parlia- 
pent, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly 
void; for when an act of parliament is against 
common right and reason, or repugnant, or im- 
possible to be perfonned, the common law will 
control it, and adjudge such act to be void." 
In Day v Savadge, Hobart, 85, headnote : 
"An act of parliament made against natural 
equity, as to make a man a judge in his own cause, 
is void." 
Lord Chief Justice Hobert says (87 a -b): 
"Because even an act of parliament, made 
against natural equity, as to make a man judge in 
his own case, is void in itself. 
In City of London v. Wood, 12 Modern, 669 , 
Lord Chief Justice Holt says (687): 
"It is againstall laws that the same person 
shouldbe party and judge in the same cause 
* The Judge is agent, the party is patient,and 
the same person cannot both be agent and patient 
in the same thing; but it is the same thing to 
say that the same man be patient and agent in the 
same thing, as to say that he may be judge and 
party; and it is manifest contradiction. And 
what my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's case, in 
his 8 Co. is far from any extravagancy, for it is 
a very reasonable and true saying, That if an act 
of parliament should ordain that the saine person 
should be party and judge, or, which is the same 
thing, judge his own cause, it would be a void 
act of parliament; for it is impossible that one 
should be judge and party, for the judge is to 
determine between party and party, or between the 
government and party; * * * but it cannot 
make one that lives under a government judge and 
party. An act of parliament may not make adultery 
lawful * * * ." 
6 Bacon's Abrdigment Statute (A) : 
"lf a statute be against common right or 
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed,'; 
the common law shall control it, and adjudge it to 
be void. 
"It has been holden, that a statute contrary) 
to natural equity, as to make a man judge in his own 
cause, is void * * * .'t 
4 Comyns's Digest, Parliament (R.27): 
"So where the words of an act of Parliament 
are against common right and reason, repugnant, or 
impossible to be performed, they shall be controlled 
by the common law." 
19 Viner's "_bridgment, Statuties (E.6), Con- 
struction of Statutes: 
"15. It appears in our books, that in sever- 
al cases the common law shall control acts of parlia- 
ment, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; 
for when an act of parliament is against common 
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to 
be performed, the common law shall control it, and 
adjudge it to be void." 
In the famous case of Monopolies, 11 Co., 84, 
86a -87b, Chief Justice Popham, and his associates 
held that a grant of the exclusive right to manu- 
facture playing cards within the realm was void as 
against the common law. Such a grant, although it 
was made by the crown, was in its essence only an 
act of legislation. It was a general prohibition. 
It forbade everybody but the patentee to manufacture 
i' :port or sell playing cards. The principle of the 
case was therefore an assertion of the judicial 
power to review the validity of legislative acts, 
whether by the crown or by the parliament. 
1761. James Otis, Writs of Assistance 
cases, Quincy, Mass. Rep. 474, says : 
"As to acts of Parliament: an act against the con- 
stitution is void: an act against natural equity is 
Void." 
(Quincy) 521 -7, Appendix by the late Mr. 
Justice Gray): 
"His" (Otis) "main reliance was the well known state 
ment of Lord Coke in Dr. Bonham's case - 'It appearet1 
in our books, that in many cases the common law will 
control Acts of Parliament and adjudge them to be 
utterly void; for where an Act of Parliament is 
against common right and reason or repugnant or im- 
possible to be performed, the common law will control e, 
it and adjudge it to be void' (Coke Rep. 118a). Otis 
seems also to have had in mind the equally familiar 
dictum of Lord Hobart - 'Even an act of Parliament 
made against natural equity, as to make a man judge in 
his own case, is void in itself * * * ' (Day 
v. Savadge) Hob.87). Lord Holt is reported to have 
said, 'What my Lord Coke says in Dr, Bonham's case 
in his 8 Rep. is far from any extravagancy, for it is 
a very reasonable and true saying, That if an act of 
Parliament should ordain that the same person should 
be party and judge, or what is the same thing, judge 
in his own cause, it would be a void act of Parliament 
(City of London v. Wood) 12 Mod. 687).' 
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"The law was 1 =:id down in the same way, on the 
authority of the above cases) in Bacon's Abridgment 
first published in 1735; in Viner's Abridgment, 
published 1741 -51, from which Otis quoted it; and 
in Comyn's Digest, published 1762 -7, but written 
more then twenty years before. And there are old - 
er authorities to the same effect. So that at the, 
timeof Otis's argument his position appeared to be 
supported by some of the highest authorities in 
the English law, (Bac.Ab. Statutes, A. Vin. Ab. 
Statutes, E'.6 p1.15; ante. 51; Com. Dig. Parliament 
R. 27 * * * ). The same doctrine was repeat -, 
euly asserted by Otis and was a favorite in the 
colonies before the Revolution." 
See, also, 2 John Adams' V$orks1525, 
appendix. 
1765. John Adams, in his argument on the 
memorial of Boston to the governor and council, said 
(Quincy Reports, 200): 
"The stamp Äct,I take it, is utterly void, and 
of no binding force upon us; for it is against our 
rights as men, and our privileges as Englishmen. 
An c ct made in defiance of the first principles of 
justice; an act which rips up the foundation of the 
British Constitution, and makes void maxims of 1800 
years standing. 
"Parliaments may err; they are not infallible ;' 
they have been refused to be submitted to. An act 
making the King's proclamation to be law, the exe- 
cutive power adjudged absolutely void." 
1776. John Adams' letter to William 
Cushing, June 9, 1776 (9 Adams'Works, 390 -1): 
"You have my hearty concurrence in telling the 
jury the nullity of acts of parliament, whether we 
can prove it by the jus gladi$ or not. I am deter- 
mined to die of that opinion, let the jus gladii 
say what it will." 
01- 
1765. Hutchinson, the Royal Chief Justice 
of Massachusetts, in 1765, speaking of the opposition 
to the stamp act, said (Quincy, Mass. Reports, 527): 
"The prevailing reason at this time is, that 
the act of Parliament is against Lagna Charta, and 
the natural rights of Englishmen, and therefore, 
according to Lord Coke, null and void." 
On September 12, 1765, Hutchinson wrote 
(Quincy, 441): 
"Our friends to liberty take advantage of a 
maxim they find in Lord Coke that an act of Parlia- 
ment against Magna Charta or the peculiar rights 
of Englishmen is ipso facto void." 
On February, 7, 1766, Cushing, one of the 
Royal Associate Justices, wrote Chief Justice Hutchin- 
son upon the question whether the courts should be 
opened without stamps (Quincy, 527 -8): 
"IT's true it is said an act of Parliament against 
natural equity is void. It will be disputed 
whether this is such an act. It seems to me the 
1 
main question here is whether an act which cannot 
be carried into execution should stop the course 
of justice, and that the judges are more confined 
than with respect to an obsolete act. If we admit', 
evidence unstamped ex necessiate Q. if it can be 
said we do wrong." 
1792. In Bowman v Middleton, 1 Bay (South 
Carolina) 252,254, it was held that an act of the 
Lseembly of South Carolina passed in 1712, transferr- 
ing a freehold from the heir -at -law of one Nicholls, 
and also from the eldest son and heir of John Cattel, 
.103 
deceased, and vesting it in a second son, William 
Cattel, was "Null and void * * *," "such an 
act being against common right and the principles 
of Magna Charta." 
Prior to the American Revolution so far 
were the English Courts from sustaining the later 
doctrine of parliamentary absolutism, that in the 
reign of James II, ten of the twelve judges of Eng- 
land held that the King was an absolute sovereign 
The change from Royal to Parliamentary absolutism 
shows that constitutional law is a living, growing 
thing. 
In Goäden v Hales, 2 Shower, 475, headnote: 
"The king of England might formerly dispense with 
any law, and therefore on a conviction on the 25 Car. 
2.c.2. for holding the office of colonel, without 
having taken thecaths, if the king granted the convict 
a dispensation, he might plead it in bar to an action 
by the informer for the penalty." 
The Lord Chief Justice in delivering the opinion 
of all the Justices of the King's Bench, as well as 
of all the justices of the Common Pleas nd Ex- 
chequer, except Street an d Powell, said (478): 
"the Kings of England were absolute sovereigns; that 
the laws were the king's laws; that the king had a 
power to dispense with any of the laws government as 
he saw necessity for it; that he was sole judge of 
the necessity; that no act of parliament could take 
away that power; that this was such a law. "" 
u4, 
The views of Coke, his associate Justices 
and their patriotic successors prior to the American 
..Revolution that Parliament was not omnipotent and 
that it was the duty of all courts to refuse to exe- 
cute acts of Parliament in contravention of the natural 
rights and liberties of free Britons, were adopted not 
merely by patriotic leaders like John Adams, Smmuel 
Adams and James Otis, but by Colonial legislatures, 
colonial and town conventions, and innumerable colon- 
ial town meetings' during a long series of years prior 
to 1776. 
James Otis drafted the address of the colon- 
ial convention of 1765, or stamp act congress, to the 
King, saying (Tudors Life of James Otis, 227): 
"To the English constitution these two principles 
are e ssential, the right of your faithful subjects 
freely to grant to your Majesty, such aids as are 
requireu for the support of your government over 
them, and other public exigencies; and trial by 
their peers. By the one they are secured from un- 
reasonable impositions, and by the other, from arbit 
rary decisions of the executive power." 
The congressional petition to the House of 
Commons says (Tudor's Life of James Otis, 228): 
"By these means, we seem to be in effect un- 
happily deprived of two principles essential to 
freedom, and which all Englishmen have ever con- 
sidered as their best birthrights, that of being 
free from all taxes but such as they have con- 
sented to in person, or by their representatives 
and of trial by their peers. " 
1 Samuel Adams' writings (Cushings ed.), In- 
Instructions of the Town of Boston to its represent - 
atives in the General Court, Septetber,1765 (pp.8 -9): 
"But we are more particularly alarmed and aston- 
ished at the act, called the stamp act, by which a 
very grievous and we apprehend unconstitutional tax 
is to be laid upon the Colony. 
"By the Royal Charter granted to our ancestors, 
the power of making laws for our internal govern - 
ment, and of levying taxes, is vested in the General 
Assembly: And by the same charter the inhabitants 
of this province are entitled to all the rights and, 
privileges of natural free born subjects of Great 
Britain: The most essential rights of British sub- 
jects are those of being represented in the same 
body which exercisesthe power of levying taxes upon 
them, and of having their property tried by juries: 
These are the very pillars of the British Constitu- 
*tion founded in the comon rights of mankind." 
1 Samueal Adams' Writings (Cushing's ed.), 
Answer of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts 
to the Governor's Speech, October 23, 1765 (pp. 16 -7): 
"You are pleased to say, that the stamp act is an 
act of Parliament, and as such ought to be observed 
t * * We hope we may without offence , put 
your Excellency in mind of that most grievious sen- 
tence of excommunication, solemnly denounced by the 
church, in the name of the Sacred Trinity, in the 
presence of King Henry the Third, and the estates 
of the realm against all those who should make 
statutes, or observe them, being made contrary to 
the liberties of the Magna Charta. We are ready 
to think that those zealous advocates for the con- 
stitution usually compared their acts of Parliament 
with Magna Charta; and if it ever happened that such 
acts were made as infringed upon the rights of that 
charter, they were always repealed. use * * * 
cannot but be surprised at an intimation in your 
speech, thet they will require a submission to an 
act as a preliminary to their granting relief from 
the unconstitutional burdens of it * * * . 
. "The Parliament has a right to make all laws with- 
in the limits of their own constitution; they claim 
no more. Your Excellency will acknowledge that 
there ire certain original inherent rights belong -' 
ing to the people, which the Parliament itself 
cannot divest them of, consistent with their own 
constitution: among these is the re- right of rep
sentation P in the same body which exercises the 
power of taxation. There is a necessity that the 
subjects of America should exercise this power with 
-in themselves, otherwise they can have no share in 
that most essential right, for they are not repre- 
sented in Pa4iament, and indeed we think it im- 
practicable." 
And further (p.18): 
"The right of the colonies to make their own 
laws and tax themselves has never been, that we know 
of, questioned; but has been constantly recognised 
by the King and Parliament. The very supposition 
that the Parliament, through the supreme power over 
the subjects of Britain universally, should yet con- 
ceive of a despotic power within themselves, would 
be most disrespectful * * * ." 
And further (pp. 19 -20): 
"They complain that some of the most essential 
rights of Magna Charta, to which as British subjects 
they have an undoubted claim, are injured by it: 
* * * that it may be made use of as a preced- 
ent for their fellow subjects in Britain for the 
future, to demand of them what part of their estc.tes 
they shall think proper, and the whole if they pleaée 
that it invests a single judge of the admiralty,with 
power to try and determine their property in con- 
troversies arising from internal concerns, without 
a jury, contrary to the very expression of Magna 
Charta; that no freeman sh,:.11 be amerced, but by 
the oath of good and lawful men of the vicinage; 
that it even put it in the power of an informer to 
carry a supposed offender more than two thousand 
miles for trial; and what is the worst of all evils, 
if his Majesty's American subjects are not to be 
governed, according to the known stated rules of the 
constitution, as those in Britain are, it is great- 
ly to be feared that their minds may in time become 
disaffected." 
1 Samuel Adams' Writings (Cushing's ed.), 
Resolutions of the House of Representatives of 
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Massachusetts, October 29, 1765 (pp. 23 -6): 
"Whereas the just rights of his Majesty's sub- 
jects of this Province, derived to them from the 
British Constitution, as well as the royal charter, 
have been lately drawn into question: in order to 
ascertain the same, this House do unanimously come 
into the following resolves: 
1. Resolved, That there are certain essential 
rights of the British Constitution of Government, 
which are founded in the law of God and nature, and 
are the common rights of mankind: therefore, 
2. Resolved, That the inhabitants of this Pro- 
vince are unalienably entitled to those essential 
rights in common with all men: and that no law of 
society can, consistent with the law of God and 
nature, divest them of those rights. 
3. Resolved, That no man can justly take the pro- 
perty of another without his consent; Fnd that upon 
this original principle, the right of representation 
in the some body which ex:rcises the power of making 
laws for levying taxes, which is one of the main 
pillars of the British Constitution, is evidently 
founded. 
4. Resolved, That this inherent right, together 
with all other essential rights, liberties, privil- 
eges and immunities of the people of Great Britain 
have been fully confirmed to them by Magna Charta, 
and by former and by later acts of Parliament. 
5. Resolved, That his Majesty's subjects in Amer- 
ica are, in reason and common sense, entitled to the 
same extent of liberty with his Majesty's subjects 
in Britain. * 
il. Resolved, That the only method whereby the con- 
stitutional rights of the subjects of this Province 
can be secure, cpnsistent with a subordination to 
the Supreme power of Great Britain, is by the con- 
tinued exercise of such powers of government, as 
are granted in the royal charter, and a firm adher- 
ence to the privileges of the same. 
0t 
12. Resolved, as a just cord_usion from some of 
the foregoing resolves, That all acts made by any 
power whatever, other than the General Assembly of 
this Province, imposing taxes on the inhabitants, 
are infringements of our ir4 erent and unalienable 
rights as men and British subjects, and render void 
the most valuable declarations of our charter." 
1. Samuel Adams' Writings (Cushing's ed.), 
House of Representatives of Massachusetts to the 
speakers of other Houses of Representatives, February 
11, 1768 (pp. 185 -6): 
"Thatïn all free states the constitution is 
fixed; and as the supreme legislative derives its 
power and authority from the constitution, it can- 
not overleap the bounds of it without destroying its 
own foundation * * * That it is an essential 
unalterable right in nature, ingrafted into the 
British constitution, as a fundamental law and ever 
held sacred and irrevocableby the subjects within 
the realm, that what a man has honestly acquired 
his own, which he may freely give, but cannot be 
thken from him without his consent: * * * 
"It is moreover their humble opinion, which 
they express with the greatest deference to the 
wisdom of the Parliament that the axts made there 
imposing duties on the people of this province with 
the sole and express purpose of raising e revenue 
are infringements of their natural and constitution- 
al rights because as they are not represented in the 
British Parliament his Majesty's Commons in Britain 
by those acts grant their property without their 
consent." 
2. Samuel Adams' Works, Report adopted by Town of 
Boston, November 20, 1772 (pp. 356 -7): 
"The absolute rights of Englishmen, and all 
freemen in or out of civil society, are principally, 
personal security, personal liberty and private 
property. * * * 
"The legislative has no right in absolute 
arbitrary power over the lives and fortunes of the 
people : Nor can mortals assume a prerogative, not 
only too high for men, but for Angls and therefore 
reserved for the exercise of the Deity alone - * 
"The Supreme power cannot justly take from 
any man, any part of his property without his con- 
sent, in person, or by his representative." 
see, also: 1 Samuel Adams' Writ- 
ings, 64 -5. Letter to Dennys 
DeBerdt, December 20, 1765. 
1 Samuel Adams' Writings, 90 -2, Letter 
of Town of Boston to Dennys 
DeBerdt, October 22 , 1766. 
1 Samuel Adams' Writings, 135- 6,139.147, 
Letter House of Representatives to 
Dennys DeBerdt, January 12, 1768. 
1 Samuel Adams' Writings,156 -7, Letter 
House of Representatives to Earl 
of Shelburne, January 15, 1768. 
1 Samuel Adams' Writings, 171, Letter 
House of Representatives to Mar- 
quis of Rockingham, January 12, 
1768. 
1 Samuel Adams' Writings, 174, Letter 
House of Representatives to Lord 
Camden, January 29, 1768. 
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1 Samuel Adams' Writings, 180, Letter 
House of Representatives to Farl 
of Chatham, February 2, 1768. 
1 Samuel Adams' Writings, 190, Letter 
House of Representatives to Conway, 
February 13, 1768. 
1 Samuel Adams' Writings, 196, Letter 
House Of Representatives to Lords 
Commissioners of the Treasury, 
February 17, 1768. 
1 Samuel Adams' Writings, 241 -4. The 
Convention of Mass. Town to Dennys 
BeBerdt, October 10, 1768. 
3 Samuel Adams" Writings, 68, Resolutions 
Town of Boston, November 5, 1773. 
3 Samuel Adams' Wriitiags , 90, Letter 
Committee of Correspondence of 
Mass. to Benjamin Franklin, March 
31, 1774. 
1 Samuel Adams' Writings ( Cushing's Ed.)) Letter of 
November 11, 1765 (p.28): 
"So that this charter" (of Massachusetts) "is 
to be looked upon, to be as sacred to them as Magna 
Charta is to the people of Britain; as it contains 
a declaration of all their rights founded in natural' 
justice. 
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"By this charter we have an exclusive right 
to make laws for our own internal government and 
taxation." 
And further (p.27): 
"In this charter, * * * there was a 
greater sacredness, than in those of the corpora- 
tions in England: because those were only acts of 
grace, whereas this was a contract, between the 
King and the first patentees; They promised the 
King to enlarge his dominion, on their own charge, 
provided that they and their posterity might enjoy 
such and such privileges. * * * Thuswe see 
that whatever government in general may be founded 
in, ours was manifestly founded in compact." 
And further (p.30): 
"The Stamp Act * 
infringement of the 
which the colonists 
doubted claim." 
* * is looked upon as an 
rights of Magna Charta, to 
as free subjects have an un- 
1 Samuel Adams Writings ( Cushing's ed.), Letter 
to John Smith, December 20, 1765 (p.55): 
"No man in the State of nature can justly 
take mother's property without his consent. It is 
an essential part of the British Constitution that 
the Supreme power cannot take from any man any part 
of his property without his consent in person or 
by his representative." 
1 Samuel Adams, Writings (Cushing's ed.) , Letter to 
Dennis DeBerdt, December 20, 1765 (p.64): 
"They hold themselves entitled to all the 
inherent, unalienable rights of nature, as men - and 
to all the essential rights of Britons, as subjects. 
The common essential ekghts of law of England, and 
the grand leading principes of the British Constitut- 
ion have their foundation in the laws of nature and 
universal reason. Hence one would think that 
British rights, are in a great measure, unalienably,, 
the rights of the colonists, and of all men else." 
And further (p.65) - 
"The primary, absolute, natural rights of 
Englishmen as frequently declared in acts of Par- 
liament from Magna Charta to this day, are personal 
security. personal liberty and private property, 
and to these eights the colonists are entitled by 
charters, by comrion law and by acts of Parliament. 
Can it then be wondered at that the act of levying 
stamp dutb s upon the colonies should be astonish- 
ing to them, since in divers respects it totally 
annihilates these rights. It is a fundamental 
principle of the British Constitution that the 
Supreme power cannot take from any man any part 
of his property without his consent in person or 
by representation." 
In connection with these citations attention 
should also be called to 
Loan Association v Topeka, 20 Wallace, 655, 
in which the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that a statute authorizing a municipality to issue bonds 
in aid of the manufacturing enterprise of individuls 
was void, because the taxes necessary to pay the bonds, 
would, if collected, be a transfer of the property of 
individuals to aid in the project of gain and profit 
to others rnd not for a public use. The Court say 
(p.663): "The theory of our governments State and 
National is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power 
anywhere." Mr. Justice Clifford dissented upon the 
ground that the legislative authority was absolute 
except so far as it was restricted by written 
constitutions. 
APPENDIX E. 
QUESTIONNAIRES AND RESOLUTIONS 
OF THE NEW YORK BAR 1915. 
Questionnaires in the following form were sent to 
over 180 leaders of thought and action, who collect - 
ively asserted in 1912 that judicial annulment is 
archaic, unique or obsolete. 
MY DEAR SIR: 
The New York State Bar Association Committee upon 
the duty of Courts to refuse to execute statutes in 
excess of or in contravention of the fundamental law,, 
;has learned that two out of our last three presidents, 
as well as many eminent judges and law school profes- 
sors have written books or pamphlets stating that the 
power the American Courts have exercised and do still 
exercise in refusing to enforce unconstitutional law 
is alleged to be unique and peculiar to the two Amer- 
icas. 
The Committee is desirous of ascertaining the 
historical accuracy or inaccuracy of the view above set 
forth in order that it may report the truth and the 
whole truth in relation thereto to the State Bar Assoc- 
iation at its next meeting. 
To those who think that the practice of refusing 
to enforce laws in excess of or in contravention of the 
fundamental/ 
!fundamental law is unique and peculiar either to this 
country or to North America and South America we sub- 
mit these questions: 
1. Prior to the French Constitution of 1791, 
which was followed by the constitutions of Austria, 
Belgium, Italy and Switzerland, prohibiting courts from 
passing upon the validity of legislation (Judge Oscar 
Hallam, Judicial Power to Declare Legislative Acts Void, 
48 American Law Review, 245 -7) , was there or was there 
not throughout the continent of Europe a prevalent idea'. 
that law was handed down from custom, and that where 
radical legislative innovations were proposed in dero- 
gation of those customs they were treated by the then 
court of last resort as void (a) during the middle ages . 
as in contravention of the ecclesiastical liberties or 
privileges of the church, and (b) prior to the French 
Revolution as in derogation of the natural rights 
theory of law? 
2. Has or has not the introduction of conscrip- 
tion for military service been generally followed by 
constitutional restrictions upon the power of courts to 
enforce fundamental laws by refusing the enforcement of 
statutes in derogation thereof? Has not the increase 
of arbitrary power based upon military force been 
generally followed by a diminution of such liberties 
as the courts theretofore preserved? 
3 ./ 
2, r5 
3. Have you considered Thomas Jefferson's view 
that prior to the adoption of the federal constitution 
state laws in contravention of the articles of con- 
federation were not enforceable (4 Life and Works of 
John Adams, 579 -80, note)? Have you considered the 
decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in 1509 unholding 
Jefferson's view that a state law in contravention of 
the articles of Confederation was unenforceable (U. S. 
v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115, 136 -141)? Have you con- 
sidered President Madison's refusal to prevent the 
execution of this judgment, and the House of Represent- 
atives and eleven states' refusal to entertain Penn- 
sylvania's appeal for a constitutional amendment to 
prevent the Supreme Court from declaring any more state 
laws to be unconstitutional (Ames, State Documents on 
Federal Relations, Nos. 22 -25) ? 
4. Have you considered John Adams' view that the 
13 United States had established by the right of the 
sword (9 John Adams' Works, 390 -1) the correctness of 
Lord Coke's view that acts of parliament in derogation 
of the rights of Englishmen were void and that the 
courts should refuse to enforce them (Quincy, Mass. 
Reports, 200, 441, 474, 521 -7; 1 Henry's Life of 
Patrick Henry, pp. 79 -106; 2 John Adams' Works, 525)? 
5. Have you considered the many Privy Council 
cases prior to the American Revolution, which refused 
to/ 
to execute Colonial laws (Colonial Appeals to the Privy 
Council. Schlesinger, 28 Political Science Quarterly, 
pages 279-297, 433 -50; Winthrop v. Lechmere, 1 Thayer's 
Cases on Constitutional Law, 34, 37 -39; 5 Pennsylvania 
Statutes at Large, 735 -7)? 
6. Have you considered the Privy Council, Common -'. 
wealth of Australia, Supreme Court of Canada, Supreme 
Court and Court of Appeals of New Zealand, and Indian 
decisions since the American Revolution, refusing to 
execute Dominion, Commonwealth, State and Colonial laws, 
and even one Legislative Act of the Governor General of 
India in council, as ultra vires? What, if any, is the 
difference between the highest court of an English 
Dominion or Commonwealth refusing enforcement of an 
act of the Dominion, Commonwealth, State or Colonial 
Parliament as ultra vires, and the Supreme Court of 
the United States refusing enforcement of an act of 
Congress or of a state Legislature as unconstitutional? 
Yours very sincerely, 
HENRY A. FORSTER, 
Chairman. 
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Only six of Mr. Holder's disciples have attempted 
! 
to champion the views on which so much of the campaign' 
of 1912 was based. Four of their letters follow. 
Some of those answering, critize the scope of the 
inquiry directed by the Association, the form of your 
Committee's questionnaires, as well as your Committee's 
attitude, generally adding that they favor making con -, 
stitutional amendments easier; that they favor elimina- 
ting the Fourteenth Amendment or due process of law 
from the Constitutions; also that they favor the recall 
of decisions. All the critical letters or parts of 
letters follow. 
In some instances, the authors of books or pamph- 
lets, containing the views above set forth, forgot what 
had written in 1912. 
Some letters show that their writers have wholly 
changed their minds since 1912. 
A distinguished historian and university professor. 
writes: 
I beg to acknowledge your circular letter relative' 
to the investigation of the relation of the courts to 
legislation. 
It is a subject which has been much in my mind in 
the last few years, and I have gathered various mater- 
ials and impressions upon it. That material is too 
voluminous, and time is too short, for me to undertake 
anything/ 
anything like a review of the subject, but I can answer 
off hand and without consulting data, some of your 
questions. 
If I understand the trend of your point of depart- 
ure, you assume that previous to the American Revolu- 
tion there was in the world a principle with regard to 
the relation of legislative power and judicial power 
which my small knowledge of the history of law'and 
jurisprudence does not verify. The main theory of 
government was that within each state there was one 
supreme power - whether King, Council or Diet. In 
England, for example, the judicial power was part of 
the royal authority, and so of the legislative. That 
a court, which was an emanation of the sovereign, would 
ever set aside a statute which was also the emanation 
of the sovereign, is totally contrary to that notion of 
power; and it may be observed that the world now seems 
to tend toward a restoration of that principle, - the 
referendum'and recall of judicial decisions acting 
together would practically come to that point. The 
lits de justice in France is a sufficient proof that 
the courts did not consider that they could contravened 
any edict proceeding from the superior law-making power 
An apparent exception was brought about by Mon - 
Itesquieu's entirely mistaken notion of a division of 
powers in the government of England, in 1730 or there -¡ 
abouts. No matter what Coke may have said, and in 
spite of the handful of tentative decisions or opinions 
by/ 
by English judges, the English courts were not a co- 
ordinate power having equal authority to judge of the 
validity of the statutes. The idea of the division of 
powers has much affected (and for the most part harm - 
fully) modern political organization particularly 
in the United States. 
Another deviation from the general principle of 
unity was brought about by federal government. In th 
so- called Holy Roman Empire, the royal legislative 
power was practically annulled, but not through any 
action whatever of the courts. I believe I am right 
in saying that neither the Hofgericht nor the Reich - 
skammergericht ever attacked the validity of an imper- 
ial ordinance, or of a vote of the Diet; nor so far 
as I am aware, did they ever interfere with the legis- 
lation of the states of the empire. The only practical 
application of the setting aside of statutes because 
controlled by some superior law, down to the Revolution, 
was in the relations of the English colonies with the 
Privy Council. Here the process seems to have sprung 
from the control of charters of commercial companies 
and other corporations, as cities and universities. 
Then the principle of ultra vires came in, and when 
such corporations grew to be little world governments 
in a distant part of the world, the principle followed 
them, and two of the colonial charters were set aside 
by the courts (Virginia (1624) and Massachusetts 
Bay/ 
itÜ 
Bay (1684) ). There were also occasional appeals frozñ 
the colonial courts to the Privy Council, but they seem 
to have accomplished little, and I have never been able 
to find an instance of a colonial statute set aside 
'because not in accordance with the colonial charter. 
The right to veto colonial acts for any reason that 
:seemed good to the English authorities, obscures if it 
does not exclude, any right to set laws aside as un- 
constitutional. The action of the Privy Council in 
such cases was, with few exceptions, never judicial but 
executive. 
The eight to ten cases in which state courts set 
aside state statutes between 1775 and 1789 are, in my 
judgment, the first definite application of the prin- 
ciple of judicial refusal to acknowledge the validity 
of a statute because inferior to another statute made 
by the same community. That is.a very significant dis- 
tinction from all colonial procedure. Writers on this 
subject seem totally to have overlooked the fact that 
even including the Rhode Island Paper Money case, every 
one of these issues was raised upon the irregular and 
temporary conditions of a civil war; every case but 
the Rhode Island case was based upon the special and 
abnormal status of Loyalists. Nevertheless there can 
be no doubt that those cases were in the minds of the 
framers of the Constitution; and that they expected the 
new federal courts to disallow state statutes because 
not/ 
not in accordance with the federal Constitution. Not -' 
withstanding recent efforts to prove the contrary, the 
history of the Convention firmly establishes this con - 
tention. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court, previous to the 
Dred Scott decision of 1857, never set aside an act of 
Congress except in the obiter dictum of 1803 and the 
Ferreira case of 1853 (both touching its own juris- 
diction), we may fairly conclude that the Supreme Court 
thought the power one to be exercised only at long 
intervals, and only in cases of grave import, so far as 
federal legislation was concerned. 
The practice of the three other federations of the 
English stock, and some of the relations of England with 
its colonies, are only lessons learned from practice in 
the United States, and throw no light upon the funda- 
mental principles of the British Empire previous to 1800. 
The action of France, and later of Switzerland and other 
countries, prohibiting judicial annulment of statutes, 
was not intended to repeal a previous practice or prin- 
ciple, but to prevent the application of the new Amer- 
ican idea to governments more or less resembling the 
government in the United States. 
A state leader of a great political party writes: 
I suppose your circular letter of June 20th is 
intended to elicit a reply. 
(1) In the middle ages the courts sometimes held 
ultra/ 
ultra vires the royal ordinance or statutes invading 
the privileges of the church or the authority of the 
courts. Such decisions generally ran counter to demo- 
cratic tendencies of the times. 
(2) The extension of parliamentary government in 
western Europe has synchronized with the limitation of 
the powers of the courts. It so happens that limita- 
tion of autocratic and ecclesiastic power has been 
accompanied by the levying of democratic military forces. 
(3 and 4) Surely the practice of American courts 
!in holding void statutes in violation of the Constitu- 
ltion is familiar to even those of us who are not lawyers 
by profession. 
(5) I know nothing of these cases. 
(6) Those of us who have been in the habit of 
asserting that the powers of American courts were 
tunique have referred primarily to the powers of English 
and other European courts. Do you mean that the Domin- 
ion courts in Canada and New Zealand and the high courts 
in Australia (I think we may consider British India 
negligible) exercise a jurisdiction in constitutional 
cases identical with that of the American courts? 
A prominent lawyer and chairman of an important 
committee in his party writes: 
Responding/ 
ILesponding to your circular letter of June l0th, 
issued as Chairman of the New York State Sax Associa- 
tion Committee, permit me, also, to ask a question. 
In my article I made this statement, "The differ- 
ence therefore between laws which are constitutional 
and unconstitutional, between what is 'due process of 
law' and what is not, in such cases involving the 
'police power,' does not depend upon any language in 
the Constitution. These cases are decided solely upon 
the opinion of the court as to whether the law is 
necessary for the general welfare and hence authorized 
by the 'police power.'" 
The power of the court thus exercised is not for 
the enforcement of any definite principle or custom, 
but the court acts as a reviewing body over the decision 
of the legislative body as to what is sound public 
policy. If the Constitution had read that Congress 
shall have the power to pass all laws necessary and 
proper but that Congress shall have no power to pass 
any bad laws, this necessarily would require some re- 
viewing body such as the Supreme Court to pass upon 
what was a bad law. You might think that such complete 
subjection of the legislature to the judiciary would 
1 
be unprecedented, yet how different is this from the 
power exercised in construing the phrase "due process 
of law"? Following this line of reasoning, the ques- 
tion I beg to ask is: "When the American courts refuse 
to/ 
2, 34.. 
to enforce laws not because of constitutional pro- 
hibition of the law in question, nor because it is in 
conflict with any established principle or custom, but 
because in the judgment of the Court the law does not 
present sound or accepted public policy -- is this 
power not unique and peculiar? 
Another question: When one considers the phrase 
"due process of law" as a constitutional restriction, 
is this not inexact? Whatever substance has been given 
this phrase (which in all candor is very little) has 
been given it by the judiciary. To refer to such a 
phrase as a constitutional restriction binding the 
courts and in the next breath to admit that its sole 
meaning is given it by the courts, seems to me to show 
that it is not at constitutional restriction at all. 
A appoints B his agent and gives him the power to do 
whatever in the judgment of C is necessary and proper, 
the limitation imposed upon B is not A's judgment (i.e., 
a constitutional prohibition) but C's judgment, and 
not C's judgment of what A wishes, but C's own opinion. 
Pardon me for going into this A, B, C discussion, 
but much argument concerning the power of the Courts to 
declare laws unconstitutional is confused by the joint 
consideration of the power of the Courts to enforce a 
specific constitutional prohibition and the power of 
the Court to superimpose its own judgment on that of 
the legislature. With the former there is little 
cause for complaint, with the latter there is very much 
I 
cause. 
A member of the Executive Committee of a great 
national party writes: 
I am, however, firmly of the personal opinion that 
the theory that the position of the American Courts 
when they have refused and do still refuse to enforce 
unconstitutional laws is both unique and peculiar as 
compared to the procedure of the continental courts. 
A prominent lawyer and distinguished law reformer 
writes: 
May I add that from my own standpoint the question- 
naise is not sufficiently important to justify the 
effort. Our learned Bar is apparently interested in 
two questions: First, usurpation by the courts; second., 
whether usurpation is unique. I long ago made up my 
mind that it was not usurpation, and I do not care 
whether it is unique. The main question is whether the 
system is one which practically works to the satis- 
faction of the people. That question will not be 
answered by any amount of learning devoted to answer - 
ing your academic questions. If I. were going to take 
úp the question of the relation of the courts to con - 
stitutional liberty, I should want to know whether it 
is advisable that our Constitution should contain such 
vague terms as "due process of law ", which the courts 
themselves cannot define and do not define, and whether 
'it/ 
it is advisable to leave it to the courts to determine 
whether any given law shall stand or fall when the 
court applies to it the test of a rule which the court 
itself cannot define, and which the legislator cannot 
know in a1vance. That, I take it, is the real question. 
It has two sides and on it opinions may differ. Your 
inquiries, however, seem to me to involve irrelevant 
learning of no special advantage either to the Bar or 
to the community, and the answers to which will serve 
no useful purpose. 
A university professor and prominent law reformer] 
writes: 
I have received your communication of Sept. 24th 
with reference to the power of the courts to refuse to 
enforce unconstitutional laws and thank you for it. 
In my article to which you refer I do not assert that 
this power is in itself unique and peculiar. )What I 
do assert is that the power as assumed by the courts 
to veto legislative acts under the XIV Amendment as 
not being "due process of law," is unjustified by the 
historical meaning of this phrase or by any of the 
rules of statutory construction. 
I think your inquiries are in grave danger of 
missing the main point raised by the proposed recall 
of judicial decisions, and of going off on a side issue. 
I would suggest that if you really desire to report the 
truth/ 
2.3 
truth and the whole truth to the State Bar Association, 
you give some attention at least to the historical 
accuracy or inaccuracy of the interpretation put on the, 
XIV Amendment which is the great source of abuse and 
usurpation of an unintended and unjustifiable discret - 
ionary veto on legislation. 
A distinguished Law School professor writes: 
I am very much obliged to you for your very in- 
structive letter of May 22nd. I hope that I may find 
time to answer your letter at more length later. Much 
can be and has been said on both sides of the question 
which you raise. I presume you have observed most of 
the articles referred to in "The Judicial Bulwark of 
the Constitution," by Frank E. Melvin in The American 
Political Science Review for May, 1914, page 167. 
Without attempting to discuss in detail the points you' 
raise, I suggest that most of the illustrations which 
you put are cases which involve conflict between legis- 
lation of a sovereign body and that of a body of limited 
powers. It does not seem to me that such illustrations ! 
are at all conclusive. The difference as to which you 
ask is that in one case legislation of a sovereign 
legislative body is declared unconstitutional. 
While your historical inquiry is of great interest, 
T am myself much more interested in the problem as to 
whether the exercise of the power in question, in ever 
increasing/ 
zag 
increasing degree, by courts composed entirely of 
members of a profession prone to be conservative does 
not unduly hamper democracy in the interest of privi- 
leged classes. Should the demand upon my time make it 
possible, I should hope to write you at greater length 
later. 
A prominent law reformer and Law School professor 
writes: 
I have been in receipt from time to time of a 
letter addressed to those who think that the practice 
of refusing to enforce laws in excess of or in contra - 
vention of the fundamental law is unique and peculiar 
to this country or to North America and South America. 
I am very grateful for this letter and the histor 
ical information and references therein contained. 
I should like to point out, however, that I do 
not fall in the class of persons to whom your letter 
is addressed. I think that I have on no occasion ex- 
pressed the view that the practice of our courts in 
declaring laws void was unique or peculiar. My idea is 
that it is a function performed by some governmental 
(body in practically all well- constituted governments. 
For instance, in England, a similar function is per- 
formed by the House of Lords. That is so constituted 
as to represent property interests. It has had until 
recently an absolute veto power on all laws passed by 
the/ 
the Commons. Naturally any action by the courts in 
declaring laws void became entirely unnecessary. 
In this country, where we have had no second 
chamber so constituted as to represent property in- 
terests and the conservative elements, we have been 
forced to work out a similar function in another way, 
namely, by prohibition in our constitutions and the 
action of courts in declaring laws void which contravene 
those provisions. All this you will find set forth 
somewhat more at length in Chapter XVI of my little 
book on Unpopular Government in the United States. 
The recall of judicial decisions raises precisely 
the same question as was raised by the recent House of 
Lords Act in England. The movement for some process 
for steam rollering the judicial veto of our Supreme 
Courts is precisely the same as the successful agita- 
tion in favor of a process of steam rollering the veto 
of the House of Lords. 
Whether other countries work out the protection of 
property interests against a popular legislative chamber 
by the legislative veto of a second chamber branch of 
the legislature or by constitutional prohibitions and 
their enforcement by judges, seems to me by itself a 
futile inquiry as compared with the merits of the real 
question "Should property interests be protected from 
the action of a popular assembly; how far should they 
be protected, and what is the best method of such 
protection?" 
A/ 
A distinguished Law School professor, political 
reader and author writes: 
Your letter of May 22nd is received. I have never 
taken veru much interest in the question whether the 
power of our courts to declare acts which they believe 
contrary to the Constitution, void, is or is not a 
power which is "unique and peculiar to the two Americas." 
You evidently have addressed the letter to me under a 
misapprehension of my opinion. I have always believed ! 
that whatever the practice in other nations or whatever 
the opinion on this question, of those who drafted the. 
Constitution of the United States and the earlier state 
constitutions, the position of Marshall, in Marbury v. 
Madison, is sound and indeed vital to our preservation 
as a federal state. * * I believe that there 
is no answer to the position that if the Constitution 
says one thing and the legislature says another, that 
the judges must follow the Constitution. I suppose that 
you addressed the letter to me because I am in favor of 
what has been miscalled the Recall of Judicial Decis- 
ions on constitutional questions. I believe that if 
a law contrary to the Constitution is desired by the 
people who have made the Constitution, there is no 
,reason why they should not, after due deliberation, have 
the law which they desire and to that extent suspend 
'the Constitution which they themselves have adopted. 




Constitution. I do not suppose that you or any of 
your Committee desire to place the judge in the posi- 
tion of having the last and final say as to what should 
be our fundamental law. Under our system of govern- 
ment, whether you prefer the machinery of formal amend- 
ment or of the so called recall of judicial decisions 
on constitutional questions, you must, unless you 
desire to establish a judocracy for a democracy, allow; 
the people to determine their fundamental law. 
I am much interested in the references which you 
give in your letter, on the purely historical question 
at issue, that is, whether the doctrine is peculiar to 
this country and whether Marshall took a position whic1 
was essentially new. It appeals to me that if your 
Committee desire to come to a conclusion which will be 
generally received as correct, your questions should 
not be so framed as to give the recipient the idea that 
you have already conclusively made up your mind. * * 
The distinguished author of Majority Rule and the 
Judiciary (by William L. Ransom), which book states 
(pp. 28 -9): "Under the American constitutional system, 
the most important issues of sovereign powers and 
policies are permitted to depend on the outcome of 
private suits between individuals - issues that in 
any other government could not be raised in any court 
at all," writes: 
On/ 
14. 
On my return to New York after an extended absence 
in the Canadian. woods, I find at my office several 
copies of your circular inquiry in behalf of a Special 
Committee of the New York State Bar Association on 
constitutional topics, of which Special Committee you 
are the head. I do not know of anything that I have 
ever written or publicly said which could bring me with 
in the purview of the first paragraph of your circular, 
letter, and therefore do not undertake reply thereto 
or comment thereon. I do not recall that I have ever 
written or said anything predicated upon assumption of 
the correctness or incorrectness of the view which you 
challenge. I am greatly interested in the collection 
of authorities which you have made upon the subject, 
and am obliged to you for sending me a co py of your 
circular letter. 
The President: 
What is your pleasure with the report and the 
resolution? 
Everett P. Wheeler, of New York: 
I move the report be accepted, the resolutions b 
adopted and the committee continued. 
Alfred Hayes, of Ithaca: 
Mr. President, I would like to state why I will 
vote against the second resolution. The statement made 
here is that this is the only peaceful means of avoid- 
ing/ 
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avoiding conflict between the Constitution and the 
rights and duties of the federation and the legislation 
in forty-nine legislative units, as well as to uphold 
and enforce the bill of rights. This is untrue. This 
ris due not only to the failure of this committee to 
observe the distinction between those two things, the 
problems of a federal organization and the enforcement 
of a bill of rights in the case which they cite, be- 
cause practically none of the cases can be pretended to 
relate to the upholding of the bill of rights, but also', 
to their failure to observe the limits of their own 
resolution, which was to examine the historical origin 
!, 
of the subject and to their making a recommendation 
which is purely political in character. I submit that 
an untrue statement is made, because so far as the bill 
of rights is concerned the proposition is not identical', 
with the question of the relative rights of a federa- 
tion and the units making it up. The federal organi- 
zation is not involved, and as to a bill of rights it 
is obviously untrue in view of such considerations as 
those presented in a paper which I had the pleasure of 
hearing, for example, at the recent joint meeting of 
the American Association of Law Schools and the Assoc - ì 
iation of Political Science at Chicago, by Professor 
Dodd of the University of Illinois, as to political as 
distinguished from judicial safeguards of the funda- 
mental liberties and rights of the people. I wish to 
say/ 
say, however, that this report is a very valuable pres- 
entation of historic material and substantially it is 
conclusive on the majority of points involved. I think 
it regrettable that the committee should take a polit- 
ical position which really manifests a lack, I take it, 
of appreciation of what was the real significance of 
the movement with reference to the recall of judicial 
decisions. I shall vote against this second resolution, 
not because of general lack of sympathy, but because I 
think such a sweeping and inaccurate statement ought 
not to receive the sanction of a body which is fair 
'minded and regards all sides of a question of this kind. 
Francis Lynde Stetson, of New York: 
Mr. President, I ask for a division of the subject', 
first, on the acceptance of the report and then a vote 
on the resolution. 
The President: 
The question is on the acceptance of the report. 
The report was duly accepted. 
The President: 
Now then on the resolution, are you ready for the 
resolution. I will submit the first resolution. It 
reads: 
"Resolved, That in federations possessing a 
written fundamental law, it is the duty of the 
Courts to uphold the fundamental law as against 
legislation in contravention thereof by refusing 
to/ 
zs 
to enforce, as ultra vires or unconstitutional, 
all statutes in excess of or in contravention 
of the fundamental law, save and except where 
the written fundamental law of the federation 
confers upon the Federal Council, or some body 
with the powers of a Federal Council, plenary 
and exclusive jurisdiction to determine con- 
flicts between the fundamental law and ordinary 
statutes, as well as to enforce the bills of 
rights." 
Those in favor of the adoption of that resolution 
will say aye. 
The resolution was duly adopted. 
The President: 
The second resolution reads: 
"Resolved, further, That in a Federal 
democratic republic, with forty-nine legisla- 
tive units (one federation and forty -eight 
States), either judicial review or else a 
supreme Federal Council with plenary power to 
revise, veto, annul or suspend all legisla- 
tion, both Federal and State, either in whole 
or in part, is the only peaceful means of re- 
solving the inevitable conflicts between the 
Constitution and the rights and duties of the 
federation and the legislation in forty-nine 
legislative units, as well as to uphold and 
enforce the bill of rights." 
24 
Francis Lynde Stetson, of New York: 
Mr. President, I trust in view of the importance 
of this particular resolution that we may have ten 
minutes allowed got discussion. I would like for my 
own information to get a little further statement - on 
the point, if the gentleman from Ithaca is correct. 
I do not want to be put in a wrong category. 
Henry A. Forster, of New York: 
Mr President, the situation is practically this: 
There have been two alternatives that have been worked 
out in different countries that are federations, one 
is what we call judicial review, and the other is 
federal council which might act in a doublt capacity 
as in the English government or German Empire with a 
federal council with plenary powers, or as in the 
British Empire a court of last resort for the colonies,' 
and now for Ireland. That in Germany is a sort of 
conciliation court of constitutional dispute. The only 
scheme that I have over heard agitated anywhere else 
is the Australian scheme. The court review was tried 
in Australia and caused a good many people to be dis- 
satisfied, but the voters of Australia refused on 
referendum to submit to the giving of plenary power to 
the Federal Parliament. Therefore this may be and un- 
doubtedly is a direct resolution against the recall of 
judicial decisions to which this Association by a large 
majority/ 
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majority has previously committed itself. 
Charles A. Boston, of New York: 
Mr. President, I would like to ask Mr. Hayes 
whether he would have us understand that his objection 
to this resolution is the use of the word ."only," 
whether he would have us understand that he thinks 
that there are other means of accomplishing the same 
end and whether one of these means is the popular re- 
call of judicial decisions. I inquire for information 
only. 
Alfred Hayes, of Ithaca: 
My objection is primarily to the word "only" both 
because it involves a large political discussion and 
also because, while I did not myself, I think, have 
primarily in mind the idea of recall of decisions 
(I never have advocated that, though I have pointed 
out at Boston and elsewhere that it was merely a method 
of amending the Constitution by popular vote in a dif- 
ferent form from the usual one as respects legislation 
involving the police power). I had in mind rather the 
use of the word "only" as being incorrect in ignoring 
all other methods. It seems to me an inaccurate state -' 
ment of the effect of political safeguards. Thus, for 
instance, the report itself shows that the House of 
Lords being a body representative of the different 
classes in the community, largely a hereditary group 
of/ 
44 ó 
of property owners, is itself a sufficient protection. 
Mr. Doddts paper to which I referred has no reference 
in it whatever to the recall of judicial decisions in 
dealing with political safeguards. I am reminded in 
answering the question of what Judge Riddell said to 
us at New York when it had been strongly asserted that 
if we did not have this particular means of protection, 
anarchy and confiscation would inevitably result. He 
said that no such result had occurred in Canada or in 
any other of those countries in which no such judicial 
power exists. I am not saying that our constitutional 
system may not be better. Being a professor of con- 
stitutional law I am not attacking constitutional law; 
I do not feel disposed to attack at all the judicial 
safeguards; I am sayint. that it is a mistake for this 
body to make a political statement of this kind, which 
is not consistent with political science because, un- 
doubtedly, other forms of government do not find this 
method necessary. Germany does not, France does not, 
Great Britain does not. It is not an accurate state- 
ment to say it is the only means of safeguarding rights. 
I think the word "only" ought to be eliminated from the 
resolution for the sake of scientific accuracy if for 
nothing else. 
Francis Lynde Stetson, of New York: 
Mr. President I mote to strike out the word "only" 
and/ 
and insert in lieu of "the only peaceful means" the 
words "the effective and preferable means." 
Henry A. Forster, of New York: 
May I ask what means you suggest? 
Mr. Stetson: 
I don't know any other, I know this is the effect- 
ive one and the preferable one. I regard it as an 
effective one and the preferable one. 
Charles A. Boston, of New York: 
T second Er. Stetson's motion. 
The President: 
The amendment is accepted by Mr. Boston represent- 
ing the committee, the question is now on the adoption 
of the resolution. 
The resolution was duly adopted. 
The President: 
The question is now on the third resolution: 
"Resolved, further, That the experience 
of 134 years of Court review of unconstitutional 
or ultra vires laws has demonstrated that not 
only the citizens of the United Stated, but 
those of the British Empire and of several 
other countries as well, where there is no 
Federal Council with plenary power to veto, 
annul/ 
annul, repeal or suspend laws, prefer Court 
review to the establishment of a Federal 
Council with absolute power to veto, annul, 
repeal or suspend all or part of any legis- 
lation, State or Federal." 
Are you ready for the question? 
The resolution was duly adopted. 
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